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ABSTRACT 
A sizeable recent literature has convincingly demonstrated that the quality of 
institutions is a fundamental determinant of economic growth. However, there is still 
much debate on the determinants of institutional quality and the channels through 
which it influences economic policies and growth. This thesis aims to contribute to this 
debate by focusing on three selected themes. The three papers are enveloped in a 
stage-setting survey of the wider literature on institutional change and economic 
growth, and a concluding chapter which summarizes the key findings and makes 
suggestions for further research.    
The approach of the three papers is empirical in nature, but the model 
formulation is well informed by the relevant theory. The empirical analysis is based on 
annual panel data covering a large number of countries at varying stages of 
development and the models are estimated using state-of-the-art econometric 
methodology, paying particular attention to potential endogeneity of the explanatory 
variables.  
The first paper (Chapter 2) investigates the implications of the composition of 
government revenue for the quality of political institutions. It is found that an increase 
in tax revenue increases political openness, whereas higher natural resource rents are 
detrimental to democracy. These relationships, however, become less pronounced 
with an increase in the level of GDP per capita.  Overall, the findings are consistent 
with the historical political-economy literature which postulates that fiscal imperatives 
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of the state are the driving force for the development of democratic systems of 
government. 
The second paper (Chapter 3) examines the implications of foreign trade 
exposure for the quality of economic institutions as represented by the extent of 
corruption and bureaucratic quality. The novelty of the analysis is the estimation of the 
impact of trade intensity (trade to GDP ratio) on institutional quality conditional on the 
nature of the trade policy regime. The results indicate that increased trade intensity 
improves institutional quality only in the context of liberalized trade policy regimes. 
There is also evidence that the dependence on exports of natural resources is harmful 
for institutional quality, but liberalization of the policy regime has the potential to 
mitigate this adverse impact. The findings are consistent with the predictions relating 
to the determinants of institutional quality in the ‘rent-seeking’ and ‘resource-curse’ 
literatures.  
The third paper (Chapter 4) explores the implications of political openness and 
corruption for the size and the growth impact of public-sector infrastructure 
investment. Based on a public choice literature, it is hypothesized that the relationship 
between institutional quality and public investment differs across democratic and 
autocratic countries. The results suggest that corruption enhances public investment in 
fixed capital, only in countries with autocratic regimes. Moreover, the growth impact 
of public investment in fixed capital is also negative only in these countries; the 
negative impact, however, is mitigated as autocratic countries become more politically 
open. These findings point to the suboptimal nature of the use of public funds in 
autocratic countries. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Context 
The study of the evolution and the impact of institutions has a rich tradition going back 
to a seminal paper by Ronald Coase (1960). Coase observed that when social and 
private costs diverge, markets may not facilitate all transactions. In other words, due 
to the presence of transaction costs, the efficient markets predicted by neoclassical 
theory do not exist. Therefore ‘social arrangements’, within the context of which 
individual decisions are taken, are important. Since then a great deal of scholarly work 
has taken note of this insight and attempted to refine the neoclassical theory which, in 
its original form, ignores the implications of different institutional arrangements. 
Douglass North brought the analysis of institutions into the mainstream through a 
series of famous works (1981, 1989, 1990, 1994, 2005 and others). In fact, North 
suggests that any fruitful approach to the study of economic development should be 
built around an analysis of institutional change. Recently one of the most talked about 
books emerging in the development literature, Why Nations Fail by Daron Acemolu 
and James Robinson (2012), reflects an ever increasing interest in this line of enquiry.  
Over the last couple of decades, institutional quality has also found its way into 
the vast empirical growth literature which is based on both the neoclassical and 
endogenous theory of growth.1 In this literature it has become a standard practice to 
include institutional quality as a key variable to explain differences in the level and 
                                                             
1 See for example Mauro (1995), Hall and Jones (1999), Acemoglu et al (2001), Easterly 
and Levine( 2002), Rodrik et al (2004) amongst others 
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growth of income per capita across countries. This has been facilitated by the 
widespread availability of subjective indicators measuring institutional quality. There is 
now a broad consensus that institutions matter in explaining differences in economic 
performance among countries (e.g. Temple 1999, Rodrik et al 2004, North 2005a and 
b, Acemoglu and Robinson 2012). Following the substantial contemporary research 
interest in institutional analysis, international lenders and donor agencies have also 
incorporated institutional development for developing countries into their agendas.2  
There is, however, still a great deal of debate on the processes through which 
institutions originate and evolve. It has been recognized that Western institutions 
cannot be simply transplanted into developing countries (e.g. Lin 2009, Sen 2013). 
Furthermore there is still much scope in identifying the different ways and channels 
through which institutions influence economic policies and growth. This thesis tries to 
place itself within the rich tradition of institutional analysis, and hopes to shed light on 
certain aspects of firstly, institutional change and secondly, the impact of institutions. 
Relating to institutional change I investigate the impact of economic policy on 
the quality of institutions. A substantial portion of the literature considers institutions 
to be determined by historical experience stretching back many decades and even 
centuries.3 The inferences of these studies do not, therefore, provide much hope for 
institutional improvement through policy action over a shorter span of time. Economic 
policy is a tool in the hands of the government primarily designed to achieve economic 
and social objectives, often with little consideration of its consequences for 
                                                             
2 See for example World Development Report (2002) of the World Bank. 
3 Shirley(2005) provides a brief but comprehensive survey of this literature 
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institutional quality. However, it is worthwhile to examine the implications of these 
policies for the quality of institutions, given the now widely accepted importance of 
institutional quality for economic development. Any evidence that is able to 
demonstrate a causal impact of economic policy on institutional quality potentially has 
profound policy implications; it would point towards practical guidance regarding the 
role of public policy in achieving institutional improvement.   
The impact of institutions on economic performance has been more widely 
studied; there is a vast literature on not only the consequences of institutional quality 
for economic growth, but also on the link between the institutional environment and 
the formulation of public policy (e.g. Mulligan et al 2004). Any study about the impact 
of institutions could take many possible directions given their pervasive influence on 
every facet of economic performance. This thesis tries to contribute towards a very 
specific literature investigating the role of institutional quality in determining the size 
and growth impact of public investment. The manner in which public investment is 
directed in an economy is one of the most important components of public policy – it 
is an extremely potent tool in the hands of a government for shaping the future social 
and economic environment of a country. Therefore any new evidence concerning the 
institutional determinants of the size and productivity of public investment might hold 
significance for policy making, and shed light on an important channel through which 
institutions affect economic growth.  
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1.2 Organization and Methods 
 
This thesis follows the ‘three research papers’ approach. The three papers follow this 
introductory chapter and constitute the bulk of the thesis. Each of the papers, while 
set in the context of institutional analysis, are self-contained and can be considered 
independently of each other. The endogeneity of institutional quality to economic 
variables is explored in the first two papers, while the impact of institutional quality is 
investigated in the third. 
The first paper (Chapter 2) examines the implications of the nature of 
government revenue for political institutions, where the quality of political institutions 
is defined in terms of political openness (the degree of democracy). Government 
revenue is grouped into two types: tax revenue and non-tax revenue. It is 
hypothesized that a greater reliance on tax revenue increases political openness. On 
the other hand, a government’s ability to fulfill its revenue needs through other 
sources of revenue, such as extraction of natural resource rents (as in the so called 
‘rentier states’), has negative consequences for democracy. The hypothesis is set 
within the context of the literature on ‘fiscal sociology’ (e.g. Schumpeter 1918, Herb 
2003, Moore 2004, Besley and Persson 2013), which attributes democratization to the 
fiscal imperatives of the State. 
The second paper (Chapter 3) investigates the impact of exposure to foreign 
trade on the quality of economic institutions. The dimensions of economic institutions 
considered for the purpose of the analysis are the extent of corruption and the quality 
of the bureaucracy. It is hypothesized that increased trade intensity (the trade to GDP 
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ratio) resulting from liberalization of the trade policy regime is beneficial for 
institutional quality; it reduces corruption and improves the quality of the bureaucracy. 
However, an increase in trade intensity in the context of an interventionist trade policy 
regime is harmful for institutional quality, because it opens avenues for rent-seeking. 
The hypothesis is motivated by lessons emerging from the large ‘rent-seeking’ 
literature (e.g. Tullock 1967, Krueger 1974, Buchanan 1980, Bhagwati 1980), which 
points out that any government-imposed restriction on economic activity has negative 
consequences for institutional quality. 
The final paper (Chapter 4) explores the implications of corruption and political 
openness for the quantity and quality of public investment. Based on a literature on 
‘public choice’ (Mohtadi and Roe 2003, Plumper and Martin 2003, Hausken et al 2004 
and Deacon 2009), it is hypothesized that political economy considerations influence 
patterns of rent-seeking in the use of public funds. Therefore the relationship between 
corruption and the size as well as the growth impact of public investment depends on 
the degree of political openness.  
The primary contribution of all three papers is empirical in nature, but the 
model formulation is well informed by the relevant theory. Using panel data at the 
cross-national level for a large number of countries at varying stages of development, 
the studies attempt to establish a statistical relationship between the variables of 
interest based on careful econometric methodologies. In each paper, the estimation 
sample consists of around one hundred countries; the country coverage is dictated by 
availability of data for all the key variables. The time coverage stretches over the past 
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two to three decades only, as the focus of the thesis is contemporary rather than 
historical. 
The main estimation technique employed in each of the chapters is the fixed 
effects technique (FE) widely used in the empirical literature. This estimation strategy 
controls for country-specific fixed effects that could plausibly be correlated with both 
the explanatory and the dependent variables in order to capture the within-country 
impact of the explanatory variables. However, FE does not address potential reverse 
causality from the dependent to the explanatory variables; hence caution is needed in 
inferring causality based on the estimated coefficients (Acemoglu et al 2008). 
Therefore in each chapter a system Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) approach 
is employed to supplement FE. The technique involves joint estimation of the 
econometric equation in both levels and first differences of the variables (Roodman 
2009a). System GMM consistently estimates a causal relation through the use of a set 
of internal instruments, consisting of the appropriate number of lagged levels and first 
differences, which identifies the exogenous variation in the explanatory variables. The 
use of this set of instruments also ensures consistent estimation in the presence of 
temporary measurement error; it is quite plausible that the institutional quality 
variables, which are based on subjective assessment, are measured with error.  
 
1.3 The Literature 
In each of the papers the hypotheses are motivated through a thorough and critical 
review of the existing literature. This helps to identify the gaps, as well as provide the 
theoretical basis and the analytical framework for the empirical analysis. In this sub-
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section I only briefly discuss the existing literature on institutional analysis in relatively 
broad terms in order to clarify the definition of institutions and place the thesis in the 
overall context of the related literature. 
1.3.1 Definition of Institutions 
What exactly are institutions? How can we measure or compare their quality? 
According to the definition proposed by North (1990, p.3) that is now widely accepted 
and used, institutions are the humanly devised constraints that shape human 
interaction. These include formal rules, informal norms and their enforcement 
mechanisms. The manifestations of institutions include the political regime, the judicial 
system, the bureaucratic and administrative system, systems for economic regulation 
and even culture.  
Every political or economic exchange between individuals or different 
segments of society involves transaction costs — the costs of defining what is being 
exchanged and then enforcing the agreement. The institutional structure determines 
these costs and thus facilitates transactions. In economic terms institutions shape the 
incentives of people to work, save, invest or carry out entrepreneurial activity. 
Economic activity would be prohibitively costly in the absence of rules such as those 
that ensure protection of property rights and enforce contracts between individuals. 
How these sets of rules are designed and enforced impact incentives and are thus a 
binding constraint. Institutional change transforms these constraints.  
Institutions in the sense defined above are an abstract arrangement of rules, 
and can be easily confused with more concrete and specific structures. North (1990, 
1994) introduces a distinction between institutions and organizations, which clarifies 
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the issue. If institutions are the ‘rule of the game’, then organizations are the ‘players’. 
Organizations are defined by North (1994, p.361) as “groups of individuals bound 
together by some common purpose to achieve certain objectives. Organizations 
include political bodies (e.g., political parties, the Senate, a city council, regulatory 
bodies), economic bodies (e.g., firms, trade unions, family farms, cooperatives), social 
bodies (e.g., churches, clubs, athletic associations), and educational bodies (e.g. 
schools, universities, vocational training centers).”  
For the purpose of measurement, it is also important to distinguish between an 
institutional structure that reflects rules, and the actual outcomes. As an example, a 
formal trichotomy of power between the executive, legislature and the judiciary, along 
with electoral rules is the basic institutional structure of a democracy, but how well the 
system actually functions in practice is the outcome. Countries with similar 
constitutions on paper are often perceived to have different degrees of democracy. 
Similarly a bureaucracy is an institutional structure meant to enforce policies and 
regulations, but its perceived efficiency is the outcome. The extent of corruption in a 
society too is an outcome of a weak institutional structure; corruption distorts 
incentives, reflects insecure property rights and weak contract enforceability (Aidt 
2003). Ideally we want to assess the quality of institutions set up but these are 
impossible to quantify, and hence we have to measure outcomes, based on subjective 
perceptions reflected in survey data such as that collected by the Political Risk Services 
(PRS) group or the Polity project. While survey data has its weaknesses, for the 
purpose of this study it is institutional quality as it is perceived that matters. The fact 
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that this survey data is widely used by investors to judge the institutional environment 
of a country also shows a revealed preference for its use (Ades and Di Tella 1997).  
1.3.2 Political and Economic Institutions 
We can distinguish between two broad categories of formal institutions: political and 
economic. In the works of both North (1990, 1991, 1994) and Acemoglu at al (2005d, 
2006b, 2012) political institutions underlie economic institutions, although the 
causality runs both ways. Political institutions determine the balance of power in 
society between the state and the citizenry, and between different interest groups. 
The economic institutions created by those holding political power govern economic 
interactions by specifying the property rights structure and contract enforcement 
mechanisms. Thus the economic institutions that come into being determine economic 
performance and the subsequent distribution of resources, which has a feedback 
effect on political institutions.  
The interplay between economic and political institutions has been 
investigated by previous studies (e.g. Giavazzi and Tebellini 2005, Rock 2008, Leftwich 
and Sen 2011, Giullano et al 2013). In Chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis, which explore the 
endogeneity of institutional quality to policy, the focus is not on the relative 
importance of political and economic institutions or on which type of institution 
precedes the other. Rather, both kinds of institutions are considered as parallel and 
independent, and changes in either due to economic policy variables are investigated 
through separate analyses in different chapters. However in Chapter 4, which pertains 
to the impact of institutional quality, the interaction between political and economic 
institutions is explored. 
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1.3.3 Institutions and the Empirical Growth Literature 
The proximate causes of variation in growth across countries and over time are 
differences in physical and human capital accumulation, and total factor productivity. 
However, the proximate determinants are themselves endogenous. Institutions are 
considered to be amongst the more fundamental determinants. Hall and Jones (1999) 
document that variation in capital accumulation and productivity can be explained by 
variation in, what they label as, social infrastructure (institutions and policies). They 
employ a Solow style level accounting framework to show that institutions and policies 
explain the variation in total factor productivity in a cross country empirical 
investigation. Hence they present a theory in which institutions play the central role in 
explaining economic development.  
The influential paper by Acemoglu et al (2001) is the first empirical study to 
establish a causal link from institutions to economic performance. Rodrik et al (2004) 
conduct an empirical horse race between institutional quality and two other possible 
deep determinants of economic growth, namely trade integration and geography. 
They find that of the three potential deep determinants only institutions have a direct 
effect on growth. Once institutions are controlled for, geography and integration have 
no direct significant effect. These ‘deeper determinants’ only affect income per capita 
through their influence on institutions i.e. both geography and trade policy determine 
institutional quality which, in turn, is the primary determinant of economic 
performance. Easterly and Levine (2002) reach similar conclusions while comparing 
institutions with endowments and policies.  
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1.3.4 Institutional Change 
The relevant question then is what determines the quality of institutions? The studies 
cited above, along with others, have come up with various conjectures about the 
determinants of institutional quality. For example, Acemoglu et al (2001) provide a 
historical explanation. They established the causal link between institutional quality 
and current income per capita by using an instrument rooted in colonial history to 
identify the exogenous variation in current institutional quality. They surmise that the 
mortality rate of early European colonialists determined their settlement patterns, 
which in turn influenced the institutions they set up. In regions where colonialists 
settled, they established inclusive institutions that have persisted to the present. In 
places where they faced high mortality rates, extractive institutions with no checks and 
balances on the power of the executive were set up, and these too have persisted.  
Similarly, Hall and Jones (1999) conjecture that social infrastructure came 
about endogenously as a result of geography and legal origin (influence of Western 
systems). Using geography and legal origin as instruments they find a causal effect of 
social infrastructure on income per capita. Engerman and Sokoloff (2002) provide a 
theory of institutional evolution based on initial factor endowments. Within the New 
World in regions such as the Caribbean and Latin America where climate and soil 
encouraged the setting up of large plantations requiring slave labor, colonial elites set 
up extractive institutions to cement their dominance. The persistent political and 
economic inequality resulting from initial factor endowments led to poor institutional 
outcomes. 
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However, explanations for institutional development based on historical 
experience, geography or initial factor endowments suggest that institutions are 
destiny. If this were the case, there would be no hope for foreseeable institutional 
reform. Some studies, however, have provided evidence that institutional change is 
often driven by contemporary factors as well. For example, Jones and Olken (2009) 
empirically demonstrate that successful assassinations of autocrats increase the 
likelihood of sustained democratization. Similarly Burke and Leigh (2010) show that 
output contractions due to adverse weather shocks leads to pressure for democratic 
change in the system of government. In a related study, Burke (2012) finds a causal 
relationship between economic growth and the likelihood of leadership change using 
exogenous shocks to economic growth as instruments.  
Contemporary institutional changes could be driven not only by exogenous 
shocks, but also by government policy. The literature on rent-seeking (discussed more 
thoroughly in Chapter 3 of this thesis) points out that any government-imposed 
restriction on economic activity leads to institutional decay (e.g. Krueger 1974) – 
suggesting a link between policy and institutional quality The impact of trade policy on 
institutional quality is examined by a vast theoretical and empirical literature as 
described in that Chapter. Similarly, Ades and Tella (1997) empirically show that active 
industrial policy is significantly associated with higher levels of corruption. Lin (2009) 
considers the link between a country’s broader development strategy and institutional 
quality. He argues that a country’s development strategy should be based on its 
endowment structure at every stage. The strategy should be dynamic in the sense that 
it is constantly updated as changes in the endowment structure occur with economic 
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progress. If a country chooses to develop industries and technologies which are 
incompatible with its endowments (Comparative Advantage Defying strategy or CAD), 
the government has to resort to administrative measures to channel resources to 
sustain these enterprises and implement various distortionary policies. CAD leads to 
institutional deterioration by distorting incentives and through rampant rent-seeking 
activities. On the other hand, in order to implement a development strategy that is 
consistent with a country’s endowment structure (Comparative Advantage Following 
strategy), a government is forced to improve the market institutions so that relative 
factor prices reflect the endowment structure, and also has to improve the 
bureaucratic efficiency.  
In this thesis, institutional change is viewed as an outcome of the relative 
strength or the bargaining power of different segments of society.4 According to North 
(1990, 1994), institutional change occurs incrementally due to the maximizing behavior 
of organizations whose incentives are in turn shaped by the existing institutional 
structure. Any change in the distribution of resources as a result of government policy 
(or an exogenous shock) leads organizations to re-optimize, and leads to a change in 
the institutional structure. When a state needs to fulfill its revenue needs through 
taxation, shifting the balance of power towards the citizenry, a change in political 
institutions takes place. Similarly increased trade exposure may strengthen either the 
constituency for reform or those with a vested interest in poor institutional quality, 
depending on the nature of the trade policy regime. Even though the investigation of 
                                                             
4 This follows the theory of institutional change proposed by North (1990 etc), 
Acemgolu (2005c, 2005d, 2012 etc), Grief (2008 etc) and others. 
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institutional change in the next two chapters is motivated by separate bodies of 
literature5, there is a similar mechanism at work, which is consistent with the idea of 
institutional change as a bargain. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
5 The ‘Fiscal Sociology’ literature motivates Chapter 2, and the ‘Rent Seeking’ literature 
underpins Chapter 3 
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Chapter2: From Revenues to Democracy? 
 
Abstract 
This chapter contributes to a historical political economy literature, which considers the 
fiscal imperatives of the state to be amongst the driving forces behind the emergence 
of representative systems of government, by examining the impact on democracy of a 
government’s reliance on alternative sources of revenue. ‘Taxation’ and ‘natural 
resource rent extraction’ are considered as alternative sources of revenue for the state 
within a unified framework. A game-theoretic model postulates that an increase in tax 
revenues, or a decrease in natural resource rents, enhances democracy. The predictions 
of the model are empirically tested using a cross-national panel dataset, covering 132 
countries over the time period 1990-2009. The evidence is in line with the theoretical 
model. The results are broadly robust to estimation through different techniques, the 
inclusion of additional control variables in the econometric specification and also the 
use of alternative measures for democracy. The findings also suggest that the 
association of these variables with democracy within any given country becomes weaker 
as its real income per capita rises.  
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2.1 Introduction   
Understanding the sources and process of democratization is an active area of 
research in political economy. Why have some cultures arrived at mature and well-
functioning democratic systems of government while others have not? How can 
democracy be nurtured in countries where it is absent or not well established?  Even 
outside of academic research, this question is of considerable importance to 
policymakers, developmental agencies and donors, civil society and the masses at 
large. The nature of a political regime is not only a matter of fundamental human 
rights, but also potentially important in understanding economic outcomes (e.g. Barro 
1996, Temple 1999, Rigobon and Rodrik 2005, Acemoglu and Robinson 2006a). Even a 
cursory look at countries around the world reveals that the richer countries are 
generally more democratic. 
 In order to identify factors that could foster better political institutions in 
countries currently lacking them, it is useful to study the historical evolution of 
successful democracies. One theory of democratization, based on the ideas of Joseph 
Schumpeter, postulates fiscal imperatives as the driving force behind the modern 
nation state and the emergence of representative political institutions in the Western 
World (Schumpeter 1918, Herb 2003, Moore 2004, Besley and Persson 2013). This 
school of thought, labeled fiscal sociology, points to the historical fact that for the 
purpose of successfully generating revenues from their people, West European 
monarchs in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries had to provide representation in 
return. Attempts at increasing taxation to meet growing military expenditure led to 
demands for representation which had to be incrementally fulfilled. Coercive power of 
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the state has its limits, and efficient tax collection relies on a degree of voluntary 
compliance, especially in the context of weak administrative structures and little 
documentation of the economy. 
 Can such a process be replicated in the modern world? Does the necessity to 
effectively raise revenues force governments to democratize? There are many 
anecdotal examples which suggest that it does. To quote one such example, the 
former military dictator of Pakistan, General Musharraf, had to promise parliamentary 
elections within three years of usurping power through a coup, arguably due to fiscal 
constraints. These constraints resulted from international sanctions coupled with an 
inability to implement a tax documentation drive in the face of popular resistance. 
Even in the repressive political regime of China increases in taxation have caused 
unrest in the rural areas over the last three decades. The protests have not constituted 
a challenge to the political regime, but often led to changes in the way local 
government operates (Bernstein and Lu 2000). Figure 2.1 demonstrates that the bi-
variate relationship between total tax collected by the government as a proportion of 
GDP and a subjective indicator of democracy is on average positive for a large number 
of countries over the period 1990-20096.  
Conversely it is argued that availability of opportunities for extracting natural 
resource rents in the so-called ‘rentier states’ has provided authoritarian regimes the 
fiscal space to persist over a long period of time (Collier 2007, Ross 1999 and 2001, 
Besley and Perrson 2010). Figure 2.2 depicts a negative relationship between total 
natural resource rents as a proportion of GDP and the subjective indicator of 
                                                             
6 The variables and the data sources are described in detail later in this chapter. 
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democracy. To the extent that these rents have weakened the dependence of the 
state on its people for taxation, there is little incentive for the population to organize 
for collective action to demand representation and accountability, and for the state to 
accede to the demands of its citizens. If these governments were fiscally constrained 
and forced to collect more taxes, would there be pressure for democratic change? 
Examples from the recent Arab Spring point in this direction, as discussed later in this 
chapter. 
Figure 2.1. ‘Democracy Score’ versus ‘Tax to GDP’, 1990-2009 
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Figure 2.2. ‘Democracy Score’ versus ‘Natural Resource Rents to GDP’, 1990-2009 
 
There is a rich literature on the impact of tax collection on democracy that has 
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effect of political regime on tax collection capacity (Cheibub 1998; Fauvelle-Aymar 
1999; Kenny and Winer 2006; Bird et al 2008; Mahdavi 2008; Besley and Persson 2009, 
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converse question (Ross 2004) finds no impact of taxation on democracy. That study, 
however, does not control for fixed country characteristics, which is essential to test 
for the association of taxation with democracy within a given country (Acemoglu 2008 
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the potential endogeneity of tax collection to democracy. Finally, there could be many 
factors correlated with both democracy and taxation that the study does not control 
for. Compared to Ross (2004), this chapter suggests methodological improvements for 
estimating the impact of taxation on democracy by addressing the issues indicated 
above.  
Moreover, this chapter empirically examines the impact of taxation and natural 
resource rents on democracy within a unified framework. The negative effect of 
natural resource rents on democracy has been empirically documented (e.g. Barro 
1999, Ross 2001, Collier and Hoeffler 2009). However these studies only look at oil 
wealth, and furthermore do not consider natural resource rents more broadly as a 
possible substitute for taxation (Devarajan et al 2010). As a possible alternative to 
taxation, natural resource rents can be viewed as a non-tax source of revenue. 
Therefore, I believe it is informative to systematically compare the relative impacts of 
both kinds of revenue on the nature of the political regime. 
This chapter is arranged in nine sections. The next section discusses the 
analytical framework, based on the review of existing literature, to provide the setting 
for the ensuing analysis. Section 2.3 presents the theoretical framework and lists the 
testable propositions that follow from the model. Section 2.4 presents the 
econometric model to be estimated. Section 2.5 describes the variable construction 
and the data sources, and Section 2.6 details the estimation strategy. The descriptive 
statistics are presented in Section 2.7 and the estimation results are discussed in 
Section 2.8. Section 2.9 documents trends in both kinds of revenues leading up to 
selected episodes of democratization in the last twenty years. The final section 
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summarizes the key finding and provides the policy implications that follow from the 
study.  
2.2 Literature Survey 
The neoclassical theory of the state advanced by Douglass North (1990, 1991 etc) and 
others (Roberts Bates 1985, 1991; Avner Grief 2004, 2005 etc) implies a fiscal contract 
between the state and the people. Fiscal contract is a natural extension of the concept 
of a social contract espoused by seventeenth century philosophers such as John Locke. 
Locke in his monumental Two Treatises of the Government (1689) describes the 
emergence of a formal state from a state of nature for the purpose of protecting 
property rights and reducing disorder. The state acquires a monopoly over coercive 
power, but in exchange guarantees the natural rights of every individual. The state 
also acquires a monopoly on taxing its people, in exchange providing representation 
(North 1990) and an alignment of its policies with the preferences of the people (Bates 
and Lien 1985).  
However, it is not apparent why rulers have to cede any absolute authority 
because of their need to collect taxes. A state strong enough to prevent disorder can 
also become a dictatorship (Djankov et al 2003). It should therefore be able to rely on 
coercion to extract revenues. The answer lies in the fact that collecting taxes is not 
costless. It requires monitoring, documentation and sanctioning, all of which cannot be 
carried out without complex administrative structures, thus making coercion costly 
(e.g. Timmons 2005; Besley and Perrson 2009, 2013a). Moreover, with the rise of 
capitalism assets acquired greater mobility, making tax collection even harder (Bates 
and Lien 1985). Capital rather than land possesses a greater taxable capacity, but it is 
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also easier to hide or transfer. In this context, in order to extract taxes and maximize 
revenues, the state has to bargain with the people rather than use coercive power 
alone.  
The ‘tax bargain’ between the state and its people is made possible by the 
emergence of representative assemblies such as the parliament. These institutions 
facilitate both the state and tax-payers in conducting the bargain (Bates and Lien 
1985). The state prefers to bargain with representatives of the people in order to 
negotiate a collectively binding agreement, rather than having to do so with multiple 
agents. The tax payers on the other hand also negotiate more effectively, and stand a 
greater chance to restrict the state’s power and get their preferences represented, 
through collective action. The origin and historical evolution of representative 
assemblies is consistent with the above narrative (North and Weingast 1989, Ross 
2004, Moore 2004). The rising cost of warfare, and the emergence of capitalism which 
shifted resources away from land, made monarchs in Europe more dependent on 
taxation. The traditional source of revenue from agriculture was not sufficient to pay 
for the increased military expenditure. This gave birth to the Parliament, the Estates 
General, the Cortes etc – in the beginning these were primarily assemblies where the 
monarchs and their people haggled over taxes.  
The ‘tax bargain’ essentially implies that the state accepts rules limiting its 
exercise of arbitrary power, and gives importance to the policy preferences of the 
people. Thus institutions designed to constrain the coercive power of the state, such as 
representative assemblies, arise endogenously when the economic power – as a 
source of revenue – rests with the people (Grief 2005, 2008). On the other hand, when 
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the state has access to adequate sources of other revenues, such as natural resource 
rents and unconditional foreign aid, it does not need to engage in any bargain 
(Brautigam and Knack 2004, Collier and Hoeffler 2009, Besley and Perrson 2013). With 
lesser scrutiny and pressure from the taxpayers, the restraint on the coercive power of 
the state is weaker. These natural resource rents, which can be quite large, also enable 
the state to develop strong repressive mechanisms. It can employ the ‘politics of 
patronage’ to weaken political competition through bribery and repression (Ross 2001, 
Collier 2007). Even historically in the context of Western Europe where large natural 
resources were found, such as Spanish discovery of silver in Latin America in the 
sixteenth century, the representative assemblies did not acquire much significance 
(Drelichman and Voth 2008). 
 Therefore an empirical investigation of the impact of taxation or natural 
resource rents on the nature of the political regime should be viewed in terms of the 
revenue imperative of the state. The state could fulfill its revenue needs through either 
taxation or other non-tax sources of revenue that it might have access to, such as 
natural resource rents. This suggests considering both taxation and resource rents, 
which have opposing impacts on the arbitrary power of the state, in a combined 
framework. Such a framework would allow us to compare the relative significance of 
both kinds of revenue on the nature of the political regime. The empirical question 
would then be that, for a given level of natural resource rents, is increased reliance on 
taxation associated with democratization? Next, a model of the ‘tax bargain’ is 
presented for formally predicting the effect of changes in taxation and natural 
resource rents on democracy. 
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2.3 Theoretical Model 
The simple game theoretic model presented here is adapted from Bates and Lien 
(1985). Their paper only considers taxation as a source of revenue. I introduce the 
counter-balancing effect of non-tax sources of revenues, and an associated resource 
constraint into the framework. I assume that non-tax revenues comprise entirely of 
natural resource rents. Also, unlike the original much more sophisticated model which 
made a distinction between mobile and immobile factors of production, my analysis 
does not require two factors of production. Hence I consider only one factor of 
production in order to simplify the constrained optimization problem. 
There are two rational agents, the government and the citizenry, who seek to 
simultaneously maximize utility. The government maximizes utility by choosing the tax 
rate, the amount of non-tax revenues to extract and a policy position. Its utility is 
increasing in the tax rate and non-tax revenues but decreasing the farther its chosen 
policy position is from its most preferred. The chosen tax rate and the policy position 
affect the utility of the citizens. On the other side, the citizenry, who own the factor of 
production, optimize by making a production decision. Their utility is increasing in 
output (net of taxes and production costs). Their production determines the total taxes 
collected by the government and so affects its utility as well. The utility maximization 
problem can be represented as follows, 
Government:  Max UG [t f(x), N, - (V - V+)2 ]                                                                                                
(t, N, V) 
s.t         t f(x) + N ≤ K 
              UC ≥ UC 
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Citizenry: Max UC [(1-t) f(x) - w.x, - (V - V-)2]                                                                                      
( x )  
Where, 
V lies in [V-, V+] 
t lies in [0,1] 
UG: Utility of Government 
UC: Utility of Citizenry 
UC: Lower bound of Utility of Citizenry. It represents the minimum tolerable utility of 
the population, below which there would be a revolution or upheaval 
V: Government’s chosen policy position 
V+: Government’s preferred policy position 
V-: Citizenry’s preferred policy position 
V - V-: The level of democracy. The closer the government’s chosen policy position is to 
the preferred policy position of the citizenry (a smaller V - V-), the greater the extent of 
democracy. 
t: Tax rate 
N: Non-tax revenues, which in this model are assumed to comprise entirely of natural 
resource rents. 
K: Upper bound of possible revenue.7 It can be interpreted as the maximum amount of 
revenues that the state can (and aims to) collect, through a mixture of taxation and 
natural resource rent extraction. 
                                                             
7 It represents an exogenous resource constraint, and implies that revenues cannot 
exceed a certain finite limit. A similar resource constraint is used in the theoretical 
model of patronage in Collier and Hoeffler (2009). 
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f(x): output 
x: factor of production 
w: average cost of factor of production. 
The solution to the problem is a Nash equilibrium in which the decision of both 
the government and citizenry is the best response of one to the other. The solution is 
derived in Appendix 2A, and it is shown that in equilibrium the inequality constraints 
are binding, i.e.                                                                                                                                                               
UC = UC, and                                                                                                                                      
t f(x) + N = K                                                                                                                                    
In other words, the government chooses t, N and V such that the utility of the citizens 
is at the minimum tolerable level below which a revolution or upheaval would occur 
(implied by the first constraint), and collects as much revenue as it possibly can 
(implied by the second constraint). Moreover the second constraint also implies that 
tax and natural resource rents are alternative sources of revenue – higher natural 
resource rents reduce the taxation required to reach revenue K. It is then argued in 
Appendix 2A that democracy (V-V-) can be expressed as an explicit function of t and N. 
Subsequently, through an exercise in comparative statics, I show that: 
d(V - V-)/f(x*)dt = -  (UC)1 / 2 (UC)2 (V - V-)  <  0, and               (2.1)          
d(V - V-)/dN =   (UC)1 / 2 (UC)2 (V - V-)  >  0                                                                     (2.2) 
Additionally, by assuming a specific functional form for the utility of the government 
and citizens, I derive the optimum t, V, x and N. This confirms that these choice 
variables lie in the expected range (i.e. 0<t<1, V- < V <V+, x > 0, N < K).       
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Therefore, the model postulates that democracy can be expressed as a function 
of taxes and non-tax revenues. The comparative statics results (Equations 2.1 and 2.2) 
are the testable propositions that follow from the model. Equation (2.1) predicts that 
an increase in tax revenue will lead to the alignment of the government’s chosen 
policy position with the preferred policy position of the citizenry (i.e. a smaller V - V-), 
or in other words towards more democratization. Equation (2.2) predicts that a 
reduction in non-tax revenues (natural resource rents) also enhances democracy. 
Moreover, the change in the level of democracy resulting from an increase in tax 
revenues will be equal in magnitude to the change due to a similar reduction in natural 
resource rents. The estimation equation is presented in the next section.8 
2.4 Estimation Model 
Based on the theoretical formulation, the estimation equation is specified as follows: 
Democracyi,t = α1 + α2( Tax)i,t + α3 (NRRents)i,t + α4 log(YPC) i,t + α5 (Trade) i,t + α6                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
(Urbpop) i,t + α7(Aid)i,t + βt (Debt)i,t + µi + εi,t                                                 (2.3) 
Where,                                                                                                                                                             
Subscript ‘i,t’: country ‘i’ at time ‘t’                                                                                                                                         
Democracy: The degree/strength of democracy.                                                                         
                                                             
8 Before moving on to the next section, it has to be acknowledged that the theoretical 
model is essentially static. In reality, the choice of both taxation and natural resource 
rents are likely to be persistent, in the sense of being a function of previous taxation 
and levels of natural resource rents. Modelling these dynamic processes in a game-
theoretic context goes beyond the scope of this chapter. 
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Tax: The percentage of total tax to GDP.                                                                                             
NRRents: The percentage of total natural resource rents to GDP.                                                                                                                                               
YPC: GDP per capita expressed in Purchasing Power Parity terms in constant year 2005 
international dollars.                                                                                                                                                 
Trade: The percentage of the sum of exports and imports to GDP.                                                         
Urbpop: The percentage of total population living in urban areas as defined by national 
statistical offices.                                                                                                                                     
Aid: The percentage of official aid and development assistance to GDP.                                               
Debt: The percentage of external public (and publically guaranteed) debt to GDP.                                                                                     
µi: Country-specific and time-invariant factors that might be correlated with both 
democracy and the explanatory set. These factors include geography, historical 
experience, legal origin, ethno-linguistic fragmentation and culture                                            
βt: A set of dummies for each year except for the first (1991-2009) to control for time 
varying common shocks to democracy across all countries in the sample. These reflect 
global trends.                                                                                                                                        
ε: the idiosyncratic error term, capturing all other determinants of democracy.    
Tax and NRRents are the main explanatory variables based on the theoretical 
model, and the expected sign of the estimated coefficients are positive and negative 
respectively, as predicted by the comparative static results (Equations 2.1 and 2.2). 
Furthermore the theoretical model predicts that the magnitudes of the two 
coefficients will be equal. However, empirically we should expect the estimated 
coefficient of Natural Resource Rents to be smaller, because in reality not all the 
natural resource rents available in an economy necessarily accrue to the government. 
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Then the ratio of the coefficient of Natural Resource Rents to the coefficient of Tax 
gives an estimate for the proportion of rents going to the government if the theoretical 
model is assumed to be correct. If the coefficient of Natural Resource Rents is a 
fraction r of Tax, this implies that 100*r percent of the rents are appropriated by the 
government. 
 The other variables included in Equation (2.3) are control variables to address 
possible omitted variable bias. Aid and Debt represent two other sources of non-tax 
revenue which reduce the dependence of governments on taxation. Aid and 
development assistance from donor agencies and advanced countries (Aid) is 
especially relevant for third world countries. The other source of non-tax revenue is 
external public debt (Debt). Even though this cannot be considered a source of rent as 
it has to be repaid eventually, it could possibly provide governments the fiscal space 
needed to reduce their dependence on taxes. Aid and Debt are only included as 
control variables, rather than as main explanatory variables in the model9, because 
these are available only for a significantly reduced number of countries.10 
YPC, trade and urbpop are also covariates that could plausibly be correlated 
with tax-revenue while also being possible determinants of democracy. A vast 
literature that seeks to explain tax performance across countries identifies the so 
                                                             
9 As sources of non-tax revenue similar to natural resource rents. 
10 Furthermore strictly speaking, Debt is a stock unlike the other sources of revenue 
which are a flow, and this might create an inconsistency in the model specification. 
However as noted above Debt is only included as a control variable, and the empirical 
specification including Debt is only meant as a robustness check. Therefore I do not 
investigate this issue more thoroughly in this chapter. 
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called ‘tax handles’ (Tanzi 1989 & 1992, Leuthold 1992, Teera and Hudson 2004, Auriol 
and Warlters 2005, Mahdevi 2008, etc). ‘Tax handles’ are the factors that determine 
the tax base of a country from which revenue can be generated. In this literature a 
large variety of factors are investigated in order to assess their impact on tax 
performance, but all studies consider per capita income, the level of international 
trade and the degree of urbanization amongst the primary tax handles. At the same 
time these variables are also likely to be associated with democracy. Income per capita 
influences democracy – based on the ‘modernization hypothesis’ which conjectures 
that political development accompanies economic development (Acemoglu et al 2008, 
Moral-Benito and Bartolucci 2013, Benhabin et al 2013). Similarly, international trade 
has been investigated as an influence on democracy (Rigobon and Rodrik 2005). Lastly 
a higher level of urbanization is associated with economic and political development as 
well. 
2.5 Variables Description and Data Sources  
The empirical investigation is carried out using a panel dataset covering 132 countries 
over the period 1990-2009. It is an unbalanced panel with data for several variables 
missing for some years. Data for the main explanatory variable, tax revenue, are not 
available before 1990 for most countries. The relatively short time coverage fits in well 
with the purpose of this chapter, which is to investigate whether the historical process 
generating democracy in the Western world could be replicated in the contemporary 
period. 
The dependent variable in Equation (2.3) is measured by an indicator called 
Polity2 developed by Marshall et al (2010) who run the Polity IV project. This indicator 
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measures the degree to which democracy is present in a country. It is based on a 
conceptual scheme which measures the characteristics of different regimes. The data 
release used for this chapter contains data from 1800 to 2009. 
The construction of Polity2 is based on two different variables, democracy and 
autocracy. These variables measure the degree of democracy and autocracy in a 
country on separate eleven point scales of 0 to 10 and 0 to -10 respectively. As the 
authors caution, both these variables are constructed independently for each country 
and cannot be considered simply as opposites. This means that a country with a 
democracy score of 5 for example, does not necessarily has an autocracy score of -5. 
The variables democracy and authority can be combined into a composite polity 
variable which ranges from -10 (absolute autocracy) to +10 (perfect democracy). A 
modified variable Polity2 provides a score on the same scale for periods where there 
was transition, interruption or anarchy. This is the dependent variable that is used in 
my regressions. 
 The conceptual scheme underlying these variables assigns a score based on 
distinct elements or characteristics of the regime, which are then combined. These 
broadly translate into the presence of institutions that allow citizens to express 
preferences about leaders and policies, the existence of institutionalized constraints 
on the power of executive, and the degree of opportunity provided to every citizen to 
participate in the political process. The score based on these elements can be 
interpreted as essentially measuring the existence of truly representative institutions 
(representative in the sense that they are accessible to the entire citizenry) that can 
check the power of the executive and influence its policy preferences.  
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As a robustness check, I also use a measure for the dependent variable from a 
different source. This variable is Voice and Accountability from the World Governance 
Indicators released by the World Bank. The data release I use contains data running 
from 1996 to 2009 with a few missing years in between. This variable is one of the six 
dimensions of institutional quality defined by the authors of these indicators 
(Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 2010). Voice and Accountability measures not just 
“the extent to which a country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting their 
government”, but also civil liberties such as media freedom. In this sense it is broader 
than Polity2. 
The methodology for the construction of Voice is also different from Polity2. It 
involves aggregation and standardization of data from 31 different sources. The 
distribution of the resulting variable is standard normal with a range from -2.5 to 2.5. I 
rescale the variable so that it ranges from 0 to 100. The sources include “surveys of 
individuals and domestic firms, perceptions of country analysts at multilateral 
development, nongovernmental organizations and commercial business information 
providers”. Crucially the Polity IV Project is not one of the underlying sources. This 
means that Polity2 and Voice and Accountability are independent, and thus using both 
allows a suitable check on the robustness of results.  
In addition, one of the potential drawbacks of the Polity2 variable is that it is 
censored at 10 for most democratic and -10 for most autocratic countries. Moreover 
the variable follows a discrete scale.11 On the other hand, whereas Voice and 
                                                             
11 For this reason, the use of Least Square Dummy Variable (LSDV) estimation used in 
this chapter might be problematic. 
33 
 
Accountability is constructed as a standard normal variable, none of the observations 
are bounded at the top or the bottom of the scale (Table 2B.1). Moreover, this 
variables is continuous rather than discrete. The use of Voice and Accountability as an 
alternate dependent variable allows me to check whether the results are sensitive to 
the bounded and discrete nature of the Polity2 variables. 
The first main explanatory variable (Tax) measures the central governments’ 
tax collection. I use Total Tax to GDP percentage from World Development Indicators 
(WDI) provided by the World Bank. This data is based on the IMF’s Government 
Finance Statistics. Total tax includes taxes on income, profits and capital gains; taxes 
on goods and services; taxes on international trade12; and a residual called ‘other 
taxes’ which comprises of taxes not allocable to the previous three categories such as 
property taxes, employer payroll taxes, penalties for non-payment of taxes etc. Total 
tax does not include most social security contributions and other sources of 
government revenues such as fines, fees, rents, profits of public enterprises etc. It also 
does not include grants. I am interested in total tax rather than total revenue, because 
it is generated solely from the economic activity of the citizens.  
                                                             
12 It could be argued that taxes on international trade should be removed as these are 
administratively less costly to collect compared to other kinds of taxes. However, 
disaggregated tax data is available only for a reduced number of countries. Moreover, 
the theoretical model on which Equation (2.3) is based only makes a distinction 
between revenue collected from the economic activity of citizens and those from 
other sources. In this context taxes on international trade are also collected from the 
economic activity of citizens, even if these are easier to collect. 
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The other main explanatory variable is a measure of rents from natural 
resources. World Bank’s WDI provides a relevant variable called exactly that. Total 
natural resource rents are the sum of rents from oil, natural gas, coal, mineral deposits 
and forests. Rents are defined as the difference between the world market value of 
these resources and their total cost of production. The calculation of this data is done 
by the World Bank staff using the Comtrade database maintained by the United 
Nations Statistics Division. It should be noted that this variable is a measure of the 
total rents available in a country, not all of which go to the government. 
The data source for all the other variables included as covariates in Equation 
2.3 (YPC, Trade, Urbpop, Aid and Debt) is also the World Bank’s WDI.  
 
2.6 Estimation Methodology 
The equation is estimated using three different regression techniques – pooled OLS, 
fixed effects and system Generalized Method of Moments (system GMM). Fixed 
effects is superior to pooled OLS, while system GMM addresses additional endogeniety 
issues compared to fixed effects. A comparison of the estimation results reveals 
different perspectives into the relationship of democracy with Tax and NRRents, based 
on the differing assumptions underlying each technique. 
 The equation is first estimated through pooled OLS — this technique estimates 
Equation (2.3) excluding the country-specific fixed effects (µi ). However, ignoring 
country-specific fixed effects could cause omitted variable bias, because the µi are 
country-specific and time-invariant factors that might be correlated with both 
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democracy and the explanatory set. These factors include geography, historical 
experience, legal origin, ethno-linguistic fragmentation and culture, which the 
literature considers to be important determinants of economic and political 
development. Thus the estimated coefficients from Pooled OLS regressions merely 
represent the statistical association between the explanatory variables and the 
dependent variable across countries (over the time period under study), indicating for 
example whether countries with higher taxation are also more democratic. The 
estimated coefficients from pooled OLS do not capture the within-country relationship, 
for example whether a given country on average becomes more democratic as it 
collects more taxes (Acemoglu et al 2008). Thus the µi are subsequently included in the 
equation, which is then re-estimated using the fixed effects regression technique. This 
technique involves estimating the equation after demeaning it to purge the µi. 
 While the fixed effects estimation technique mitigates omitted variable bias by 
removing the influence of long run determinants of both revenues and democracy, it 
does not address another source of endogeneity — potential reverse causality from 
the dependent variable to the explanatory variables. Therefore we still need to be 
cautious about inferring causality based on the estimated coefficients from fixed 
effects regressions (Acemoglu et al 2008). Strictly speaking, in order to establish a 
causal impact the explanatory variables need to be statistically shown as exogenous 
(uncorrelated with the error term).  
Moreover, there is also reason to believe that democracy is a persistent 
variable, with the present nature of the political regime dictating its future quality 
(Acemoglu et al 2005b, 2006a, 2006c, 2008). Hence there is a rationale for including 
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lagged democracy as an explanatory variable in the econometric equation. Then the 
fixed effects regression technique also does not consistently estimate an equation 
containing the lagged dependent variable, because the lagged dependent variable is 
correlated with the error term after the equation is demeaned to purge the country-
specific fixed effects. 
Because of the concerns discussed above I subsequently re-estimate the 
equation after also including lagged democracy in the specification through the system 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) regression technique developed by Arellano 
and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998).13 The modified equation to be 
estimated is as follows, 
Democracyi,t  = α1 + α2 Democracyi,t-1 + α3 (Tax)i,t-1 + α4 (NRRents)i,t-1 + α5 log(YPC) i,t-1 + 
βt + µi + εi,t          (2.4) 
The explanatory variables now enter the equation with a lag, so that I am in effect 
estimating the impact of Tax and NRRents on the change in democracy from the 
current to the next period. Neither does the equation include the complete set of 
control variables, the reason for which will be explained shortly. 
The system GMM estimation procedure involves differencing the equation 
through either subtracting the previous observations of the variables, or alternatively 
subtracting from it the average of all future available observations of the variables. The 
second method of differencing, known as ‘forward orthogonal deviations’, is 
                                                             
13 System GMM augments the difference GMM technique suggested by Arellano and 
Bond (1991) 
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preferable when dealing with an unbalanced panel (Roodman 2009a). Then the 
differenced Democracyi,t-1, can be instrumented by Democracyi,t-2 (and previous lags) as 
these are uncorrelated with the differenced error term. The difference GMM 
technique uses this set of instruments only. However, lagged levels of the variables are 
weak instruments for the first differences if the variable is persistent (Bond et al 2001). 
The system GMM technique derives additional moment conditions by instrumenting 
Democracyi,t-1 in the original levels equation by its contemporaneous and lagged first 
differences, as these are uncorrelated with the level of the error term.    
System GMM estimation has an important advantage in addition to allowing 
consistent estimation of an equation that controls for the lagged dependent variable14. 
It allows the explanatory variables to be either endogenous or weakly exogenous 
(predetermined), and thus deals with the problem of likely reverse causality from 
taxation to democracy establishing a causal impact. In order to estimate the model, I 
impose the restriction that the explanatory variables Tax, NRRents and per capita 
income are predetermined. This means that they can be correlated with the past error 
terms as long as they are not correlated with the current error term. In other words 
the exclusion restriction is that for a given predetermined variable (x), E(xi,t, εi,s) = 0 for 
s ≥ t, but E(xi,t, εi,s) ≠ 0 for s < t. Because our explanatory variables are specified in the 
equation with a lag, this effectively means that they are endogenous. So for example 
Taxi,t-1 can be correlated with εi,t-1. The predetermined variables are then instrumented 
in the same way as the lagged dependent variable. The System GMM estimation 
                                                             
14 System GMM is primarily employed in the literature to consistently estimate an 
equation containing the lagged dependent variable (Bond et al 2001). 
38 
 
technique provides us with a set of internal instruments, rather than having to look for 
external instruments which are highly correlated with tax collection, but do not impact 
democracy through any other channel — this would be a really difficult task, and the 
validity of such an instrument can always be argued against.  
 For estimation of (2.4) through system GMM I take observations occurring 
every second year from 1991-2009 as this technique works best for small T (time 
interval) and large N (countries) (Roodman 2009a, Jayasuriya and Burke 2013). I also 
restrict the number of lags used for instrumenting the right-hand side variables to one. 
This is because a large instrument set relative to the number of observations causes an 
over-fitting bias for the estimates (Roodman 2009b). Increasing the number of lags 
used to instrument the right-hand side variables beyond one does not substantially 
change the estimated coefficients while improving the efficiency in terms of standard 
errors and diagnostics.15 
It is for the same reason (to avoid instrument proliferation), that the complete 
set of control variables is not included in the specification. In any case, because system 
GMM provides consistent estimates for the coefficients even when the explanatory 
variables are correlated with the error term, we do not need to worry about omitted 
variables. A standard Sargan or Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions allows us to 
check for the validity of the instrument set; the instrument set is exogenous if it is not 
correlated with the error term. Thus an inappropriate exclusion of the control variables 
                                                             
15 Moreover, using the minimum possible lag length allows the least reduction in the 
number of observations available for estimation given the availability of tax data over 
relatively short time duration. 
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would lead to the rejection of the null hypothesis (under the test of over-identifying 
restrictions) that the instrument set is valid. 
 Finally it is also worthwhile to examine if the relation between the main 
explanatory variables and democracy varies with the level of income per capita — for 
example does the impact of Tax (or NRRents) on democracy change as a country 
becomes richer. In order to investigate this I modify Equations (2.3) and (2.4) by 
including an interaction term between income per capita (in thousands of dollars) and 
Tax, as well as income per capita and NRRents. The estimated coefficients of these 
interaction terms tell us how the impact of Tax and NRRents on democracy varies as 
income per capita changes by a thousand dollars.   
2.7 Descriptive Statistics 
Before presenting the regression results I report (in Table 2B.1 of Appendix 2B) the 
descriptive statistics, including the means, standard deviations, minimums, maximums, 
as well as the number of observations and countries, for all the variables in the 
econometric model. As expected with a large sample of countries at varying stages of 
development, all the variables show substantial variation. Income per capita varies 
from 250 to 77,000 real international dollars. The first measure for democracy, Polity2, 
varies across the entire range of the indicator. The second measure, Voice, ranges from 
12 to 87. Tax as a proportion GDP ranges from close to 0 to as much as 61 percentage 
points. Similarly, natural resource rents as a proportion of GDP varies from 0 to as high 
as 75 percentage points. The other sources of non-tax revenue also vary substantially. 
The variable ‘aid as a proportion of GDP’ is only relevant for developing countries: 
some of these countries receive no aid while others get more than the value of their 
40 
 
GDP. Similarly the external public (and publically guaranteed) debt as a percentage of 
GDP for some countries is in single digits while at the other extreme the percentage is 
higher than 800.  
More interesting are the statistics in Tables (2.1) and (2.2). These tables show 
the mean of Democracy, Tax and NRRents for countries grouped by the Polity2 
quartiles (Table 2.1) and the Voice quartiles (Table 2.2). The mean of the proportion of 
tax to GDP progressively rises from around twelve to over twenty from the bottom to 
the top quartile of both Polity2 and Voice. On the other hand, the mean of the 
proportion of natural resource rents to GDP falls from around fourteen for the bottom 
quartile to two for the top quartile. The means of Tax and NRRents for each Polity2 
quartile are roughly similar to the corresponding Voice quartile. These tables present 
initial yet clear-cut evidence in favor of the hypothesis of a positive linear relation 
between democracy and Tax, and an inverse linear relation between democracy and 
NRRents. 
 
Table 2.1. Means by Polity2 Quartiles 
 
Variable 1st Quartile 
(Polity2 < -1) 
2nd Quartile          
(-1<Polity2<7) 
3rd Quartile 
(7<Polity2<10) 
4th Quartile 
(Polity2=10) 
Polity2 -5.83 
(2.36) 
3.70 
(2.37) 
8.06 
(0.72) 
10 
(0.00) 
Tax 12.24 
(7.11) 
14.02 
(7.17) 
16.45 
(7.05) 
20.81 
(7.12) 
NRRents 14.75 
(16.52) 
9.62 
(11.70) 
4.01 
(6.07) 
2.93 
(8.15) 
YPC (1000) 10.79 
(16.78) 
3.67 
(3.71) 
7.39 
(6.70) 
25.40 
(9.42) 
Countries 46 49 56 34 
Note: Standard deviation are reported in parenthesis 
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Table 2.2. Means by Voice Quartiles 
 
Variable 1st Quartile 
(Voice < 
39.39) 
2nd Quartile          
(39.39<Voice<52.42) 
3rd Quartile 
(52.42<Voice<70.71) 
4th Quartile 
(Voice> 
70.71) 
Voice 28.92 
(7.53) 
45.80 
(3.80) 
62.44 
(5.67) 
76.88 
(3.92) 
Tax 12.39 
(6.54) 
15.28 
(7.45) 
18.73 
(6.95) 
21.48 
(6.44) 
NRRents 13.90 
(15.86) 
6.65 
(11.58) 
3.85 
(9.19) 
1.57 
(3.51) 
YPC(1000) 6.21 
(10.94) 
7.81 
(11.98) 
13.50 
(9.80) 
29.89 
(10.74) 
Countries 58 57 60 37 
Note: Standard deviation are reported in parenthesis 
 
As a sidenote, these tables also show the mean of real income per capita (in 
thousands) for each of the Polity2 and Voice quartiles. There appears to be a non-
linear relationship between income per capita and democracy, when democracy is 
measured by Polity2. Average real income per capita for the lowest quartile (the group 
of most autocratic countries) is higher than what it is for the second and the third 
quartiles. From the second to the highest quartile, the mean of real income per capita 
rises progressively, and the group of countries that are the most democratic are on 
average the richest. If democracy is measured by Voice, then there is a clear linear 
relationship between income per capita and democracy. 
Finally, the pair-wise partial correlation reported in Appendix Table 2.B2 lend 
further credence to my hypothesis. Even though from different sources, both 
measures of democracy (Polity2 and Voice) are highly correlated with each other (the 
correlation coefficient is 0.8). Moreover, both the measures display a clear positive 
correlation with Tax and an equally clear negative correlation with natural resource 
rents. Both are also negatively correlated with the other sources of non-tax revenue 
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(Aid and Debt), although the magnitude of the correlation coefficient is not as high as 
for Tax and NRRents. This justifies including Aid and Debt as control variables in our 
model rather than the main sources of revenue. The correlations of both measures of 
democracy are clearly positive with income per capita and urbanization. The 
correlation of trade with Polity2 and Voice is of the opposite sign, but the magnitudes 
are negligible. 
The pair-wise correlation of Tax with the three non-tax sources of revenue is 
also instructive. The negative correlation of Tax is the highest in magnitude with 
natural resource rents (0.26), followed by Aid (0.10) and then Debt (0.06). 
Furthermore, Tax is clearly positively correlated with all the tax handles (income per 
capita, trade as a proportion of GDP and urban population as a proportion of the total) 
included as control variables. Natural resource rents are positively correlated with 
external debt as a proportion of GDP; this is not surprising given the donor optimism 
that normally accompanies discovery of natural resources. Finally Aid and Debt also 
exhibit a high degree of positive pair-wise correlation with each other. 
 
2.8 Estimation Results  
2.8.1 Regression Results for Polity2 
Table 2.3 reports the pooled OLS and Table 2.4 reports the fixed effects regression 
results. In both these tables the first two columns show results from a regression of 
the dependent variable on each of the main explanatory variables separately. In 
Column (3), both the explanatory variables are included together. In Column (4), the 
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first set of control variables — L(YPC), Trade and Urbpop — are then added. Finally 
Column (5) also includes Aid and Debt — this is done last because the sample of 
countries is highly reduced, which is why this is my least preferred specification. It is 
only reported as a comparison to check for the robustness of estimated coefficients. 
Columns (3) and (4) are the preferred specifications. 
In the regressions reported in Table 2.3 both Tax and NRRents are highly 
significant (at the one percent level) in explaining the Polity2 score across countries 
over this time period — countries that tax more, and sustain themselves on smaller 
natural resource rents as a percentage of GDP, are more democratic. The estimated 
coefficients of both the variables in Column (3) confirm the prediction of the model — 
these are statistically significant (at the one percent level) with opposite signs. The null 
hypothesis that the magnitudes of the coefficients are exactly the same (as predicted 
by the theoretical model) cannot be rejected at any reasonable level of significance 
based on the F-test for equality of the coefficients. The coefficient of Tax indicates that 
a percentage point increase in Tax is on average associated with a 1.1 percentage 
point (=0.21/20*100) higher Polity2 score16. To put it differently, a one standard 
deviation increase in Tax is associated with a 0.25 of a standard deviation 
improvement in the Polity2 score.17 By contrast a percentage point rise in NRRents is 
on average associated with 0.9 of a percentage point lower Polity2 score. In terms of 
                                                             
16 Here and henceforth a percentage point is meant to indicate the change as a 
proportion of the total range of the variable. 
17 This calculation (and all other similar calculations henceforth) is based on the 
estimated coefficient, and the standard deviations reported as descriptive statistics 
(i.e. Table 2B.1). 
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standard deviations: a one standard deviation increase in NRRents is associated with a 
0.33 of a standard deviation lower Polity2 score. Adding the control variables in 
Column (4) does not change the estimated coefficients substantially18.  
An interesting finding is that higher Trade is associated with a lower democracy 
score, confirming a similar result reported by Rigobon and Rodrik (2005). The 
magnitude of this partial correlation is not very high — only 0.15 of a percentage point 
lower Polity2 score. Finally for the reduced sample of countries that results from 
adding Aid and Debt in Column (5), only the coefficient of NRRents is estimated 
precisely at a high level of statistical significance.  
The fixed effects estimation results reported in Table 2.4 indicate that the 
within-country association of tax and natural resource rents with democracy remains 
statistically significant at the ten percent level.19 The overall explanatory power of 
these regressions (indicated by the R2 from regression of the equivalent LSDV Model) is 
much higher than the corresponding pooled OLS regressions, suggesting that fixed 
country characteristics explain most of the variation in the extent of democracy. This is 
exactly as expected because institutional quality, such as the nature of political 
regimes, is determined to a great extent by historical experience, geography, culture 
                                                             
18 Note than the coefficient of Tax (as well as NRRents) in columns 3 and 4 overlap 
within one standard error band. 
19 The reduction in statistical significance and magnitude of the estimated coefficients 
is expected due to the inclusion of fixed country characteristics that are correlated 
with democracy as well as Tax and NRRents. 
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and other long-run determinants (Acemoglu et al 2001, Rodrik et al 2004, Shirley 2005 
etc). 
 
Table 2.3. Determinants of Polity2t: Pooled OLS Estimation Results 
 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Taxt 0.285*** 
(0.072) 
 0.214*** 
(0.066) 
0.170*** 
(0.053) 
0.099 
(0.066) 
NRRentst  -0.214*** 
(0.045) 
-0.177*** 
(0.042) 
-0.177*** 
(0.045) 
-0.120*** 
(0.042) 
L(YPC)t    1.188* 
(0.613) 
-0.478 
(1.172) 
Tradet    -0.025*** 
(0.008) 
-0.007 
(0.014) 
UrbPopt    0.025 
(0.036) 
0.096 
(0.052) 
Aidt     0.016 
(0.048) 
Debtt       -0.001 
(0.008) 
Observations 1540 1540 1540 1516 963 
Countries 130 130 130 129 91 
TE included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Tax=- NRRents   0.685 0.924 0.811 
R2 0.189 0.230 0.294 0.373 0.198 
Adjusted R2 0.178 0.220 0.284 0.363 0.176 
Notes:  A constant is included in all regressions but not reported. Annual 
observations of the dependent variable are used from 1990-2009. Robust standard 
errors clustered by countries reported in parentheses. TE refers to the set of time 
dummies. The statistic reported for ‘Tax - NRRents = 0’ is the p-value of the F-
statistic testing for equality of the magnitudes of the coefficients. 
*Significant at the 10% level 
**Significant at the 5% level 
***Significant at the 1% level 
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Table 2.4. Determinants of Polity2t: Fixed Effects Estimations Results 
 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Taxt 0.115* 
(0.063) 
 0.120* 
(0.062) 
0.121** 
(0.061) 
0.167** 
(0.074) 
NRRentst  -0.052 
(0.036) 
-0.056* 
(0.032) 
-0.061* 
(0.034) 
-0.118*** 
(0.044) 
L(YPC)t    -2.486* 
 (1.394) 
-4.872*** 
(1.420) 
Tradet    0.010 
(0.010) 
0.025* 
(0.016) 
UrbPopt    0.198 
(0.156) 
0.228 
(0.183) 
Aidt     -0.007 
(0.023) 
Debtt     -0.002 
(0.003) 
Observations 1540 1540 1540 1516 963 
Countries 130 130 130 129 91 
TE included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Tax= -
NRRents   
  0.329 0.308 0.484 
R2 0.868 0.868 0.869 0.870 0.813 
Adjusted R2 0.854 0.853 0.855 0.855 0.787 
R2(within) 0.090 0.085 0.096 0.126 0.184 
R2(between) 0.94 0.263 0.326 0.105 0.114 
Notes: A constant is included in all regressions but not reported. Annual 
observations of the dependent variable are used from 1990-2009. Robust standard 
errors clustered by countries are reported in parentheses. TE refers to the set of 
time dummies. The statistic reported for ‘Tax = - NRRents’ is the p-value of the F-
statistic testing for equality of the magnitudes of the coefficients. The R2 refers to 
the coefficient of determination from estimation of the equivalent Least Squares 
Dummy Variable Model (LSDV). 
*Significant at the 10% level 
**Significant at the 5% level 
***Significant at the 1% level 
 
Comparing the impact of the two types of revenue in Table 2.4, the coefficient 
for Tax is more significant and higher in magnitude than NRRents. Columns (3) and (4) 
indicate that a one percentage point rise in Tax is associated with 0.6 of a percentage 
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point better Polity2 score20. In other words, a one standard deviation increase in Tax is 
associated with a 0.15 of a standard deviation reduction in the Polity2 score. For 
NRRents the negative association is 0.3 of a percentage point. In terms of standard 
deviation this partial correlation is -0.11. The point estimates imply that within any 
given country, higher taxation is more strongly associated with democracy compared 
to the adverse association of higher natural resource rents with democracy. However 
in line with the theoretical model, the null hypothesis that the coefficients are equal in 
magnitude cannot be rejected at the ten percent level of significance. 
The negative association between Trade and democracy witnessed in the 
pooled OLS regression results also disappears within countries. An interesting result is 
the sign of the coefficient of L(YPC). One percent higher real per capita income within a 
given country is associated with a Polity2 score that is lower by 0.12 of a percentage 
point. This surprising result could be due to a potentially non-linear relation between 
income per capita and democracy (shown in Table 2.1) that I have ignored. As income 
per capita is not the main explanatory variable, I do not explore this issue in detail.  
Unlike the pooled OLS results, the within-country association of Tax and 
NRRents with Polity2 for the reduced sample of countries (following the addition of Aid 
and Debt in Column (5) of Table 2.4) is even stronger. The coefficients are higher in 
magnitude and more statistically significant. The coefficients for L(YPC) and Trade are 
                                                             
20 The coefficients of Tax and NRRents in column (4) after the addition of the control 
variables are practically unchanged compared to column (3).  
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also estimated more precisely in this specification. The coefficient of Aid and Debt are 
not statistically significant at a reasonable level, but have the expected negative sign. 
The system GMM regression results are presented in Table 2.5. The first three 
columns are specifications similar to Tables 2.3 and 2.4. However Column (4) only 
includes log of income per capita as the control variable because of reasons discussed 
in Section 2.6. The diagnostics indicate that the model has been adequately estimated. 
The p-value of the Hansen test for over-identifying restrictions shows that we cannot 
reject the null hypothesis that the instrument set is valid. At the same time the 
estimation does not likely suffer from an over-fitting bias caused by over 
instrumentation, as the Hansen p-value is not unrealistically high (Roodman 2009b, 
Jayasuriya and Burke 2013). Also, the p-value of the AR(2) test indicates that we 
cannot reject the null of no second order serial correlation at the ten percent level of 
significance, which is a necessary assumption for consistent estimation using system 
GMM.   
The system GMM results provide the strongest evidence for my hypothesis. 
The positive impact of higher taxation and the adverse effect of higher natural 
resource rents on democracy within countries are quite substantial. Moreover, the 
coefficients for Tax and NRRents are statistically significant (at the five percent level). 
Although the point estimate of the impact of taxation is higher as expected, we still 
cannot reject the null hypothesis that the magnitudes of the coefficients are equal. 
Column (3), for example, tells us that a percentage point higher tax to GDP ratio 
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cumulatively increases the Polity2 score to rise by 0.44 points21. This is an increase of 
more than 2 percentage points. On the other hand a percentage point lower natural 
resource rents to GDP ratio, cumulatively decreases the democracy score to fall by 
0.21 points (or 1 percentage point). As suspected, democracy is a highly persistent 
variable as indicated by the magnitude and statistical significance of the coefficient for 
lagged Polity2. Addition of the control variable in Column (4) does not change the 
results to any noticeable degree, although the coefficient for Tax becomes slightly less 
statistically significant22. 
The relative magnitudes of the impact of Tax and NRRents on democracy, as 
indicated by the point estimates are similar in both the fixed effects and the system 
GMM regressions. The coefficient of Tax is approximately twice as large as the 
coefficient of NRRents. According to the prediction of the theoretical model the 
coefficients should have been of the same magnitude. This was based on the 
assumption that the entire natural resource rents available in an economy go to the 
government. In terms of the interval estimates, we cannot reject that the coefficients 
are equal in magnitude at the ten percent level of significance. However if we consider 
the point estimates, the relative magnitudes of the coefficients give an approximation 
of the total resource rents accruing to the government. If the theoretical model is 
correct, then based on the point estimates, on average around half of the rents in a 
country belong to the government. 
                                                             
21 The cumulative impact equals 0.027/(1-0.938) 
22 The coefficients of Tax (and NRRents) in columns (3) and (4) overlap within one 
standard error band. 
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Table 2.5. Determinants of Polity2t: System GMM Estimations Results  
 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Polity2t-1 0.944*** 
(0.027) 
0.959*** 
(0.017) 
0.938*** 
(0.022) 
0.926*** 
(0.023) 
Taxt-1 0.026* 
(0.015) 
 0.027** 
(0.013) 
0.028* 
(0.015) 
NRRentst-1  -0.010** 
(0.004 
-0.013** 
(0.006) 
-0.015** 
(0.006) 
L(YPC)t-1    0.043 
(0.068 
Observations 771 1480 761 754 
Countries 131 156 130 129 
TE included Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Tax= -NRRents     0.337 0.429 
Instruments 64 66 92 111 
Hansen J test p-
value 
0.395 0.444 0.169 0.105 
AR(2) test p-
value  
0.340 0.938 0.359 0.371 
Wald chi-sq 
statistic 
5135.97 7185.90 16170.03 13480.71 
Wald chi-sq p-
value 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Notes:   A constant is included in all regressions but not reported. Observations of the 
dependent variable at 2 year intervals are used from 1993-2009. Windmeijer-Corrected 
Robust standard errors from the two-step GMM estimation are reported in parenthesis. TE 
refers to the set of time dummies. The statistic reported for ‘Tax = - NRRents’ is the p-value 
of the chi-squared statistic testing for equality of the magnitudes of the coefficients. 
Orthogonal forward deviations used to purge fixed effects. All explanatory variables are 
treated as endogenous and instrumented by 1 lag.  
*Significant at the 10% level 
**Significant at the 5% level 
***Significant at the 1% level 
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2.8.2 Regression Results for Polity2 Including the Interaction 
Terms 
 
Table 2.6. Determinants of Polity2t (including interactions) 
 
Variable Pooled OLS Fixed Effects System GMM 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Tax 0.110* 
(0.066) 
0.157** 
(0.079) 
0.024* 
(0.014) 
NRRents -0.094** 
(0.044) 
-0.083* 
(0.046) 
-0.011* 
90.006) 
YPC(1000) 0.068 
(0.072) 
-0.088 
(0.109) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Tax * YPC(1000) 0.004* 
(0.003) 
-0.005** 
(0.002) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
NRRentst * 
YPC(1000) 
-0.005*** 
(0.002) 
0.002* 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
Polity2t-1   0.936*** 
(0.023) 
Observation 1540 1540 754 
Countries 130 130 129 
TE included Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.360 0.872  
Adjusted R2 0.350 0.857  
R2 (within)  0.112  
R2 (between)  0.007  
R2 (overall)  0.004  
Instruments   148 
Hansen J test p-value   0.689 
AR(2) test p-value    0.363 
Wald chi-sq statistic   17786.55 
Wald chi-sq p-value   0.00 
Note: A constant is included in all regressions but not reported. 
For pooled OLS and fixed effects regressions annual observations of the dependent 
variable are used from 1990-2009. Robust standard errors clustered by countries are 
reported. Explanatory variables are contemporaneous. TE refers to the set of time 
dummies. The R2 in column (2) refers to the coefficient of determination from 
estimation of the equivalent Least Squares Dummy Variable Model (LSDV). 
For System GMM observations of the dependent variable at 2 year intervals are used 
from 1993-2009. Windmeijer-Corrected Robust standard errors from the two-step 
GMM estimation are shown in parentheses. Explanatory variables are lagged. 
Orthogonal forward deviations used to purge fixed effects. All explanatory variables 
are treated as endogenous and instrumented by 1 lags.  
*Significant at the 10% level 
**Significant at the 5% level 
***Significant at the 1% level 
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The results for the variation in the impact of Tax and NRRents on Polity2 as 
income per capita changes are reported in Table 2.6. These results are meant as a 
supplementary analysis and only for the purpose of exploring whether the 
hypothesized impact of tax or natural resource rents on democracy depends on the 
level of development. Table 2.6 demonstrates an interesting contrast between the 
three regression techniques, emphasizing the importance of recognizing the different 
assumptions underlying each technique and interpreting the results accordingly. 
The pooled OLS results suggest that the positive association of Tax and 
negative association of NRRents with democracy are stronger for richer countries. The 
coefficient for the first interaction term [Tax * YPC(1000)] indicates that the 
association between Tax and democracy is almost four percent (=0.004/0.11*100) 
higher for countries whose real per capita income is a thousand dollars greater. The 
coefficient of the second interaction term [NRRents * YPC(1000)] suggests that the 
negative association between NRRents and democracy is approximately five percent 
lower as the real income per capita increases by a thousand dollars. 
However the fixed effects results in Column (2) of Table 2.6 indicate that once 
fixed country characteristics are controlled for the opposite relationship emerges. 
Thus, ignoring the long term factors correlated with both revenues and democracy 
leads to extremely misleading conclusions. Within countries, on average the statistical 
association gets weaker as a country becomes richer. The corresponding coefficient 
shows that as a country’s real per capita income increases by a thousand dollars the 
positive association between Tax and democracy becomes three percent lower. 
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Similarly the negative association between NRRents and democracy is almost 2.5 
percent lower as real income per capita increases by a thousand dollars. This is an 
important finding. It implies that the connection between the nature of revenues and 
the political regime within a given country is most pronounced when its real income 
per capita is low. 
Finally the system GMM results in Column (3) indicate that we cannot reject 
the null hypothesis of no difference in the impact of Tax or NRRents on democracy as 
the level of income per capita changes. The coefficients of the interaction terms are 
not statistically significant at even the 10 percent level. Therefore, we need to be 
careful in inferring a causal relationship based on the fixed effects results. In other 
words, the causal mechanism that makes taxation and natural resource rents affect 
democracy does not likely change as a country becomes richer. 
 
2.8.3 Regression Results for Voice as an alternative measure of 
democracy 
For the alternative measure of democracy (Voice), I only report the pooled OLS and the 
fixed effects regression results in Tables 2.B3 and 2.B4 respectively. Due to the shorter 
time period over which this data is available with various missing years in between, the 
system GMM regression results are not estimated consistently (as indicated by the 
diagnostics) nor with precision. The pooled OLS and the fixed effects regression results 
for Voice are qualitatively similar to the results for Polity2, but quantitatively different.  
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The explanatory power of the pooled OLS regressions in explaining Voice is very 
similar to that for Polity2 in the specifications that do not include the control variables. 
However, for the specifications with the control variables included (Columns 4 and 5) 
the R2 for the regression of Voice is substantially higher. Column (4) of Table 2.B3 
indicates that a percentage point higher Tax is associated with a Voice score that is 
higher by 0.44 percentage points. Whereas an additional percentage point of natural 
resource rents is associated with a 0.47 percentage point decrease in the score. This 
association is lower than the corresponding one for Polity2. The estimated coefficients 
of both L(YPC) and Trade are highly significant (at the one percent level) as well. Similar 
to the pooled OLS regression results for Polity2, the association of real income per 
capita with Voice remains positive, while for Trade it is negative. The estimated 
coefficients retain their statistical significance even for the reduced sample of 
countries (Column 5). More interestingly the coefficient for Aid is also estimated with a 
high level of precision (one percent level of statistical significance). However, it has the 
unexpected sign. Countries that receive more aid are more democratic over the time 
period 1996-2009. As discussed previously, this is yet another illustration of the 
shortcoming of the pooled OLS regression technique. It is plausible that fixed-country 
characteristics simultaneously affected both the nature of the political regime and the 
amount of aid it receive over this time period; or it could be that countries which are 
more democratic receive more aid rather than the other way round. 
The fixed effects regressions explain the within-country variation in Voice to a 
lesser degree than Polity2 (as indicated by the within R2). This is expected given the 
shorter time period being investigated. Also, the coefficients are estimated with less 
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precision, and magnitudes of the association of the explanatory variables with Voice 
are smaller than with Polity2. Compared to Tax, the coefficient for NRRents is more 
statistically significant. Moreover the point estimate for the coefficient for NRRents is 
much closer in magnitude to the coefficient for Tax, indicating that from 1996 onwards 
the proportion of natural resource rents accruing to the government is smaller. 
Column (3) for example indicates that a percentage point increase in Tax is associated 
with a 0.13 percentage point higher Voice score within countries, whereas a similar 
increase in NRRents is associated with a 0.09 percentage point lower score. For the 
reduced sample of countries in Column (5), the only control variable that is associated 
at a reasonable level of statistical significance with Voice is Debt. An increase of one 
percentage point in the external debt to GDP ratio within a given country is associated 
with a 0.35 percentage point reduction in the Voice score.  
In summary, the regression results for Voice are broadly similar to Polity2 — 
the signs of estimated coefficients for the main explanatory variables remain the same. 
It can be concluded that the positive association of taxation with democracy and the 
negative association of natural resource rents is not a peculiarity of the Polity2 
variable. 
2.9 Country Examples 
The cross-country evidence presented in the previous section demonstrates that in a 
large sample of countries over the period 1990-2009, greater taxation, on average 
makes the political regime more democratic, while natural resource rents have an 
unfavorable impact. I now look at a few selected episodes of democratization within 
the same time period (1990-2009), and document trends in tax revenues and natural 
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resource rents leading up to those. Democratization is reflected by changes in the 
Polity2 or Voice score. It is expected that the total tax to GDP ratio would be rising 
relative to NRRents in the years prior to democratization. Thus the relevant variable to 
consider is the difference between Tax and NRRents, which ranges from -100 to 100. 
Figure 2.3 shows a strong positive bivariate relation between the mean of this variable 
for each country with the mean Polity2 score for each country.  
Figure 2.3 ‘Polity2 Score’ versus ‘Tax - NRRents’, 1990-2009 
 
It has to be acknowledged that the following country examples are not a 
rigorous illustration of the link between revenues and democratization. I do not 
provide any explanation or analysis for the underlying cause of changes in these 
sources of revenue in the instances described. Therefore the changes in taxation or 
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natural resource rents cannot be interpreted as the cause of these particular episodes 
of democratization — these examples are presented only to supplement the cross-
country evidence.  
Egypt 
The most important example from the Arab Spring is perhaps that of Egypt. President 
Hosni Mubarak ruled the country as a dictator for almost three decades. The Polity2 
score for Egypt for most of the decade prior to 2011 was -3, which is in the lowest 
quartile. The Voice score was around 30, which is also well into the lowest quartile. In 
early 2011, Mubarak was forced to step down due to a popular uprising.23 Figure 2.C1 
in Appendix 2C shows the time plot of the difference between the ratios of total taxes 
to GDP and natural resource rents to GDP from 2005 onwards. Between 2005 and 
2010 ‘Tax - NRRents’ increased from -10 to 4, a rise of seven percentage points. This 
was almost exclusively due to a fall in NRRents.  
Syria 
Syria is an example from the Middle East where a movement for democracy has been 
ongoing since 2011 against the longstanding dictatorial rule of Basher Al Assad. It is not 
yet clear how successful this struggle will be, but the pressure for democratic change 
has certainly begun. The Polity2 score for Syria was -7, amongst the lowest in the 
world, for the entire previous decade. This will undoubtedly rise if the present 
democratic movement is successful. Unfortunately, I do not have Tax data for Syria. 
                                                             
23 I do not have data for the democracy scores in 2011, but the events of the year 
would undoubtedly be reflected in significantly higher scores. 
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However, it is still informative to note that the natural resource rents to GDP ratio has 
fallen by more than thirteen percentage points from 2005 to 2010, as shown in Figure 
2.C2. 
Libya 
Libya is another example where the entrenched dictatorial rule of Muammar Gaddafi 
that had lasted for over three decades was overturned in 2011 as a result of a popular 
uprising. Qaddafi’s regime was one of the most autocratic in the world - the Polity2 
score was -7 throughout his rule, and the Voice score was also the lowest in our 
sample. The Tax data for Libya is also not available, but NRRents fell almost twenty five 
percentage points (from 70 to 45) in the five years leading up to the uprising, as is 
illustrated in Figure 2.C3. 
Ukraine 
Ukraine experienced an episode of democratization in 2005 and 2006, reflected by a 
rise in the Polity2 score from 6 to 7, and the Voice score increase of ten percentage 
points from 2004 to 2006. In the five years prior to this episode, the difference 
between Tax and NRRents had steadily risen by 6 points, or three percentage points, as 
is shown in Figure 2.C4. This was mostly due a rise in total taxes as a percentage of 
GDP from around 12 in 2001 to over 17 in 2005. 
Zimbabwe 
Zimbabwe experienced pressure for democratization in 1998-1999, when the Polity2 
score jumped from -6 to -3. For the entire previous decade the democracy score had 
been stagnant. Tax data are not available after 1997, but the trend is instructive to 
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note. From 1992 to 1997, ‘Tax-NRRents’ rose by over four percentage points, from 12 
to over 21. This occurred due to a combination of a rise in Tax and a fall in NRRents. 
Tax increased by six percentage points over these five years.  Natural resource rents as 
a percentage of GDP fell from 8 in 1992 to around 5 in 1997, and below 2 in 1998-
1999. This is shown in Figure 2.C5. Subsequently NRRents started gradually rising again 
until 2008, which might explain why the democratisation that occurred in 1998-1999 
was only temporary. However, in 2008 natural resource rents as a percentage of GDP 
again fell by four percentage points over the next two years, and this was accompanied 
by a rise in the Polity2 score from -4 (which it had been for most of the decade) to 1 in 
2009. 
Indonesia 
The long standing dictatorial rule of President Suharto was overturned in 1998 
following widespread street protests. The Polity2 score jumped from -7 in 1997 to 6 in 
1999. This episode has been widely investigated, and one of the reasons attributed to 
the change in regime is the output contraction that immediately preceded it (Burke 
and Leigh 2010). However it is also instructive to note the trend in Tax and NRRents in 
the previous years. In the six years leading to the overthrow of Suharto, the difference 
between tax and natural resource rents as a percentage of GDP had risen by 4 points 
(close to two percentage points) as shown in Figure 2.C6.  
Zambia 
Zambia is a country that has experienced at least two episodes of democratization in 
the last two decades. In 1990-91 the twenty year long, dictatorial one party rule 
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headed by Kenneth Kaunda (reflected by a Polity2 score of minus -9) came to an end 
following mass protests. The Polity2 score jumped to 6. I do not have tax data for the 
country but in the four years prior to this episode natural resource rents as a 
percentage of GDP had almost halved from 20 to under 10. However, democratization 
was slightly reversed in 1996 when the Polity2 score fell to 1. In the three years prior, 
natural resource rents as a percentage of GDP had again increased by seven 
percentage points. Finally the Polity2 score reverted back to 5 in 2001 – in the 
preceding five year NRRents had again fallen by over five percentage points. This is 
illustrated in Figure 2.C7. 
2.10 Conclusion 
The possible impact of a government’s effort to collect more taxes from its population 
on the characteristics of the political regime has a basis in history, as well as episodes 
in the modern world. When a government is forced to collect more taxes because of 
fiscal imperatives, it may have to accede to the policy preferences of the people. 
Higher taxation often leads to pressure for changes in the political regime. Despite the 
existence of a rich literature to provide a historical and theoretical basis, this link has 
not been systematically investigated in a cross-national context. Most studies focus on 
the causality from political regime to tax collection. This chapter investigates the other 
direction, while also incorporating natural resource rents as a source of non-tax 
revenues into the framework. In this sense the study attempts to also add to the 
resource rent literature, by framing the question of its effect on the political regime 
within the broader issue of a State’s revenue needs, following a direction pointed out 
by Devarajan et al (2010). This chapter is also related to literature on the income-
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democracy nexus — in particular the investigation by Burke and Leigh (2010) that 
commodity price shocks that cause output contractions could increase the likelihood 
of democratic change. 
The empirical evidence presented in this chapter using a sample of 132 
countries for the time period 1990-2009 is consistent with the hypothesis that higher 
taxation leads to better democracy, even when the state has access to natural 
resource rents. On the other hand, natural resource rents are detrimental for 
democracy even in the presence of taxation. This relationship of taxation and natural 
resource rents with democracy is established using two different and unrelated 
measures of democracy. The statistical relationship is also robust to the addition of 
control variables in the econometric specification as well as estimation through 
different regression techniques. The potential endogeneity of tax revenues and natural 
resource rents to democracy is addressed through estimation by the system GMM, a 
regression technique which employs a set of exogenous internal instruments in order 
to establish a causal impact. It is found that the impact of a percentage point increase 
in the ratio of tax to GDP is equivalent to more than a two percentage point 
improvement in the democracy score. On the other hand, a similar increase in the ratio 
of natural resource rents to GDP reduces the democracy score by one percentage 
point.  
I then document the trend in taxes and natural resource rents for a few 
selected countries which underwent some sort of democratization within the last 
twenty years. For example Egypt, Syria and Libya experienced significant falls in natural 
resource rents which culminated in the events labeled as the Arab Spring. Ukraine 
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presents the opposite scenario, where increased taxation was associated with pressure 
for better democracy in 2005-2006. 
The findings of this chapter have especially critical policy implications for 
countries that possess well developed and functional systems for tax collection, but 
have recently also discovered natural resources. These new resource producers, 
especially certain African countries such as as Ghana, Tanzania, Mozambique and 
Kenya, now face the choice of continuing to rely on taxation as their main source of 
revenue, or shifting to natural resource rents to fulfill their fiscal needs. While 
exploitation of natural resources will undoubtedly be carried out, these countries 
would be well advised to invest these rents into trust funds, or perhaps distribute 
these to the citizens followed by subsequent taxation along the lines of a proposal by 
Devarajan et al (2010). Given the nascent state of democracy in many of these 
countries, the decision to use natural resource rents to as a direct source of 
government revenue could hamper prospects for democratic progress. 
The fixed effects estimation results also suggest that the significance of the 
revenue imperative is greater for poorer countries. As countries become richer, the 
favorable link between taxation and democracy, and the adverse association of natural 
resource rents, becomes less pronounced. This has an important policy implication for 
donors and the prosperous countries with an interest in promoting democracy. These 
actors are likely to have more leverage over poorer countries, where the potential 
gains for democracy from encouragement of higher taxation are the greatest. This 
leverage may be especially strong because of the influence that the powerful countries 
have on markets for natural resources and the ability to give development assistance. 
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Institutional transplantation inspired by the Washington Consensus has by and large 
failed (Rodrik 2004, Lin 2009). However the fiscal policies of poorer countries can 
perhaps be more easily influenced than their political institutions.  
The estimates presented here are very aggregate in nature. Further research 
could perhaps identify with more clarity the exact channels through which tax 
collection impacts political institutions. For this purpose it could be informative to 
identify a variable that is highly correlated with taxation, but not with democracy. Such 
an external instrument, if more malleable than fiscal policy, could guide us towards a 
more practical theory of how to promote democracy. 
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Appendix 2A 
 
Before solving the problem of the government and citizenry described in Section 2.3 of 
the chapter, I impose the assumptions below.24  
(1) UG and UC are continuously differentiable. Furthermore, (UG) 1, (UG)2, (UG)3, 
(UC)1, (UC)2 are all > 0. Here subscripts 1, 2 and 3 refer to the partial 
derivative of the function with respect to the first, second and third 
argument of the function respectively. 
(2) UG and UC are both quasiconcave functions, while f(x) is a concave function. 
This ensures that the first order conditions are sufficient conditions as well.  
(3) Max UC [(1-t) f(x) - w.x, - (V+ - V-)2 ] < UC , for all t  between 0 and 1. This 
states that Government will never be able to choose its exact preferred 
policy position i.e. V ≠ V+. If V = V+, the utility of the citizens would fall below 
the minimum tolerable level. 
The solution to the problem of both agents is a simultaneous move Nash Equilibrium. 
The citizenry, given t and V, chooses how much factor of production to hire, which is a 
best response to what the government does. The first order condition is: (1-t) f’ (x) = w, 
and the solution is given by x*(t, V).  The government, knowing x*(t, V), optimizes 
subject to constraints, which is a best response to the production decision of the 
citizenry. Therefore the government’s maximisation problem can be written as, 
    Max  UG [t f(x), N, - (V-V+)2] + λ1 [ (1-t) f’(x) – w ] + λ2 (UC - UC )  +  λ3 ( K - t f(x) - N) 
                                                             
24 I follow the set of assumptions listed by Bates and Lien (1985). 
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(t, N, V, x) 
The first order conditions are listed below: 
w.r.t ‘t’ : (UG)1 f(x) - λ1 f’(x) - λ2 (UC)1 f(x) - λ3f(x) = 0    (2.A1) 
w.r.t ‘N’: (UG)2 - λ3 = 0        (2.A2) 
w.r.t  ‘V’: -2 (UG)3 (V-V+) - 2 λ2 (UC)2 (V-V-) = 0    (2.A3) 
w.r.t ‘x’: (UG)1 t f’(x) + λ1 (1-t) f”(x) + λ2 (UC)1 [ (1-t) f’(x) – w] - λ3 t f’(x) = 0 (2.A4) 
w.r.t ‘λ1’: (1-t) f’(x) = w       (2.A5) 
w.r.t ‘λ2’: λ2 (UC - UC) = 0,  UC - UC ≥ 0,  λ2≥ 0    (2.A6) 
w.r.t ‘λ3’ : λ3(K - t f(x) - N)  = 0, K - t f(x) – N ≥ 0,  λ3≥ 0  (2.A7) 
where (2.A6) and (2.A7) follow from Kuhn-Tucker condition for inequality constraints 
From (2.A2), 
λ3 = (UG)2 > 0         (2.A8) 
From (2.A3), 
λ2 = - [(UG)3 (V - V+)] / [(UC)2 (V-V-)]  > 0,             (2.A9)                                                                                                 
as (V - V+) < 0 by Assumption (3).                                                                                                     
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Then (2.A8) and (2.A9) imply that in equilibrium the inequality constraints are binding 
by (2.A6) and (2.A7) i.e. 
UC = UC , and                   (2.A10)          
t f(x) + N = K                               (2.A11) 
Equations (2.A10) and (2.A11), which characterize the equilibrium, allow V to be 
written as an explicit general function of t and N. As UC is continuously differentiable 
by Assumption (1) and the partial derivative of UC with respect to V-V- is not zero for all 
V ≠ V-, by the implicit function theorem, 
V-V- = g (t) such that UC [(1-t*)f(x*) - w. x*, (V*-V-)2] = UC, and V ≠ V-            (2.A12) 
V-V- = h (N) such that UC [f(x*) + N* - K - w. x*, (V*-V-)2] = UC, and V ≠ V-           (2.A13) 
Therefore taking any linear combination of (2.A12) and (2.A13), 
V-V- = F (t, N) such that UC = UC, t f(x) + N = K and V ≠ V-.             (2.A14) 
We can then derive the comparative static results for the change in democracy 
resulting from changes in tax and non-tax revenues along the optimal solution path. 
Taking the total derivative of (2.A10) and setting dx = 0, 
-  (UC)1 f(x*) dt  - 2 (UC)2 (V - V-) d(V - V-) = 0 
=> d(V - V-)/dt = -  (UC)1 f(x*)/ 2 (UC)2 (V - V-)  <  0 
=> d(V - V-)/f(x*)dt = -  (UC)1 / 2 (UC)2 (V - V-)  <  0              (2.A15) 
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Similarly, substituting (2.A11) into (2.A10) and then taking the total derivative, and 
setting dx = 0, 
(UC)1 dN  - 2 (UC)2 (V - V-) d(V - V-) = 0 
=> d(V - V-)/dN =   (UC)1 / 2 (UC)2 (V - V-)  >  0                           (2.A16) 
 
Finally, consider the following specific functional form for the utility of the government 
and citizens, this allows us to verify whether the choice variables of the optimization 
problem lie in the expected range. 
UG  = t xα + N - log (V-V+)2 
UC = (1-t) xα - wx - log (V-V-)2 
where α < 1. 
Then, by FOC (2.A4), 
t* = [λ2α x(α-1) - λ1α (1-α)x(α-2)  - λ2w]/ [ (λ2 +  λ3)α x(α-1) - λ1(1-α)x(α-2) - α x(α-1)], 
where the numerator is positive as λ1 < 0 by definition, and α x(α-1) > w by (2.A5). The 
denominator is also positive as λ2 + λ3 > 1 by (2.A2), (2.A8) and (2.A9). Also the 
denominator is greater than the numerator as λ2 + λ3 > λ2. Therefore, 0< t*<1 as we 
expect. 
By FOC (2.A3), 
V* = (λ2V+ + V-)/(λ2 +1) . Thus, V- <V*< V+ as we expect. 
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By FOC (2.A1), 
x* = - α λ1/ λ2 > 0 as we expect. 
Finally by (2.A10), 
N* = K - t* f(x*)  
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Appendix 2B 
 
 
Table 2B.1. Descriptive Statistics (Entire Sample) 
 
Variable Mean Minimum Maximum Observations Countries 
Polity2 4.45 
(6.22) 
-10 10 1540 130 
Voice 53.71 
(18.51) 
11.93 86.53 1117 143 
Tax 16.63 
(7.53) 
0.12 61.02 1802 149 
NRRents 6.52 
(11.27) 
0 74.67 1802 149 
L(YPC) 8.82 
(1.28) 
5.51 11.25 1802 149 
YPC (1000) 13.16 
(13.85) 
0.25 77.11 1802 149 
Trade 91.52 
(55.98) 
10.83 445.91 1775 148 
UrbPop 57.15 
(23.48) 
5.4 100 1802 149 
Aid 5.19 
(8.98) 
-0.66 148.50 1365 126 
Debt 46.69 
(52.80) 
1.44 824.09 1157 102 
Note: Standard deviations are reported in parentheses 
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Table 2.B2. Pair-wise Correlation Matrix 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 1.00         
2 0.80 1.00        
3 0.38 0.44 1.00       
4 -0.41 -0.37 -0.26 1.00      
5 0.21 0.61 0.18 0.01 1.00     
6 -0.06 0.02 0.20 -0.02 0.24 1.00    
7 0.26 0.48 0.13 -0.03 0.65 0.24 1.00   
8 -0.07 -0.17 -0.11 0.03 -0.34 -0.01 -0.34 1.00  
9 -0.11 -0.22 -0.04 0.14 -0.31 -0.01 -0.14 0.46 1.00 
Note: 
1.Polity2 
2.Voice 
3.Tax 
4.NRRents 
5.YPC 
6.Trade 
7.UrbPop 
8.Aid 
9.Debt 
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Table 2.B3. Determinants of Voicet: Pooled OLS Estimation Results 
 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Taxt 1.127*** 
(0.258) 
 0.960*** 
(0.253) 
0.438*** 
(0.120) 
0.519*** 
(0.165) 
NRRentst  -0.595** 
(0.114) 
-0.445*** 
(0.104) 
-0.468*** 
(0.088) 
-0.331*** 
(0.101) 
L(YPC)t    9.911*** 
(1.281) 
5.611*** 
(2.473) 
Tradet    -0.052*** 
(0.014) 
-0.063** 
(0.029) 
UrbPopt    -0.028 
(0.069) 
0.064 
(0.097) 
Aidt     0.265*** 
(0.090) 
Debtt     -0.013 
(0.041) 
Observations 1117 1117 1117 1101 657 
Countries 143 143 143 142 97 
TE included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Tax = - 
NRRents  
  0.094 0.856 0.379 
R2 0.214 0.144 0.288 0.633 0.312 
Adj R2 0.206 0.136 0.281 0.626 0.294 
Notes:  A constant is included in all regressions but not reported. Annual 
observations of the dependent variable are used from 1996-2009. Robust standard 
errors clustered by countries are reported in parenthesis. TE refers to the set of time 
dummies. The statistic reported for ‘Tax = - NRRents’ is the p-value of the F-statistic 
testing for equality of the magnitudes of the coefficients. 
*Significant at the 10% level 
**Significant at the 5% level 
***Significant at the 1% level 
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Table 2.B4. Determinants of Voicet: Fixed Effects Estimation Results 
 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Taxt 0.122 
(0.084) 
 0.132* 
(0.812) 
0.120 
(0.079) 
0.217*** 
(0.072) 
NRRentst  -0.088* 
(0.047) 
-0.094** 
(0.047) 
-0.096* 
(0.049) 
-0.206*** 
(0.060) 
L(YPC)t    1.584 
(2.760) 
0.383 
(3.969) 
Tradet    0.014 
(0.016) 
0.019 
(0.021) 
UrbPopt    0.278 
(0.248) 
0.466 
(0.297) 
Aidt     0.031 
(0.039) 
Debtt     -0.050** 
(0.022) 
Observations 1117 1117 1117 1101 657 
Countries 143 143 143 142 97 
TE included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Tax - NRRents 
= 0 
  0.670 0.787 0.908 
R2 0.971 0.971 0.972 0.972 0.940 
Adj R2 0.967 0.967 0.967 0.967 0.927 
R2 (within) 0.024 0.026 0.033 0.045 0.109 
R2 (between) 0.219 0.163 0.304 0.394 0.239 
R2 (overall) 0.180 0.125 0.265 0.385 0.175 
Notes: A constant is included in all regression but not reported. Annual observations 
of the dependent variable are used from 1990-2009. Robust standard errors 
clustered by countries reported in parentheses. TE refers to the set of time 
dummies. The statistic reported for ‘Tax - NRRents = 0’ is the p-value of the F-
statistic testing for equality of the magnitudes of the coefficients. The R2 refers to 
the coefficient of determination from estimation of the equivalent Least Squares 
Dummy Variable Model (LSDV). 
*Significant at the 10% level 
**Significant at the 5% level 
***Significant at the 1% level 
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Appendix 2C 
 
Figure 2.C1. ‘Tax - NRRents’, Tax, and NRRents, for Egypt, 2005-2010. 
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Figure 2.C2. NRRents for Syria, 2005-2010. 
 
Figure 2.C3. NRRents for Libya, 2005 to 2009. 
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Figure 2.C4. ‘Tax - NRRents’, Tax, and NRRents, for Ukraine, 2000-2006. 
 
 
Figure 2.C5. ‘Tax - NRRents’, Tax, and NRRents, for Zimbabwe, 1991-1997. 
 
5
1
0
1
5
2
0
2000 2002 2004 2006
UKRAINE
Tax - NRRents Tax
NRRents
Year
5
1
0
1
5
2
0
2
5
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998
Zimbabwe
Tax - NRRents Tax
NRRents
Year
76 
 
Figure 2.C6. ‘Tax - NRRents’, Tax,and NRRents, for Indonesia, 1991-1997. 
 
Figure 2.C7. NRRents for Zambia, 1988-2004. 
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Chapter 3: Trade and Institutional Quality 
 
Abstract 
This chapter investigates the implications of trade exposure for institutional quality 
while distinguishing between trade intensity and the openness of trade policy, which 
are often erroneously treated as synonymous in the previous literature. Based on the 
‘rent-seeking’ literature, it is hypothesized that increased trade improves institutional 
quality only in the context of a liberalized trade policy regime. In the presence of a 
closed trade policy regime, increased trade deteriorates institutional quality by 
opening up new avenues for ‘rent-seeking’. Furthermore, it is also hypothesized that 
the negative impact of natural resource exports on institutional quality, as pointed out 
by the ‘natural resource curse’ literature, is mitigated if the trade policy regime is 
open. The modeling strategy involves estimating the impact of trade intensity (the 
trade to GDP ratio) on institutional quality conditional on the nature of the trade policy 
regime. The empirical analysis is based on panel data covering 114 countries over the 
time period 1987-2008. The findings are generally consistent with the hypotheses.   
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3.1 Introduction 
 
The enabling role of institutional quality in the development process is well established 
and generally agreed upon in the growth literature (e.g. Knack and Keefer 1997, 
Temple 1999, Acemoglu at al 2001, Dollar and Kray 2003, Rodrik et al 2004). However, 
the literature on the causes of variation in the quality of institutions among countries 
still remains lopsided in that it has focused predominantly on geography, initial factor 
endowments and historical experience (Hall and Jones 1998, Acemoglu et al 2001 & 
2002, Engerman and Sokoloff 2002, Easterly and Levine 2002, Shirley 2005). These 
explanations overlook the potential role of contemporary factors in institutional 
quality improvement and suggest that ‘institutions are destiny’. Therefore it is 
important to investigate those factors that are amenable to policy.  
One such factor is trade exposure. It has been shown both theoretically and 
empirically that trade exposure (greater openness to trade) can improve institutions by 
fostering foreign competition, strengthening those groups that favor reforms and 
reducing the amount of artificial rents generated by trade restrictions (Krueger 1990, 
Ades and Di Tella 1999, Treisman 2000, Weil 2000, Sandholtz and Koetzle 2000, Gatti 
2004, Levchencko and Do 2009, Bhattacharya 2012). However, there is ambiguity 
about how to define trade exposure in empirical analysis. Is trade exposure 
synonymous with trade intensity (the trade to GDP ratio) or does it describe the 
openness of the trade policy regime?  
Trade intensity is often used as a measure of trade exposure in the empirical 
literature. However, an increase in trade intensity does not always occur as a result of 
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liberalization of trade policy (e.g. Sachs and Warner 1995, Frankel and Romer 1999, 
Rodriquez and Rodrik 2000, Weil 2000, Gatti 2004, Athukorala 2011, Henry et al 2012, 
and Milner 2013). For instance, discovery of natural resources, entry into preferential 
trade agreements, increase in world demand, reduction in transport costs or any other 
exogenous influence on trade performance could increase the volume of trade even 
without liberalization. The degree of trade intensity is also negatively correlated with 
the country size.  
On the other hand, the nature of the trade policy regime as an indicator of 
trade exposure is not entirely satisfactory either. This is because some channels 
postulated in the literature through which trade exposure improves institutional 
quality operate only through trade intensity25. It is quite conceivable that liberalization 
of the trade policy regime may not result in the anticipated increase in the volume of 
trade if, for instance, a country faces high natural barriers to trade (Frankel and Romer 
1999, Rodriguez and Rodrik 2000). Furthermore liberalization is an episodic event; it is 
not clear over what time-frame it affects trade intensity. Wacziarg and Welch (2008) 
do not find evidence in a large sample of countries that episodes of liberalization in the 
period 1990-98 increased the trade to GDP ratio within the same time period.   
Consider two contrasting examples which illustrate the need to jointly consider 
both trade intensity and the nature of trade policy, in order to examine the impact of 
trade exposure on institutional quality. From 1970 to 1990 Nigeria’s trade to GDP ratio 
grew almost four fold from around 20 percent to over 70 percent according to 
                                                             
25 For example, the models formulated by Ades and Di Tella (1999), Weil (2000), and 
Levchenko and Do (2009) which are described in more detail in the next section. 
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statistics from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. However, the 
increased trade exposure occurred due to the discovery of oil, and was not a 
consequence of any policy reforms. Nigeria remains one of the most corrupt countries 
in the world (Transparency International, Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian 2003). On the 
other hand, another African country Ghana also increased its international trade 
starting from 1985. The trade to GDP ratio almost tripled within a decade from under 
20 percent to over 60 percent. Unlike Nigeria, Ghana’s higher trade exposure was 
driven by a series of policy reforms which involved the removal of government-
imposed trade restrictions (Wacziarg and Welch 2008). The increased trade intensity 
resulting from liberalization was accompanied by an improvement of institutional 
quality as measured by the subjective indicators of corruption and bureaucratic quality 
provided by the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG).26  
Therefore, this study uses trade intensity and the nature of the trade policy 
jointly in examining the impact of trade exposure on institutional quality. It is 
hypothesized that the impact of trade intensity on institutional quality depends on the 
nature of the trade policy regime. Only increased trade intensity driven by policy 
reform could potentially improve institutional quality. I call this ‘liberalized trade’. 
Greater trade intensity in the absence of policy reform (un-liberalized trade) 
deteriorates the quality of institutions by opening up new avenues for ‘rent-seeking’; 
this hypothesis is set in the context of the rich ‘rent-seeking’ literature (Tullock 1967, 
                                                             
26 In 1984 Ghana ranked in the lowest decile for both the indicators, while a decade 
later it had close to the median score amongst all the countries for which ICRG 
provides governance ratings. 
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Krueger 1974, Bhagwati 1980, Bhagwati and Srinivasan 1980). While previous works 
have distinguished between trade intensity and trade policy, to my knowledge no 
empirical study has combined the two concepts to differentiate between liberalized 
and un-liberalized trade. 
In this chapter institutional quality is defined as the level of corruption and the 
quality of the bureaucracy.27 Both of these measures, which reflect the quality of 
economic institutions, are a representation of the rent-seeking efforts. The empirical 
analysis is carried out using a dataset covering 114 countries over the period from 
1987 to 2008. Unlike previous empirical studies, I also separately analyze the impact 
on institutional quality of exports and imports in addition to overall trade. As a 
corollary this study also hypothesizes that the deleterious impact of natural resource 
trade on institutions, which has been suggested by the vast resource curse literature 
(Sachs and Warner 1995, 1999, 2001; Tornell and Lane 1996, 1998, 1999; Leite and 
Weidmann 1999; Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian 2003; Isham et al 2005; Robinson et 
al 2006), could be mitigated by liberalization of trade policy.  
The chapter is arranged in eight sections. In the next section I critically survey 
the related literature to formulate a context for the model formulation which is then 
discussed in Section 3.3. This is followed by a discussion on variable construction and 
data sources in Section 3.4. Section 3.5 describes the estimation strategy. The 
descriptive statistics are presented in Section 3.6 in order to set the stage for a 
                                                             
27 The reason for this selection is explained in detail in the next section. 
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discussion of the estimation results in Section 3.7. Section 3.8 concludes with a 
discussion of the results and policy implications of the study. 
 
3.2 Literature Survey 
3.2.1 The Impact of Trade Intensity on Institutions 
The first channel through which greater trade intensity can lead to better institutional 
quality is the foreign competition effect. Due to increased foreign competition faced by 
domestic producers a disciplining effect is induced, which leads to a preference for 
better institutions (Ades and Di Tella 1999, Wei 2000, Gatti 2004, Levchenko and Do 
2009). Levchenko and Do (2009) develop a general equilibrium model in which the 
production side consists of heterogeneous firms and monopolistic competition. 
Institutional quality is interpreted as the fixed cost of entry into production. Facing 
foreign competition, all firms prefer better institutions i.e. lower fixed cost of entry 
into production. 28 
Wei (2000) demonstrates using a simple two country and two period model 
that countries with a higher natural propensity to trade, based on their geographical 
characteristics, invest more in building good public institutions. Investing in a good 
bureaucracy is costly. At the same time, foreign producers are deterred more by weak 
institutions. Therefore countries which are naturally more open have a greater 
                                                             
28 In the Levchenko and Do (2009) model, greater trade could also have a negative 
impact on institutional quality due to a political economy impact as explained shortly. 
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incentive to provide better public institutions to check corruption and build an efficient 
bureaucracy. The prediction of the model is backed by cross-national empirical 
evidence.  
In the principal-agent model formulated by Ades and Di Tella (1999) better 
institutions are represented by the proportion of bureaucrats (agents) truthfully 
reporting profits accruing from the regulation of firms to the public representative 
(principal). Greater international trade increases competition, reduces the level of 
profits at the discretion of the bureaucrat, and lowers the probability of a bureaucrat 
being corrupt. 29 
However, the foreign competition effect is not the only one that operates due 
to increased trade intensity. Trade also has political economy effects and its impact on 
institutions depends on who it benefits. On one hand trade can empower the 
constituency for reform, but on the other it can also strengthen those interests that 
thrive due to poor institutions. The formal model developed by Levchenko and Do 
(2009) also accounts for political economy considerations in addition to the foreign 
competition effect. Because firms are heterogeneous and only the most efficient firms 
can export, foreign trade results in the elite group of exporters growing larger, and 
acquiring more political power relative to less productive firms. These firms prefer 
worse institutional quality — higher fixed costs of entry — to deter the competition 
from smaller firms (i.e. the political power effect). As a result of foreign trade if these 
                                                             
29 Using a model of bureaucratic compensation, they show that the efficiency wage 
required to induce honesty falls with increased competition.     
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larger firms grow large enough the political power effect dominates the foreign 
competition effect, consequently worsening institutional quality.  
History provides examples of both kinds: instances where the constituency for 
reform was strengthened or weakened due to increased trade. Acemoglu et al (2005a) 
argue that one of the contributing factors in the improvement of institutional quality in 
Western Europe post 1500 was trans-Atlantic trade with the new colonies. Trade 
strengthened the merchant groups relative to the monarchies, especially in countries 
with a non-absolutist system of government at the starting point such as England and 
the Netherlands. Institutional change is the result of a bargain between different 
groups with vested interests, and the change is resisted by those who stand to lose 
rents. Conversely where trade empowered the elites even further, institutions 
deteriorated (Engerman and Sokoloff 2002). Within those regions where soil and 
climate conditions encouraged the setting up of large plantations requiring a 
substantial amount of slave labor (such as the Caribbean and Latin America in the New 
World), colonial elites established institutions to cement their dominance. Trade with 
Europe in the 1700s exacerbated the inequality and led to a further deterioration of 
institutional quality.  
3.2.2 The Impact of Trade Policy on Institutions 
The political economy effect of increased trade intensity can be better understood in 
the context of the nature of the trade policy regime. Government-imposed restrictions 
on international trade such as tariffs, quotas, exchange rate controls, and other such 
measures create the possibility for certain sectors to earn supranormal profits or rents 
(Tullock 1967, Krueger 1974, Bhagwati 1980 & 1982, Buchanan 1980, Bhagwati and 
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Srinivasan 1980, Tollison 1982). This confers upon the government’s bureaucracy a 
discretionary power to allocate the rents arising from these restrictions. For instance, if 
a quota is imposed, the bureaucracy allocates the right to import through the granting 
of licenses and can demand illegal monetary gains in the process. In the case of tariffs, 
customs officials acquire the ability to collude with importers to enable tariff evasion in 
exchange for bribes.  
One of the central lessons of the rent-seeking literature is that any 
government-imposed distortion in the economy creates artificial rents. The existence 
of rents in an economy is not unusual, and can arise naturally from the price system. 
Seeking natural rents (profit seeking) involves creation of value through production of 
goods, and the rent eventually dissipates with increasing resources devoted to that 
activity (Buchanan 1980, Tollison 1982). However, as a result of a government-
imposed restriction or distortion that controls entry into productive activity, resources 
will be devoted towards seeking artificially contrived rents through non-market 
mechanisms (artificial rent-seeking). Efforts towards this end range from wasteful 
expenditure to lobbying, bribery, and coercion.  
Artificial rent-seeking, unlike natural rent-seeking, does not lead to the 
production of value; rather it diverts resources away from productive activity. In a 
seminal paper which set the foundation for the rent-seeking literature, Tullock (1967) 
argued that the cost of government-imposed distortions is not just the traditional 
deadweight loss triangle. In fact resources up to or even exceeding the total amount of 
the available rent might be expended in pursuit of those rents. Krueger (1974) showed 
that quantitative import restrictions (quotas) lead to competition amongst private 
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agents for acquiring import licenses, which leads to a welfare loss. This competition 
has no value in terms of production but does have significant social costs. Bhagwati 
and Srinivisan (1980) show that imposition of tariffs leads to similar consequences.  
Once set in, the artificial rent-seeking process exhibits increasing returns 
(Tullock 1967, Murphy et al 1993). This means that it is self-enforcing and ever-
increasing. Once an artificial rent-seeking opportunity has been created, vested 
interest groups devote even more resources for maintaining the status quo. Those 
adversely affected similarly expend resources to change the status quo. In order to 
curtail this rent-seeking the government might devise further distortionary policies or 
regulations, thus leading to a vicious cycle. Therefore artificial rent-seeking is even 
more socially costly in a dynamic setting than in a static one. 
The rent-seeking literature was originally concerned with the welfare impact of 
artificial rent-seeking. However, implicit in the welfare analysis was the argument that 
once an opportunity for seeking artificially contrived rents has been established as a 
result of a government-imposed restriction, competition for these rents will lead to 
adverse consequences for institutional quality. Artificial rent-seeking takes many 
forms, not all of which are illegal. Lobbying, for example, is perfectly legal in many 
countries even though it has negative welfare consequences (Bhagwati 1980). 
However, artificial rent-seeking also manifests in activities which are classified as 
corruption (Buchanan 1980, Paul and Wilhite 1994, Lambsdorff 2002). Even though 
Krueger (1974) does not model institutional quality in her theoretical analysis, she 
does speculate that competition for rents translates into corruption in reality, and 
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causes deterioration in institutional quality. It leads to the perception of the market 
mechanism as a means for rewarding the well connected.  
In order to better understand the link between artificial rent-seeking and 
institutional quality, it is important to clarify the meaning of institutional quality and be 
more precise about how it is manifested. While a detailed discussion is beyond the 
scope of this chapter, the widely accepted definition proposed by North (1990) is that 
institutions are the rules established by society to govern behavior and interaction 
amongst agents. In this sense, institutions are of higher quality if the rules are fair, 
transparent, easy to implement and difficult to contravene. Thus corruption — defined 
as the use of public office for private gain in disregard of the prevalent morality and 
laws (Shleifer and Vishny 1993, Sandholtz 2000, Lambsdorff 2002, Aidt 2003) — is a 
symptom of poor institutional quality. To be even more specific, Lambsdorff (2002) 
considers corruption as a subset of artificial rent-seeking. Whereas lobbying for 
example is open to anyone, entry into corruption is more restricted. In this framework, 
the availability of artificial rents leads to corruption amongst other legal rent-seeking 
activities as well.  
The established rules are enforced by the bureaucracy as the agent of the 
government (Rauch and Evans 2000, Aidt 2003). Thus an inefficient and corrupt 
bureaucracy is another reflection of poor institutional quality considered in this 
chapter. Then clearly, if the bureaucracy has discretion over the distribution of rents 
that are created as a result of government-imposed restrictions, it acquires the 
opportunity to extract part of the rents for private gain, leading to an erosion of its 
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quality. Ades and Di Tella (1997, 1999) show (using the popular principal-agent 
framework) that availability of rents lead to corruption by the agent (bureaucracy).  
3.2.3 Trade in Natural Resources and Institutional Quality 
The rent-seeking literature is also related to the natural resource curse literature. This 
literature points out that natural resource abundance or windfall gains lead to poor 
economic performance (Sach and Warner 1995, 1999, 2001; Tornell and Lane 1996, 
1998, 1999). Other than the more conventional arguments, one of the links identified 
between natural resource abundance and growth is institutional quality (Leitte and 
Weidmann 1999, Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian 2003, Papyrakis and Gerlagh 2004, 
Isham et al 2005, Robinson et al 2006). The impact of these resources on political 
institutions in the context of the so called ‘rentier states’ is examined in the previous 
chapter, but here I am concerned with examining the impact of the consequent export 
structure on corruption and bureaucratic quality.  
Natural resource exploitation and exports are commonly controlled by the 
government, and this confers discretion over who can access the rents.30 The 
competition for natural resource rents will engender corruption and an erosion of 
bureaucratic quality just as the competition for other policy induced artificially 
contrived rents does. Moreover other than the consequent artificial rent-seeking, 
exports of these resources also create powerful natural monopolies due to the 
economies of scale inherent in natural resource exploitation. In the Levchencko and Do 
(2009) model when certain firms grow disproportionately large, these firms prefer 
                                                             
30 Similar to the discretion that arises from other government-imposed restrictions. 
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higher fixed costs of entry (worse institutional quality) to discourage competition. Sala-
i-Martin and Subramanian (2003) and Isham et al (2005) empirically demonstrate that 
exports of natural resources are associated with worse economic institutions in a cross 
section of countries. 
3.2.4 Analytical Framework 
This chapter embeds the direct link between trade and institutions — the effect of 
trade intensity — within a framework that also accounts for the nature of the trade 
policy regime. Theoretically, trade intensity (the volume of trade as given by the trade 
to GDP ratio) impacts institutional quality through the foreign competition effect and 
the political economy effect as pointed out by the literature discussed earlier. The 
nature of a country’s trade policy influences institutional quality through the rent-
seeking channel. I integrate the two strands of the literature, and hypothesize that 
trade intensity potentially improves institutional quality only if possibilities for artificial 
rent-seeking do not exist. I term trade in the absence of policy restrictions as 
liberalized trade. In the presence of trade restrictions that open up avenues for seeking 
artificial rent, increased trade intensity has a negative impact on institutional quality.  
As an extension, trade in natural resources (especially exports) similarly harms 
institutional quality because of the artificial rents involved. I hypothesize that an open 
trade policy reduces the amount of artificial rents associated with natural resources; 
therefore liberalized trade in natural resources is not quite as harmful to institutional 
quality. While for natural resources it is exports in particular which are likely to be 
linked with institutional quality, for other kinds of trade both exports and imports can 
be expected to have an effect. Both export and import intensity could have a bearing 
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on the quality of institutions through the foreign competition and the political 
economy effects. Similarly government policies that foster rent-seeking can be 
relevant for both exporters and importers. The difference in the impact of (liberalized 
and un-liberalized) exports versus imports is an open question and therefore 
worthwhile comparing through an empirical analysis.  
As a final point, I consider trade policy to be exogenously determined in this 
chapter, and investigate the impact of the subsequent liberalized and un-liberalized 
trade on institutional quality. The seminal papers on rent-seeking (Tullock 1967; 
Krueger 1974; Bhagwati 1980, 1982) considered the welfare impact of exogenously set 
distortionary policies which lead to artificial rent-seeking and institutional 
deterioration. However, since then a great deal of work within both the rent-seeking 
and international trade literature has endogenized trade policy (Brock and Magee 
1978, 1984; Findlay and Wellisz 1982, 1983, 1984; Krueger 1992; Alt et al 1996). It has 
been shown that the institutional environment, as well as the already existing rent-
seeking efforts, influences the formulation of policy; the domestic political economy 
considerations play a major role in determining the level of tariffs, quotas, and other 
kinds of trade protection. While recognizing the potential reverse causality between 
institutions and trade policy, I am primarily interested only in exploring how 
institutional quality responds to trade. However, for the purpose of an empirical 
investigation, endogeneity of trade policy is an important issue which is addressed 
through the use of a system GMM estimation strategy.  
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3.2 Empirical Model  
Motivated by the discussion in the preceding section, the econometric specifications to 
be estimated in turn are:  
Insti,t = α0 + α1 log(ypc)i,t-3 + α2 openi,t-3  + α3 tradei,t-3 + α4(open * trade)i,t-3  + α5 Xi,t-3 + βt 
+ μi + εi,t          (3.1) 
Insti,t = α0 + α1 log(ypc)i,t-3 +α2 openi,t-3  + α3 exporti,t-3 + α4 (open * export)i,t-3  + α5 Xi,t-3 + 
βt + μi + εi,t          (3.2) 
Insti,t = α0 + α1 log(ypc)i,t-3 +α2 openi,t-3  + α3 importi,t-3 + α4 (open * import)i,t-3  + α5 Xi,t-3 + 
βt + μi + εi,t          (3.3) 
where, 
Subscripts i,t : country ‘i’ in year ‘t’.  
Inst: Measures institutional quality. Three different indicators are separately used in 
each of the three equations namely corruption (corr), bureaucratic quality (bq), and an 
additive combination of the previous two (comp). The rationale for using comp is 
explained in the next section. 
log(ypc): The log of real per capita GDP in purchasing power parity terms 
open: The Sachs and Warner binary openness index. It takes a value of 1 for countries 
with an open (liberalized) policy regime, and 0 for countries with closed (un-
liberalized) policy regime.  
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trade: The ratio of total trade to gross domestic product. It represents un-liberalized 
trade in this model.  
export: The ratio of exports to gross domestic product. It represents un-liberalized 
exports in this model.  
imports: The ratio of imports to gross domestic product. It represents un-liberalized 
imports in this model.  
open * trade: A multiplicative interaction variable which represents the difference 
between the impact of liberalized and un-liberalized trade in this model.  
open * exports: A multiplicative interaction variable which represents the difference 
between the impact of liberalized and un-liberalized exports in this model.  
open * imports: A multiplicative interaction variable which represents the difference 
between the impact of liberalized and un-liberalized imports in this model. 
X: A vector of additional control variables. The variables included are the log of 
population (lpop), a measure for the degree of political openness (pol), and a measure 
for the amount of natural resource rents available in a country (nrrents). 
β: A set of dummy variables for each year except for the first (1987) to capture time 
varying shocks that are common to all countries. These reflect global trends in 
institutional quality. 
μ: Country-specific and time-invariant fixed factors. Capture the invariant country 
characteristics correlated with both the dependent variable and the explanatory 
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variables. These include geography, historical experience, legal origin, ethno-linguistic 
fragmentation and culture 
ε: the idiosyncratic error term, capturing all other determinants of institutional quality. 
 The Sachs and Warner binary index for the openness of the trade policy regime 
separates the sample into two groups of countries — those with a liberalized trade 
policy regime, classified as 1, and those with an un-liberalized regime, classified as 0. 
The model thus allows differentiation between the impacts of trade intensity on 
institutional quality for the two groups.31 While the coefficient α3 is the estimated 
impact of trade intensity on institutional quality for countries which are closed, α4 is 
the difference in the impact of trade intensity on institutional quality between 
countries with open and closed trade policy regimes. Thus α3 + α4  is the estimated 
impact of trade intensity on institutional quality for countries with a liberalized policy 
regime. Based on the hypothesis that un-liberalized trade is harmful for institutional 
quality and liberalized trade improves it, the expected sign of α3 is negative and the 
expected sign of α3 + α4 is positive.  
 The relation of both exports and imports with institutional quality is estimated 
through Equations (3.2) and (3.3) in addition to the relation between total trade (sum 
of exports and imports) and institutional quality through Equation (3.1). Having 
otherwise identical equations with only trade being replaced by exports and imports 
allows me to investigate whether the liberalized (and un-liberalized) impact of each of 
                                                             
31 The model estimates separate intercepts and slopes (the partial impact of trade on 
institutional quality) for the two groups. 
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these with institutional quality differs quantitatively and qualitatively. All explanatory 
variables enter the econometric specification with a lag because any impact of trade 
on institutional quality is unlikely to be immediate. The choice of the third lag is 
discussed further in Section 3.5. 
The other variables are included in the specification in order to address 
potential omitted variable bias. The log of income per capita is a measure for the level 
of development — economic development is plausibly correlated with both 
institutional quality and trade patterns (Rodrik et al 2004). The vector of additional 
control variables consists of the log of total population (lpop), a measure for political 
openness or the extent of democracy (pol), and also a measure for the total amount of 
natural resource rents available in a country (nrrents). Each of these variables is a 
possible determinant of institutional quality, while at the same time being plausibly 
correlated with trade intensity and policy. There is a relationship between population 
and indicators of institutional quality because the multi-national organizations which 
construct these indicators tend to focus on countries which are large, and for smaller 
countries those which are well governed (Knack and Azfar 2003). At the same time, 
according to a substantial literature in international trade theory, population is also a 
determinant of trade flows (e.g. Frankel and Romer 1999). Similarly, there are also 
reasons to believe that the nature of the political regime prevalent in a country 
influences other dimensions of institutional quality such as corruption and 
bureaucratic quality (Mohatdi and Roe 2003, Rock 2009), while also impacting both 
trade intensity and trade policy (Rodrik 1998, Rodrik and Rigobon 2005). Finally, as 
already discussed, the natural resource curse literature suggests a link between natural 
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resource rents and institutional quality. At the same time, it is also obvious that the 
presence of natural resources is an important influence on the pattern of trade that a 
country engages in.  
As discussed in the previous Section, I am also interested in investigating the 
impact of trade in natural resources on institutional quality. Natural resources are of 
specific interest because of the artificial rents involved in the exploitation and trade of 
these commodities. Therefore three further equations which are similar to the 
previous econometric specifications are estimated in turn: 
Insti,t = α0 + α1 log(ypc)i,t-3 + α2 openi,t-3  + α3 natrestradei,t-3 + α4 (open * natrestrade)i,t-3  
+ α5 Xi,t-3 + βt + μi + εi,t           (3.4) 
Insti,t = α0 + α1 log(ypc)i,t-3 + α2 openi,t-3  + α3 natresexporti,t-3+α4 (open * natresexport)i,t-3  
+ α5 Xi,t-3 + βt + μi + εi,t           (3.5) 
Insti,t = α0 +α1 log(ypc)i,t-3 + α2 openi,t-3  + α3 natresimporti,t-3 + α4 (open*natresimport)i,t-3  
+ α5 Xi,t-3 + βt + μi + εi,t             (3.6) 
where in addition to the variables already discussed, 
natrestrade: The ratio of total trade in natural resources to GDP. This represents un-
liberalized trade in natural resources in this model. The expected sign of the coefficient 
is negative. 
natresexports:  The ratio of exports of natural resources to GDP. This represents un-
liberalized exports of natural resources in this model. The expected sign of the 
coefficient is negative. 
96 
 
natresimports: The ratio of imports of natural resources to GDP. This represents un-
liberalized imports of natural resources in this model. The expected sign of the 
coefficient is negative. 
open * natrestrade: An interaction variable representing the difference between the 
impact of liberalized and un-liberalized trade in natural resources. The expected sign of 
the coefficient is positive. 
open * natresexport: An interaction variable representing the difference between the 
impact of liberalized and un-liberalized exports in natural resources. The expected sign 
of the coefficient is positive. 
open * natresimport: An interaction variable representing the difference between the 
impact of liberalized and un-liberalized imports in natural resources. The expected sign 
of the coefficient is positive. 
 
3.3 Variable Construction and Data Sources 
The empirical investigation is carried out using a panel data set covering 114 
countries over the time period 1984-2008. The country coverage is dictated primarily 
by the availability of data for the Sachs and Warner binary openness indicator and the 
time coverage is limited by the data measuring institutional quality 
Three different measures for the dependent variable (institutional quality) are 
considered. One reflection of poor institutional quality is corruption by government 
officials — the use of public office for private gain. A corrupt and inefficient 
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bureaucracy is another manifestation. The source of the indicators measuring the level 
of corruption (corr) and the quality of the bureaucracy (bq) is the International Country 
Risk Guide (ICRG) provided by the PRS group (2008). These indicators, as well as those 
measuring various other aspects of institutional quality provided by the same source, 
are constructed on the basis of subjective assessment by experts. The data are 
primarily meant as a guide for foreign investors, but have been widely used in the 
empirical literature as well. The third measure is a composite indicator (comp) 
constructed as the additive sum of corr and bq to be a more complete measure of 
institutional quality, as explained shortly. The dataset available for this Chapter runs 
from 1984 to 2008. 
The corruption index (corr) is an assessment of not only direct financial 
corruption encountered by businesses in dealing with the government, but also 
political corruption such as “excessive patronage, nepotism, job reservations, favour-
for-favours, secret party funding, and suspiciously close ties between politics and 
business”(ICRG 2008, page 31). Thus it is a broad measure that represents the type of 
artificial rent-seeking activities that translates into poor institutional quality. The 
indicator runs on a discrete scale from 0 to 6, with higher values indicating less 
corruption. The bureaucratic quality index is an assessment of the ability of the 
bureaucracy to implement policy and carry out administrative functions in an effective 
manner based on transparent procedures. Efficient bureaucracies tend to be 
autonomous from political pressures and have established rule-based mechanisms for 
recruitment, promotions, and postings. A bureaucracy that does not have these 
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attributes will operate in a discretionary and erratic manner. The indicator runs on a 
discrete scale from 0 to 4, with higher values representing a better bureaucracy.  
Both corruption and bureaucratic quality are closely related, but still capture 
distinct aspects of institutional quality. Even though both the indicators are 
constructed by the same organization, these are positively but not perfectly 
correlated. In fact, the pair-wise correlation coefficient is only 0.67. The composite 
institutional quality indicator captures both aspects to an almost equal degree (its 
correlation with both corr and bq is almost 0.9). In terms of the theory discussed in 
Section 3.2, it is difficult to disentangle the relative importance of corruption and 
bureaucratic quality, thus providing a rationale for the use of the composite indicator 
which is a more complete measure. Also, it conveniently runs from 0-10, thus 
potentially providing more variation in data than either corr or bq.32 
 The main explanatory variables of interest are trade (and similarly export and 
import in Equations (3.2) and (3.3) respectively) and its interaction with the binary 
variable open. Trade (similarly export and import) intensity is the ratio of total trade to 
GDP and is obtained from the World Development Indicators (WDI). The variable open 
is the Sachs and Warner (1995) liberalization index, which has been updated by 
Wacziarg and Welch (2003 and 2008). This index classifies a country as having a closed 
trade policy for a given year if it fulfils any of five different criteria. These five criteria 
                                                             
32 I alternatively constructed comp by converting both corr and bq to a common scale 
(0-5), and then added them. It makes practically no difference to the results reported 
in Section 3.7. 
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are average tariff rates of more than 40 percent, non-tariff barriers covering more than 
40 percent of trade, a black market exchange rate premium of more than 20 percent, a 
state monopoly on major exports, and a socialist economic system. Each of the five 
criteria underlying the liberalization index represents a restriction on trade. It is 
obvious that the first two directly limit trade. The other three capture indirect barriers. 
All of these are government induced policy distortions which give rise to rent-seeking. 
In our framework trade in the presence of any of these restrictions should be 
associated with poorer institutional quality.  
Sachs and Warner (1995) originally constructed the index for 111 countries for 
the time period 1950-1994. The index has been criticized as being an imperfect 
indicator of trade openness (e.g. Rodriguez and Rodrik 2000). In particular, the decisive 
criteria in classifying a country as open or closed appear to be the black market 
exchange rate and state monopoly on major exports rather than price or quantity 
restrictions. Wacziarg and Welch (2003, 2008) agree that using the index in cross-
sectional studies is problematic. However they suggest that using dates of 
liberalization — the year following which a country remains open with respect to each 
of five criteria — is more sensible. This is because liberalization dates are not driven 
merely by changes in the black market premium or abolition of state monopolies on 
exports, but reflect broader liberalization. They also update the index until 2001, and 
expand it to include a further 22 countries. For this study I extrapolate the time period 
until 2005, based on the uninterrupted date of liberalization provided by Wacziarg and 
Welch.  
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 The variable GDP per capita (ypc) is measured in year 2000 US dollars and in 
purchasing power parity terms, and obtained from the Penn World Tables (PWT) of 
Heston et al (2011). The data for population (pop) and natural resource rents (nrrents) 
are obtained from the WDI. The data for population provided by WDI is based on 
national censuses, with extrapolations for the intervening years based on demographic 
models. Natural resource rents are defined as the difference in the world price and the 
cost of production, and are the sum of rents from oil, natural gas, coal, minerals, and 
forests. The indicator for political openness (pol) is from the Polity IV project run by 
Marshall et al (2010), and ranges from -10 for absolutely autocratic to 10 for perfectly 
democratic countries.  
In Equations (3.4)-(3.6) the main explanatory variables are trade, exports and 
imports of natural resources respectively, along with their interactions with the Sachs 
and Warner openness indicator. Based on the definition of natural resources provided 
by the WTO  (World Trade Report 2010), natural resources trade (and similarly export 
and imports) is defined as the sum of trade in raw materials, fuel, and metal and ores. I 
obtain these data from WDI, which itself derives these from the Comtrade database 
maintained by the United Nations Statistics Division. The classification of commodity 
groups is based on Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) Revision 3. Raw 
materials consist of SITC Section 2 (crude materials except fuels), excluding Divisions 
22, 27, and 28. Fuel comprises SITC Section 3, whereas metals and ores are made up of 
Divisions 27, 28 and 68. WDI provides data for the trade flows of specific commodity 
groups as a ratio of merchandise trade, while also providing merchandize trade as a 
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proportion of GDP. Therefore the conversion of the specific commodity group trade as 
a proportion of GDP is straightforward.  
Finally, I also provide descriptive statistics for trade flows (and similarly exports 
and imports flows) of some other commodity groups across the countries that are 
classified as open and closed according to the Sachs and Warner criteria. This includes 
manufacturing, food and commercial services, all as a proportion of GDP and obtained 
also from WDI. While these are not incorporated separately into the econometric 
model and thus no conclusions can be drawn about the statistical association of trade 
in these commodities with institutional quality, they do provide some insight and the 
basis for useful discussion on how trading patterns differ across open and closed 
countries. Also presented are descriptive statistics for education as a measure of 
prosperity in addition to real income per capita. The variable used is gross secondary 
school enrolment obtained from WDI. It is not incorporated as a control variable 
because there is no pressing reason to believe that secondary school enrolment is 
correlated with trade policy or intensity. Moreover, this variable is only available for a 
greatly limited group of countries. 
 
3.4 Estimation Methodology 
The Equations (3.1)-(3.6) are initially estimated by the fixed effects regression 
technique widely used in the cross-country empirical literature. The inclusion of a 
separate intercept in the model for each country controls for time-invariant and 
country-specific factors such as geography, culture, historical experience and ethno- 
linguistic fractionalization. These factors are thought to be potentially important 
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determinants of institutional quality (Acemoglu et al 2001, 2005b, 2008), besides being 
plausibly correlated with the explanatory variables. The regression technique involves 
estimation after demeaning the equation to purge the fixed effects. The inclusion of 
country-specific fixed effects in the model mitigates possible omitted variable bias. 
Moreover, unlike the pooled OLS technique the estimated coefficients from the fixed 
effects regression isolate the within-country relationship between the explanatory 
variables and institutional quality. For example, the estimated coefficient for 
liberalized trade tells us how on average institutional quality responds to changes in 
liberalized trade within a given country (Acemoglu 2008). For the purpose of 
comparison, however, I also report results from pooled OLS regressions of Equations 
(3.1)-(3.6). 
The explanatory variables enter the econometric specification with a lag 
because I am interested in investigating how institutional quality responds to changes 
in liberalized or un-liberalized trade — the impact of increases in trade on future 
institutional quality. Data for institutional quality are available for the time period 
1984-2008, whereas data for trade policy only run until 2005. Thus I choose the lag 
length to be three in order to utilize the latest available data. However, a different lag 
length for the explanatory variables does not make a substantial difference to the 
estimation results. 
The combination of the fixed effects regression technique along with the use of 
lagged explanatory variables partially addresses the endogeneity concern that I 
discussed at the end of Section 3.2. However, there are also reasons to include the 
lagged institutional quality on the right-hand side of Equations (3.1)-(3.6). Institutional 
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quality is thought to be persistent with the present quality dictating the future 
(Acemoglu et al 2006c). Yet with the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable on the 
right-hand side, fixed effects regression does not estimate consistently. This is because 
the lagged dependent variable is correlated with the error term, which violates the 
condition for consistent estimation.  
Thus I re-estimate Equations (3.1)-(3.6) after incorporating lagged institutional 
quality using the system Generalized Method of Moments technique developed by 
Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998), which augments the 
difference GMM technique suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991). System GMM 
estimates the impact of the explanatory variables on changes in institutional quality. 
This procedure involves differencing the equations through either subtracting the 
previous observations of the variables, or alternatively subtracting from it the average 
of all future available observations of the variables. The second method of 
differencing, known as ‘forward orthogonal deviations’, is preferable when dealing 
with an unbalanced panel such as the one used for this study (Roodman 2009a). Then 
the differenced lagged institutional quality can be instrumented by all previous lags of 
institutional quality as these are uncorrelated with the differenced error term. 
Additional moment conditions can be derived by instrumenting the lagged institutional 
quality in the original levels equation by its contemporaneous and lagged first 
differences, as these are uncorrelated with the error term.    
The system GMM estimation has an important advantage besides allowing 
consistent estimation of an equation that controls for the lagged dependent variable. 
It allows the explanatory variables to be either endogenous or weakly exogenous 
104 
 
(predetermined). In order to estimate the model, I impose the restriction that the main 
explanatory variables are predetermined. This means that they can be correlated with 
the past error terms as long as they are not correlated with the current error term. In 
other words the exclusion restriction is that for a given predetermined variable (y), 
E(yi,t, εi,s) = 0 for s ≥ t, but E(yi,t, εi,s) ≠ 0 for s < t. Because our explanatory variables are 
specified in the equation with a lag, this effectively means that they are endogenous. 
So for example Tradei,t-3 can be correlated with εi,t-3. The predetermined variables are 
then instrumented in the same way as the lagged dependent variable.  
The fact that the econometric equations can be consistently estimated even 
when the explanatory variables are not exogenous allows us to deal with the problem 
of likely reverse causality from institutional quality to trade policy and intensity, and 
establish a causal relation. The system GMM estimation technique provides us with a 
set of internal instruments, rather than having to search for external instruments 
which are highly correlated with trade policy or intensity, but do not impact 
institutions through any other channel. This would be a very difficult task, and the 
validity of such an instrument can always be argued against. 
For the estimation of Equations (3.1)-(3.6) through system GMM, I do not 
include the vector of additional control variables. Including the additional variables 
leads to the problem of instrument proliferation — if the set of instruments is large 
relative to the number of observations it causes an over-fitting bias (Roodman 2009b). 
However because the explanatory variables can be correlated with the error term, 
there is no pressing reason to worry about omitted variables. If omission of the 
additional control variables leads to a bias, it would be reflected in the ‘Hansen test of 
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over-identifying restrictions’ which I report with the estimation results. This test checks 
for the validity of the instrument set under the null hypothesis that this set is 
exogenous. For the same reason (to avoid instrument proliferation) I only take 
observations occurring every third year, rather than using annual observations as is 
done for the pooled OLS and fixed effects regressions. It has been pointed out widely 
in the literature that system GMM works best for small T (time interval) and large N 
(countries) (e.g. Roodman 2009a, Jayasuriya and Burke 2013).    
 
3.6 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3.A1 in the appendix of this chapter presents the descriptive statistics 
including the means, standard deviations, minimums, and maximums of the variables 
used, as well as the number of observations and countries in the estimation sample. 
Tables 3.A2 and 3.A3 report these statistics separately for the group of countries that 
are open and closed respectively according to the Sachs and Warner criteria. In 
addition, in each of the tables I also report the descriptive statistics for other variables 
— trade, exports and imports of certain other types of merchandise trade as well as 
secondary school enrolment — which are not employed in the econometric model but 
reveal on average significant differences across open and closed countries.  
 Table 3.A1 for the overall sample demonstrates that all variables exhibit a 
substantial amount of variation. This is expected in a large cross-country sample which 
includes countries at all stages of development. For example, the minimum real 
income per capita (in PPP terms) in the sample is $101 while the maximum is $68,000. 
As another example, trade as a proportion of GDP varies from 0.31 to 430 percent.   
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 Tables 3.A2 and 3.A3 are more interesting as they reveal striking differences 
between open and closed countries. Both the corruption and bureaucratic quality 
indicators are on average better for countries that have an open (liberalized) trade 
policy regime. These countries are also substantially more democratic — one standard 
deviation less than the mean political openness score for open countries is still higher 
than the mean score for closed countries.33 The average real GDP per capita of open 
countries is almost three times higher and secondary school enrolment almost twice. 
Better average scores for institutional quality, political openness, GDP per capita and 
education suggest that open countries are more prosperous. On the other hand these 
countries possess substantially less natural resource rents as a proportion of GDP – 
almost a third of the rents available in closed countries on average. Open countries are 
also much smaller in terms of population size, the mean being almost half of that of 
closed countries.  
 The trading patterns also reveal interesting differences, in line with the 
hypothesis of this study. The mean of trade as a proportion of GDP is higher by 20 
percentage points for the sample of open countries. These countries export and import 
more in equal measure. This difference is reflected across the two sets of countries by 
the means of manufacturing trade, exports and imports as a proportion of GDP. On the 
other hand, the mean of trade in natural resources as a proportion of GDP is more 
than 4 percentage points lower for open countries. However, that is only true for 
exports, and not for imports. On average closed countries appear to be natural 
                                                             
33 Open and closed henceforth refers to the nature of the trade policy regime. This 
terminology is used interchangeably with liberalized and un-liberalized. 
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resource exporters, while open countries import these resources. Closed countries also 
trade more in food items as a proportion of GDP; however, unlike for natural 
resources, closed countries both import and export more on average. Finally, closed 
countries on average import more, and export less, commercial services as a share of 
GDP.  
 Tables 3.A4, 3.A5, and 3.A6 report the pair-wise correlations amongst the 
variables. These tables demonstrate the difference in trading patterns across the two 
sets of countries in a different way. The Sachs and Warner openness indicator has a 
positive correlation with overall trade, exports, and imports. This is reflected even 
more starkly by manufacturing trade, exports, and imports. The correlation of the 
openness indicator is negative only with exports of natural resources. With food items 
this is true for imports as well. Finally, the correlation of the openness indicator is 
positive with commercial services exports and negative with imports.  
These three tables also reveal the pair-wise correlations of the institutional 
quality indicators with the other variables. Both corruption and bureaucratic quality 
have a higher positive correlation with trade intensity for the sample of countries that 
have open trade policy regimes, as is expected. The institutional quality indicators are 
positively correlated with manufacturing and commercial services trade (both exports 
and imports). On the other hand their partial correlations with natural resources trade 
and in particular exports are negative. Both exports and imports of food items have a 
negative correlation with the indicators.   
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 The descriptive statistics relating to the data that I use for the econometric 
analysis, provide broad support for the hypotheses of this study, and set the stage for 
a discussion of the regression analysis in the next Section. 
 
3.7 Estimation Results 
3.7.1 Regression Results for Equations (3.1)-(3.3) 
Tables 3.1-3.3 present the fixed effects regression results for Equations (3.1)-
(3.3) respectively.34 Corruption (corr), bureaucratic quality (bq) and the composite 
indicator (comp) enter, in turn, as the dependent variables in each table.35 Tables 3.A7-
3.A10 contain the corresponding pooled OLS regression results presented only for 
comparison, and will not be the focus of the discussion. The first regression for each of 
the institutional quality variables (Column 1 for corruption, Column 4 for bureaucratic 
quality and Column 7  for the composite indicator) does not comprise of the complete 
model, and only includes the Sachs and Warner openness indicator (open) and trade 
intensity (trade) as the explanatory variables. This regression shows the association of 
trade intensity with institutional quality for the entire sample, ignoring the difference 
between un-liberalized and liberalized. The next regression for each of the dependent 
variables adds the interaction variable. A comparison of the two sets of regressions 
                                                             
34 As a reminder trade is the explanatory variable in Equation 3.1 (Table 3.1), exports in 
Equation 3.2 (Table 3.2) and imports in Equation 3.3 (Table 3.3) 
35 Also as a reminder, higher values of institutional measures imply better institutional 
quality. 
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demonstrates the impact of introducing the distinction between liberalized and un-
liberalized. The final regressions also include the set of control variables.  
The regression results reported in Table 3.1 for Equation (3.1) partly confirm 
our hypotheses. While there is no evidence that un-liberalized trade is harmful for 
institutional quality at a reasonable level of statistical significance, liberalized trade is 
associated with better bureaucratic quality and a higher composite institutional score 
at the ten percent level of significance.36 The coefficient of the interaction term (open 
* trade) indicates the difference in the impact of trade on institutional quality in open 
countries relative to its impact in closed countries; in other words, the difference 
between the association of liberalized and un-liberalized trade with institutional 
quality. The sum of coefficients for trade and (open * trade) is the impact of liberalized 
trade.  
If I do not differentiate between liberalized and un-liberalized trade (Columns 
1, 4 and 7), neither the coefficient of openness nor of trade intensity explain 
institutional quality. On the other hand when the distinction between liberalized and 
un-liberalized trade is introduced in Columns (2), (5), and (8) through the inclusion of 
the interaction term (open * trade), I find that only the coefficient of the interaction 
term is significant at the five percent level. Un-liberalized trade shows little statistically 
                                                             
36 However, with corruption as the institutional quality variable in Columns (1)-(3), 
there is no evidence that liberalized trade lowers corruption (i.e. improves institutional 
quality) at a reasonable level of statistical significance. Nevertheless, the coefficient of 
the interaction variable indicates that relative to un-liberalized trade, trade after 
liberalization is associated with lower corruption.   
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significant association with institutional quality. For each of the dependent variables 
the coefficient of the interaction term (open * trade) is positive and larger in 
magnitude than the (negative) coefficient of un-liberalized trade, indicating that the 
partial correlation of liberalized trade with institutional quality is positive. Adding the 
control variables in Columns (3), (6), and (9) does not change the results to any 
noticeable degree.37  
Column (9) for example shows that an increase in liberalized trade by 10 
percentage points is associated with a 0.1 point (=0.13-0.03) improvement in the 
composite indicator. This improvement is a 1 percentage point increase.38 The impact 
of liberalized trade on comp is significantly different from zero at the ten percent level. 
Looking at the underlying institutional quality measures separately, such an increase in 
liberalized trade would improve the corruption score by 3 percentage points (Column 
3) and the bureaucratic quality score by 7 percentage points (Column 6).39  
To put this in a different way, a one standard deviation increase in the trade to 
GDP ratio is associated with more than a third of a standard deviation improvement in 
comp.40 For example, if Pakistan liberalized and then traded as much as Thailand 
(increased its trade to GDP ratio by almost 40 percentage points), keeping everything 
                                                             
37 The coefficients overlap within one standard error band. 
38 Here and henceforth, a percentage point is defined as the change in the variable as a 
proportion of its total range. 
39 The impact on corruption is however not different from zero at a reasonable level of 
statistical significance. 
40 Here and henceforth, this calculation is based on the estimated coefficients, and the 
standard deviations of the variables as reported in Table 3.A1. 
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else constant, its composite institutional quality score is predicted to improve by more 
than 10 percent of its existing score.41 
Table 3.2 reports the regression results for Equation (3.2); exports are now the 
main explanatory variable. Similar to the results for total trade, the first regression for 
each dependent variable demonstrates that without the distinction between 
liberalized and un-liberalized, neither the coefficient of openness nor of export 
intensity explains institutional quality at a statistically significant level. However, 
whereas liberalized (but not un-liberalized)  trade explains institutional quality with 
precision once the interaction variable is added, now un-liberalized exports exhibit a 
statistically significant association at the ten percent level with corruption and the 
composite indicator. Un-liberalized exports increase corruption and deteriorate 
composite institutional quality. Relative to un-liberalized exports, the impact of 
liberalized exports on all three institutional quality variables is positive.42 For instance 
Column (9) shows that an un-liberalized increase in the export to GDP ratio by 10 
percentage points is associated with a 1.2 percentage point deterioration in the 
composite indicator. There is no evidence that a similar increase in liberalized exports 
decreases the composite indicator; in fact compared to un-liberalized a similar 
increase in liberalized exports improves comp by 2.6 percentage points.  
 
                                                             
41 The existing comp score for Pakistan is 3.92. 
42 However there is no evidence that the overall impact of liberalized exports on corr 
and comp is positive at a reasonable level of significance. Nevertheless the impact on 
bq is positive at the ten percent level of significance. 
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Table 3.1. Fixed Effects Regression Results for Institutional Quality (Equation 3.1) 
 
 Corruption Bureaucratic Quality Composite Inst Quality 
 
Ind Var (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Log(YPC) -0.399 
(0.291) 
-0.421 
(0.282) 
-0.337 
(0.305) 
0.560*** 
(0.213) 
0.535*** 
(0.201) 
0.539** 
(0.234) 
0.161 
(0.420) 
0.114 
(0.396) 
0.201 
(0.443) 
Open   0.069 
(0.133) 
-0.226 
(0.218) 
-0.299 
(0.218) 
0.205 
(0.153) 
-0.146 
(0.221) 
-0.200 
(0.224) 
0.274 
(0.223) 
-0.372 
(0.395) 
-0.499 
(0.386) 
Trade  0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.003 
(0.002) 
-0.003 
(0.002) 
0.004 
(0.003) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
0.000 
(0.002) 
0.005 
(0.004) 
-0.004 
(0.004) 
-0.003 
(0.004) 
Trade  
*Open  
 0.005* 
(0.003) 
0.006** 
(0.003) 
 0.006** 
(0.003) 
0.007** 
(0.003) 
 0.012** 
(0.005) 
0.013** 
(0.005) 
log(pop)   0.318 
(0.539) 
  0.097 
(0.450) 
  0.415 
(0.805) 
Polity2    0.016 
(0.011) 
  0.005 
(0.010) 
  0.021 
(0.018 
NRRents    0.001 
(0.003) 
  -0.003 
(0.003) 
  -0.002 
(0.004) 
Obs 2554 2554 2433 2554 2554 2433 2554 2554 2433 
Countries 114 114 109 114 114 109 114 114 109 
‘α3 + α4 = 
0’ 
 0.367 0.388  0.028 0.009  0.093 0.061 
T.E incl Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.810 0.812 0.805 0.848 0.852 0.848 0.865 0.867 0.863 
R2(within) 0.264 0.270 0.272 0.100 0.116 0.124 0.139 0.157 0.164 
Notes: A constant is included in all regressions but not reported. Annual 
observations of the dependent variable are used from 1987-2008. The explanatory 
variables are lagged by three years. Robust standard errors clustered by countries 
reported in parenthesis. TE refers to the set of time dummies. The statistic reported 
for ‘α3 + α4 = 0’ is the p-value of the F statistic testing that ‘Trade + (Trade * Open)’ 
equals zero. The R2 refers to the coefficient of determination from estimation of the 
equivalent Least Squares Dummy Variable Model (LSDV).                                                                                                                                        
*Significant at the 10% level                                                                                                               
**Significant at the 5% level                                                                                                                  
***Significant at the 1% level 
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Table 3.2. Fixed Effects Regression Results for Institutional Quality (Equation 3.2) 
 
 Corruption Bureaucratic Quality Composite Inst Quality 
 
Ind Var (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
log(YPC)  -0.392 
(0.291) 
-0.410 
(0.279) 
-0.309 
(0.300) 
0.574*** 
(0.212) 
0.552*** 
(0.200) 
0.561** 
(0.231) 
0.182 
(0.418) 
0.143 
(0.388) 
0.252 
(0.428) 
Open   0.071 
(0.134) 
-0.204 
(0.200) 
-0.279 
(0.201) 
0.212* 
(0.125) 
-0.115 
(0.195) 
-0.166 
(0.199) 
0.283 
(0.227) 
-0.319 
(0.351) 
-0.445 
(0.345) 
Export  0.001 
(0.005) 
-0.007* 
(0.004) 
-0.008* 
(0.005) 
0.004 
(0.004) 
-0.005 
(0.004) 
-0.004 
(0.004) 
0.004 
(0.008) 
-0.012* 
(0.007) 
-0.012* 
(0.008) 
Export  
*Open  
 0.011** 
(0.005) 
0.012** 
(0.005) 
 0.013** 
(0.006) 
0.014** 
(0.006) 
 0.024** 
(0.010) 
0.026*** 
(0.010) 
log(pop)    0.366 
(0.545) 
  0.104 
(0.460) 
  0.470 
(0.812) 
Polity2    0.017 
(0.011) 
  0.006 
(0.010) 
  0.023 
(0.018) 
NRRents    0.002 
(0.003) 
  -0.002 
(0.003) 
  -0.000 
(0.004) 
Obs 2554 2554 2433 2554 2554 2433 2554 2554 2433 
Countries 114 114 109 114 114 109 114 114 109 
‘α3 + α4 = 
0’ 
 0.446 0.514  0.097 0.047  0.190 0.161 
T.E incl Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.810 0.812 0.805 0.847 0.851 0.848 0.864 0.868 0.863 
R2(within) 0.263 0.272 0.273 0.089 0.113 0.119 0.135 0.158 0.164 
Notes: A constant is included in all regressions but not reported. Annual 
observations of the dependent variable are used from 1987-2008. The explanatory 
variables are lagged by three years. Robust standard errors clustered by countries 
reported in parentheses. TE refers to the set of time dummies. The statistic reported 
for ‘α3 + α4 = 0’ is the p-value of the F statistic testing that ‘Export + (Export * Open)’ 
equals zero. The R2 refers to the coefficient of determination from estimation of the 
equivalent Least Squares Dummy Variable Model (LSDV).                                                                                                                                          
*Significant at the 10% level                                                                                                               
**Significant at the 5% level                                                                                                                  
***Significant at the 1% level 
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Table 3.3. Fixed Effects Regression Results for Institutional Qualityt (Equation 3.3) 
 
 Corruptiont Bureaucratic Qualityt Composite Inst Qualityt 
 
Ind Var (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
log(YPC)  -0.396 
(0.291) 
-0.420 
(0.287) 
-0.351 
(0.312) 
0.579*** 
(0.213) 
0.549*** 
(0.205) 
0.556** 
(0.238) 
0.183 
(0.420) 
0.130 
(0.406) 
0.205 
(0.459) 
Open  0.065 
(0.132) 
-0.182 
(0.222) 
-0.246 
(0.221) 
0.192 
(0.121) 
-0.1222 
(0.223) 
-0.178 
(0.227) 
0.257 
(0.220) 
-0.304 
(0.401) 
-0.424 
(0.393) 
Import  0.003 
(0.004) 
-0.003 
(0.004) 
-0.003 
(0.004) 
0.008** 
(0.003) 
0.002 
(0.004) 
0.003 
(0.004) 
0.011* 
(0.007) 
-0.001 
(0.006) 
0.000 
(0.006) 
Import  
*Open  
 0.008 
(0.006) 
0.009 
(0.006) 
 0.010* 
(0.006) 
0.011* 
(0.006) 
 0.020* 
(0.010) 
0.020** 
(0.010) 
log(pop)    0.260 
(0.534) 
  0.080 
(0.447) 
  0.340 
(0.811) 
Polity2    0.016 
(0.011) 
  0.003 
(0.010) 
  0.019 
(0.018) 
NRRents    0.000 
(0.003) 
  -0.003 
(0.003) 
  -0.003 
(0.004) 
Obs 2554 2554 2433 2554 2554 2433 2554 2554 2433 
Countries 114 114 109 114 114 109 114 114 109 
‘α3 + α4 = 
0’ 
 0.297 0.266  0.009 0.003  0.049 0.024 
T.E incl Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.810 0.811 0.804 0.850 0.852 0.849 0.865 0.867 0.863 
R2(within) 0.264 0.268 0.270 0.104 0.119 0.126 0.142 0.155 0.162 
Notes: A constant is included in all regressions but not reported. Annual 
observations of the dependent variable are used from 1987-2008. The explanatory 
variables are lagged by three years. Robust standard errors clustered by countries 
reported in parentheses. TE refers to the set of time dummies. The statistic reported 
for ‘α3 + α4 = 0’ is the p-value of the F statistic testing that ‘Import + (Import * Open)’ 
equals zero. The R2 refers to the coefficient of determination from estimation of the 
equivalent Least Squares Dummy Variable Model (LSDV).                                                                                                                         
*Significant at the 10% level                                                                                                               
**Significant at the 5% level                                                                                                                  
***Significant at the 1% level 
 
 
Table 3.3 presents the results for Equation (3.3), using imports as the main 
explanatory variable. Corruption is not explained with statistical precision by any of the 
regressors. However, even for bq and comp, the distinction between liberalized and 
un-liberalized imports is less clear. Even without the inclusion of the interaction term 
(open * imports) in the model, higher import intensity is associated at a significance 
level of at least ten percent with a better score for bureaucratic quality and the 
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composite indicator (Columns 4 and 7 respectively). A 10 percentage point increase in 
import intensity is associated with a 1.1 percentage point increase in comp. When the 
interaction variable is introduced, liberalized imports now positively explain 
institutional quality at a statistically significant level, whereas there is no evidence that 
un-liberalized imports hurt institutional quality. For example Column (9) shows that an 
increase in liberalized imports of 10 percentage points is associated with a 2 
percentage point improvement in the composite indicator, at the five percent level of 
significance.  
An interesting feature of the fixed effects results presented in Tables 3.1-3.3 is 
that GDP per capita is only correlated with bureaucratic quality — the coefficient is 
positive and statistically significant at the one percent level — and not with corruption. 
In fact the overall explanatory power (indicated by the R2) of the set of regressors is 
slightly higher as well for bureaucratic quality.  
Tables 3.A7-3.A8 report the corresponding pooled OLS regression results for 
Equations (3.1)-(3.3) and reveal interesting differences compared to the fixed effects 
results. Firstly, as expected, the overall explanatory power of the fixed effects 
regressions is higher (comparing the R2); an additional 30 to 40 percentage point 
variation in institutional quality is explained by fixed effects compared to the 
corresponding pooled OLS regressions. Secondly, income per capita is now positively 
associated with not only bureaucratic quality, but also with corruption at a highly 
significant level. Similarly, the control variables now appear significant. Democracy is 
associated with an improvement in the corruption score, while country size is 
correlated positively with bureaucratic quality. Moreover the Sachs and Warner 
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openness indicator, which did not appear important in explaining institutional quality 
in the within-country context (fixed effects regressions), now exhibits a more 
statistically significant association. Most of the explanatory power of these variables 
(income per capita, democracy, country size, and the openness indicator) disappears 
once country-specific factors are controlled for. Thus a comparison of the pooled OLS 
results with the fixed effects results reinforces the importance of the country-specific 
factors in explaining institutional quality and mitigating omitted variable bias. In 
contrast, the main variables of interest (liberalized and un-liberalized trade, exports, 
imports) appear to be more important in explaining institutional quality in the within-
country context. Compared to the pooled OLS, they are generally statistically more 
significant and robust to the inclusion of control variables in the fixed effects 
regressions. 
Finally, the system GMM regressions are presented in Table 3.4. This table 
reports the causal impact of liberalized as well as un-liberalized trade (in Columns 1 
and 2), exports (in Columns 3 and 4), and imports (in Columns 5 and 6) on the change 
in institutional quality over the subsequent three-year period. Here, and henceforth, I 
only report the regressions for the composite indicator as the institutional quality 
variable, and exclude corruption and bureaucratic quality in order to simplify the 
discussion. It has already been argued in Section 3.4 that the composite indicator is a 
more complete and thus suitable measure for our purpose. Neither do I report the 
regressions which include the control variables, as discussed in Section 3.5.  
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Table 3.4. System GMM Regression Results for Composite Institutional Quality 
(Equations 3.1-3.3) 
 
Ind Var (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Comp 0.8340*** 
(0.0342) 
0.8429*** 
(0.0298) 
0.8319*** 
(0.0316) 
0.8337*** 
(0.0302) 
0.8561*** 
(0.0334) 
0.8508*** 
(0.0283) 
log(YPC)  0.2660*** 
(0.0793) 
0.2276*** 
(0.0604) 
0.3050*** 
(0.0575) 
0.2415*** 
(0.0562) 
0.2009*** 
(0.0759) 
0.2169*** 
(0.0625) 
Open   -0.0548 
(0.1503) 
-0.3600 
(0.2614) 
-0.0426 
(0.1377) 
-0.3983 
(0.2434) 
-0.1171 
(0.1519) 
-0.2814 
(0.2701) 
Trade  0.0002 
(0.0016) 
-0.0050* 
(0.0026) 
    
Trade  
*Open  
 0.0052* 
(0.0028) 
    
Exports    -0.0013 
(0.0032) 
-0.0112** 
(0.0052) 
  
Exports  
*Open  
   0.0117** 
(0.0058) 
  
Imports      0.0026 
(0.0030) 
-0.0077 
(0.0050) 
Imports  
*Open  
     0.0081 
(0.0054) 
Obs  810 810 810 810 810 810 
Countries 114 114 114 114 114 114 
‘α3 + α4 = 0’  0.7918  0.7565  0.8326 
T.E included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Instruments 90 112 90 112 90 112 
Hansen j 
Test p-value 
0.128 0.292 0.135 0.267 0.100 0.323 
AR(2) Test 
p-value 
0.846 0.933 0.884 0.830 0.958 0.979 
Wald chi-sq 
statistic 
2267.08 3695.15 2848.24 3660.40 2130.34 3928.18 
Wald chi-sq 
p-value 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Notes:  A constant is included in all regressions but not reported. Observations of 
the dependent variable at 3 year intervals are used from 1987-2008.The explanatory 
variables are lagged by three years. Windmeijer-Corrected robust standard errors 
from the two-step GMM estimation shown in parentheses. TE refers to the set of 
time dummies. The statistic reported for ‘α3 + α4 = 0’ is the p-value of the F statistic 
testing that ‘Trade + (Trade * Open) = 0’ in Columns (1)-(3), ‘Export + (Export * Open) 
= 0’ in Columns (4)-(6), ‘Import + (Import * Open) = 0’ in Columns (7)-(9) 
respectively. Orthogonal forward deviations are used to purge fixed effects. All 
explanatory variables are treated as endogenous and instrumented by 2 lags.                                                                                                                                      
*Significant at the 10% level                                                                                                                
**Significant at the 5% level                                                                                                                            
***Significant at the 1% level 
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The diagnostics for all the system GMM regressions indicate that Equations 
(3.1)-(3.3) have been adequately estimated. The p-value of the Hansen test for over- 
identifying restrictions shows that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the 
instrument set is valid at the ten percent level of significance. Also, the estimation 
does not likely suffer from an over-fitting bias caused by over-instrumentation, as the 
p-value is not unrealistically high (Roodman 2009b, Jayasuriya and Burke 2013). The p-
value of the AR(2) test indicates that we cannot reject the null of no second order 
serial correlation of significance, which is a necessary assumption for consistent 
estimation using system GMM.   
The results for each of the three equations show that the lagged dependent 
variable is highly persistent, as expected. It is significant at the one percent level in 
each of the regressions and explains current institutional quality better than any other 
regressor. In addition, the estimated coefficient for income per capita is highly 
significant (at the one percent level) and positive as well in all the regressions.  
For my main explanatory variables the results show that the distinction 
between liberalized and un-liberalized is important for trade (Equation 3.1) and 
exports (Equation 3.2), but not for imports (Equation 3.3). Neither trade nor export 
intensity have a causal impact on institutional quality at any reasonable level of 
statistical significance if the interaction variable is not included. When the distinction is 
introduced in Column (2), I find that un-liberalized trade has a negative impact on 
institutional quality. On the other hand, there is no evidence that the impact of 
liberalized trade is statistically different from zero at a reasonable level of significance. 
However, we can conclude that the impact of trade on institutional quality in open 
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countries relative to closed countries is positive; in other words the negative impact of 
un-liberalized trade is eliminated by liberalization of trade policy. Column 2 shows that 
an increase of 10 percentage points in the un-liberalized trade to GDP ratio reduces 
institutional quality by 3.2 percent points [=0.05/(1-0.84)]. Relative to un-liberalized 
trade a similar increase in liberalized trade improves institutional quality by 3.3 
percentage points.43  
The results for Equation (3.2) with exports as the explanatory variable are 
qualitatively similar, but ‘stronger’ in terms of both precision and magnitude. Column 
(4) indicates an increase of 10 percentage points in un-liberalized exports as a 
proportion of GDP reduces the composite institutional quality score by 6.7 percentage 
points. On the other hand, an equivalent increase in liberalized exports improves comp 
by 7.0 percentage points relative to un-liberalized exports.44  
Finally, the results for Equation (3.3) with imports as the explanatory variable 
are the ‘weakest’. Even with the distinction between liberalized and un-liberalized, we 
cannot reject at a reasonable level of statistical significance that imports have no 
causal impact on institutional quality. 
 
                                                             
43 The overall impact however is an improvement of only 0.13 percentage points, 
which is not statistically different from zero.  
44 The overall impact however is an improvement of only 0.30 percentage points, 
which is not statistically different from zero.  
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3.7.2 Regression Results for Equations (3.4)-(3.6) 
Table 3.5 reports the fixed effects regression results for institutional quality 
with liberalized and un-liberalized trade, exports and imports in natural resources as 
explanatory variables (Equations (3.4)-(3.6) respectively). Table 3.A10 presents the 
pooled OLS regression results, again only meant for a broad comparison, and these will 
not be discussed as they reveal similar differences with fixed effects regressions as 
they did for Equations (3.1)-(3.3). 
The first three columns of Table 3.5 report the regressions results for Equation 
(3.4) and show that the distinction between liberalized and un-liberalized remains 
important for trade in natural resources. Without the interaction term included, 
intensity of trade in natural resources has no association with institutional quality. 
When the interaction variable is introduced, I find that un-liberalized trade in natural 
resources is negatively associated with institutional quality at a high level of statistical 
significance (one percent). On the other hand, there is no evidence that liberalized 
trade in natural resources is harmful for institutional quality. Column (3) for example 
shows that a 10 percentage point increase in un-liberalized trade as a proportion of 
GDP is associated with a 4.2 percentage point deterioration in the composite indicator. 
In other words, a one standard deviation increase in un-liberalized natural resource 
trade is correlated with almost a fifth of a standard deviation decrease in comp. For 
example, if Pakistan’s natural resource trade as a proportion of its GDP in 2011 was to 
increase to the level of Nigeria (which is an increase of 38 percentage points), keeping 
everything else constant, its composite institutional score is predicted to fall by more 
than 40 percent of the existing score.  
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Table 3.5. Fixed Effects Regression Results for Composite Institutional Quality 
(Equations 3.4-3.6) 
 
Ind Var (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Log(YPC) 0.632 
(0.544) 
0.649 
(0.539) 
0.891 
(0.576) 
0.554 
(0.521) 
0.557 
(0.520) 
0.758 
(0.541) 
0.826 
(0.580) 
0.894 
(0.578) 
1.082* 
(0.614 
Open 0.509** 
(0.210) 
0.027 
(0.295) 
-0.084 
(0.278) 
0.476** 
(0.207) 
0.341 
(0.260) 
0.250 
(0.242) 
0.53** 
(0.211) 
0.106 
(0.276) 
0.063 
(0.268) 
NatResTrd -0.005 
(0.011) 
-0.036*** 
(0.013) 
-0.042*** 
(0.014) 
      
Open * 
NatResTrd 
 0.042*** 
(0.014) 
0.046*** 
(0.014) 
      
NatResExp    -0.024* 
(0.014) 
-0.04** 
(0.02) 
-0.055*** 
(0.18) 
   
Open * 
NatResExp 
    0.022 
(0.016) 
0.029* 
(0.016) 
   
NatResImp       0.027* 
(0.016) 
-0.042 
(0.034) 
-0.038 
(0.035) 
Open* 
NatResImp 
       0.087** 
(0.035) 
0.075** 
(0.036) 
Log(pop)   0.847 
(0.785) 
  0.561 
(0.778) 
  0.656 
(0.798) 
Polity2   0.044** 
(0.018) 
  0.048*** 
(0.017) 
  0.046** 
(0.018) 
NRRents   0.010 
(0.014) 
  0.023 
(0.016) 
  -0.002 
(0.011) 
Obs 2026 2026 1950 2050 2050 1973 2083 2083 2000 
Countries 112 112 107 114 114 109 114 114 109 
‘α3 + α4 = 
0’ 
 0.429 0.755  0.322 0.223  0.011 0.014 
T.E 
included 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.881 0.884 0.885 0.883 0.883 0.885 0.883 0.885 0.885 
R2(within) 0.147 0.164 0.188 0.156 0.159 0.187 0.151 0.166 0.190 
Notes: A constant is included in all regressions but not reported. Annual 
observations of the dependent variable are used from 1987-2008. The explanatory 
variables are lagged by three years. Robust standard errors clustered by countries 
reported in parentheses. TE refers to the set of time dummies. The statistic reported 
for ‘α3 + α4 = 0’ is the p-value of the F statistic testing that ‘Trade + (Trade * Open) = 
0’ in Columns (1)-(3), ‘Export + (Export * Open) = 0’ in Columns (4)-(6), ‘Import + 
(Import * Open)=0’ in Columns (7)-(9) respectively. The R2 refers to the coefficient of 
determination from estimation of the equivalent Least Squares Dummy Variable 
Model (LSDV).                                                                                                                                                      
*Significant at the 10% level                                                                                                               
**Significant at the 5% level                                                                                                                  
***Significant at the 1% level 
 
The results for exports in natural resources are reported in the next three 
Columns of Table 3.5. Exports of natural resources harm institutional quality, when the 
distinction between liberalized and un-liberalized is not made. Column (4), which does 
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not include the interaction variable, shows that the intensity of exports in natural 
resources has a negative association with comp. When the interaction variable is 
introduced (Columns 5 and 6), I find that liberalized trade in natural resources 
mitigates the negative impact. In fact, there is no evidence that the impact of 
liberalized trade in natural resources is statistically different from zero. Column (6) 
shows that a 10 percentage point increase in un-liberalized natural resource export as 
a proportion of GDP is associated with a 5.5 percentage point deterioration in 
institutional quality at a significance level of one percent.45  
The results for imports of natural resources presented in the final three 
columns of the table are very different compared to exports. There is no evidence of a 
negative association of natural resource imports with institutional quality. This is in line 
with my expectation, as the rent-seeking behavior which hurts institutional quality is 
relevant mainly for exports of these resources which are tightly controlled by the 
government. In fact, the results show that liberalized imports of natural resources have 
a positive correlation. Column (7) shows that without the distinction between 
liberalized and un-liberalized, intensity of natural resource imports is positively 
correlated with comp at the ten percent level of significance. When the interaction 
variable is introduced (Columns 8 and 9), I find that a 10 percentage point increase in 
liberalized NatResImp is associated with a 3.7 percentage point improvement in comp 
at a significance level of five percent.  
                                                             
45 A similar increase in liberalized exports has a lower negative association (26 
percentage points), and this is not statistically different from zero at a reasonable level 
of significance. 
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The system GMM results for Equations (3.4)-(3.6) are presented in Table 3.6. 
Similar to the results for Equations (3.1)-(3.3), the diagnostics here also indicate that 
the equations have been estimated adequately. Moreover, the estimated coefficients 
for the lagged dependent variable and GDP per capita in all the regressions remain 
similar.  
The conclusions that the system GMM estimation of Equation (3.4)-(3.6) leads 
to are broadly similar to those from the fixed effects results. However, introducing the 
distinction between liberalized and un-liberalized appears less meaningful. For 
Equation (3.4) with NatResTrd as the main explanatory variable, I find that intensity of 
trade in natural resources has a negative effect on institutional quality at a significance 
level of five percent – Column (1) shows that an increase of 10 percentage points in 
the proportion of trade in natural resources to GDP reduces comp by 4.5 percentage 
points. When the interaction variable is introduced (in Column 2), neither the 
coefficients for un-liberalized trade nor the interaction term are statistically significant. 
For Equation (3.5), I find that intensity of natural resource exports deteriorates 
institutional quality. Column (3) shows that an increase of 10 percentage points 
reduces comp by 8.7 percentage points, and the estimated coefficient is significant at 
the five percent level. When the interaction variable is introduced (in Column 4), I find 
that an increase of 10 percentage points in un-liberalized exports of natural resources 
deteriorates comp by 6.4 percentage points at the ten percent level of significance. 
There is no evidence that the impact of liberalized exports of natural resources on 
institutional quality is statistically different from zero. 
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Table 3.6. System GMM Regression Results for Composite Institutional Quality 
(Equations 3.4-3.6) 
 
Ind Var (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Comp 0.8418*** 
(0.0310) 
0.8525*** 
(0.0289) 
0.8674*** 
(0.0350) 
0.8745*** 
(0.0289) 
0.8577*** 
(0.0345) 
0.8681*** 
(0.0280) 
Log(YPC) 0.2834*** 
(0.0723) 
0.2442*** 
(0.0614) 
0.2077*** 
(0.0627) 
0.1771*** 
(0.0662) 
0.2958*** 
(0.0777) 
0.2303*** 
(0.0627) 
Open  -0.1444 
(0.1227) 
0.0720 
(0.1996) 
-0.2446 
(0.1539) 
-0.0791 
(0.1750) 
-0.1785 
(0.1564) 
0.0386 
(0.1681) 
NatResTrd -0.0071** 
(0.0032) 
-0.0033 
(0.0066) 
    
Open * 
NatResTrd 
 0.0060 
(0.0088) 
    
NatResExp   -0.0116*** 
(0.0035) 
-0.0081* 
(0.0044) 
  
Open * 
NatResExp 
   0.0040 
(0.0074) 
  
NatResImp     -0.0046 
(0.0094) 
-0.0061 
(0.0140) 
Open* 
NatResImp 
     0.0138 
(0.156) 
Obs  627 627 636 636 644 644 
Countries 104 104 106 106 106 106 
‘α3 + α4 = 0’  0.856  0.711  0.490 
T.E included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Instruments 90 112 90 112 90 112 
Hansen j 
Test p-value 
0.436 0.530 0.288 0.519 0.152 0.489 
AR(2) Test 
p-value 
0.437 0.368 0.352 0.268 0.301 0.282 
Wald chi-sq 
statistic 
4117.86 5302.81 
 
4208.14 4564.67 3627.69 5771.49 
Wald chi-sq 
p-value 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Notes:  A constant is included in all regressions but not reported. Observations at 3 
year intervals are used from 1987-2008. Windmeijer-Corrected Robust standard 
errors from the two-step GMM estimation shown in parenthesis. TE refers to the set 
of time dummies. The statistic reported for ‘α3 + α4 = 0’ is the p-value of the F 
statistic testing that ‘Trade + (Trade * Open) = 0’ in columns (1)-(3), ‘Export + (Export 
* Open) = 0’ in columns (4)-(6), ‘Import + (Import * Open) =0’ in columns (7)-(9) 
respectively. Orthogonal forward deviations used to purge fixed effects. All 
explanatory variables are treated as endogenous and instrumented by 2 lags.                                                                                                                       
*Significant at the 10% level                                                                                                                
**Significant at the 5% level                                                                                                                            
***Significant at the 1% level 
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Finally, the regressions results for Equation (3.6) in Columns (5) and (6) 
demonstrate no statistically significant causal impact of imports of natural resources 
on the composite institutional quality score, in line with the fixed effects results. 
 
3.8 Conclusion 
This chapter attempts to add to the growing literature on the link between trade 
exposure and institutional quality. It is motivated by the observation, based on 
historical experience as well as formal theoretical models, that a country that engages 
in greater international trade does not necessarily improve its institutions. I 
hypothesize that institutional quality might only improve if greater trade occurs in the 
context of a liberalized (open) trade policy regime. In the presence of trade restrictions 
and policy distortions, increased trade deteriorates institutional quality. The 
hypothesis is set within the context of the ‘rent-seeking’ literature. The central lesson 
of this literature is that any government-imposed restriction leads to artificial rent-
seeking. Artificial rent-seeking then manifests as corruption and erosion of 
bureaucratic quality.  
For ease of exposition, I distinguish between the two different kinds of trade as 
liberalized and un-liberalized. Classification of trade policy as open or closed is based 
on the widely used Sachs and Warner binary openness indicator. While some previous 
works have differentiated between trade intensity (the proportion of trade to GDP) 
and trade policy, to my knowledge the distinction between liberalized and un-
liberalized trade is unique. Moreover I look at not only the impact of overall trade, but 
also consider exports and imports separately in an identical framework. Within the 
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same setting and also based on the rent-seeking premise, I further investigate whether 
liberalization mitigates the deleterious impact of trade in natural resources on 
institutions, as pointed out by the ‘natural resource curse’ literature.  
The contribution of this chapter is primarily the empirical cross-country 
evidence derived from a careful econometric strategy. The data used for the analysis 
comprises of 114 countries from 1987 to 2005. Based on the rent-seeking literature, 
the relevant institutional quality variables identified are subjective indicators (widely 
used by investors and the previous empirical literature) measuring the extent of 
corruption and bureaucratic quality — these two are combined to form a composite 
variable that exhibits more variation and a more complete representation of 
institutional quality. The hypothesis is tested by relying on an interaction variable 
which combines trade intensity with policy, and thus makes a distinction between 
liberalized and un-liberalized trade. Results without this distinction are presented 
alongside to judge whether the distinction was worthwhile making. Plausible control 
variables are included, and the within-country association of trade with institutional 
quality estimated through use of the fixed effects estimation technique. The system 
GMM estimation technique, which generates a set of internal instruments, is relied 
upon to address additional endogeneity concerns and make inferences about causality. 
The evidence presented in this chapter supports the hypothesis to a reasonable 
degree. The fixed effects results suggest that liberalized trade is associated with better 
institutional quality within countries — the results are stronger for imports compared 
to exports. Moreover, whereas un-liberalized exports are found to be associated with 
deterioration in institutional quality, the same cannot be said for imports. With regards 
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to the investigation of the impact of natural resource trade on institutional quality, 
exports are highly associated with a deterioration of institutions, but liberalization 
mitigates the harmful effect.  
The causal relationships estimated through system GMM portray a broadly 
similar story. Whereas the negative causal impact of un-liberalized exports on 
institutional quality is quite large, the beneficial effect of liberalized exports is 
relatively smaller and not estimated at a reasonable level of statistical significance. 
Imports demonstrate no statistically precise causal impact. Similarly, the impact of 
natural resource exports on institutions is substantially negative, while, like the fixed 
effects results, there is no evidence that liberalized exports of natural resources hurt 
institutional quality. 
The separate analysis undertaken for exports and imports suggests that 
artificial rent-seeking engendered by government-imposed policy restrictions operates 
more vigorously on the export side, both for overall trade, and more specifically, for 
natural resource trade. While this was expected for natural resources, for overall trade 
this was an open question to be answered by the empirical analysis. Furthermore, the 
deterioration of institutional quality due to un-liberalized exports is quite substantial. 
Even if the beneficial impact of liberalized exports is relatively smaller or even zero, at 
least liberalization eliminates the institutional erosion that would result without it.   
For countries that try to follow an export promotion strategy, this leads to an 
important policy recommendation. The role of institutional quality for strong economic 
performance is now widely accepted, as discussed in the introductory chapter of this 
thesis. Therefore, in order to reap the full rewards of an export-led development 
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strategy, countries should liberalize the trade regime first. This is especially crucial for 
natural resource exporters. While the natural resource curse operates through other 
channels as well, institutional erosion is an important one. Indeed for a country like 
Nigeria, which is often quoted as a classic example in this regard, the institutional 
channel may well be the most pressing (Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian 2003, 
Robinson et al. 2006).  
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Appendix 3 
 
 
Table 3.A1. Descriptive Statistics (Entire Sample) 
 
Variable Mean Minimum Maximum Observations Countries 
 
Corruption 
 
3.21 
(1.42) 
0 6.17 120 2438 
Bureaucratic 
Quality 
2.16 
(1.26) 
0 4 120 2438 
Composite 
Inst Quality 
5.37 
(2.47) 
0 10.17 120 2438 
Real GDP per 
Capita (PPP) 
10437 
(11127) 
101 68290 115 2276 
Trade to GDP 
 
73.94 
(51.30) 
0.31 429.95 117 2311 
Exports to 
GDP 
35.55 
(27.18) 
0.18 229.68 117 2311 
Imports to 
GDP 
38.40 
(25.07) 
-17.13 200.27 117 2311 
Population 4.67*10^7 
(1.47 * 
10^8) 
239511 1.30 * 10^9 119 2416 
Polity2 
 
3.33 
(6.74) 
-9 10 115 2341 
Natural Res 
Rents to GDP 
7.32 
(13.50) 
0 218.89 117 2330 
Sec School Enr 
Rate(gross)   
67.60 
(33.71) 
3.07 162.35 116 1809 
Manuf Trade 
to GDP 
37.22 
(36.16) 
4.18 299.88 112 1865 
Food Trade to 
GDP 
8.55 
(7.08) 
1.00 60.03 112 1865 
Comm Serv 
Trade to GDP 
0.20 
(0.19) 
0.04 1.71 110 116 
Natural Res 
Trade to GDP 
11.69 
(10.15) 
1.15 88.74 111 1832 
Manuf Exp to 
GDP 
14.77 
(19.55) 
0.00 152.04 114 1896 
Food Exp to 
GDP 
4.94 
(5.78) 
0.01 48.16 114 1896 
Comm Serv 
Exp to GDP 
0.10 
(0.11) 
0.01 1.07 110 116 
Natural Res 
Exp to GDP 
6.67 
(8.94) 
0.02 77.55 113 1856 
Manuf Imp to 
GDP 
22.32 
(17.70) 
2.10 151.73 114 1880 
Food Imp to 
GDP 
3.63 
(2.71) 
0.12 22.84 114 1880 
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Comm Serv 
Imp to GDP 
0.10 
(0.08) 
0.02 0.64 110 116 
Natural Res 
Imp to GDP 
5.07 
(4.24) 
0.08 47.69 114 1880 
 
Note: Standard deviation reported in parentheses 
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Table 3.A2. Descriptive Statistics (Open countries) 
 
Variable Mean Minimum Maximum Countries Observations 
Corruption 
 
3.55 
(1.39) 
0 6 93 1567 
Bureaucratic 
Quality 
2.55 
(1.17) 
0 4 93 1567 
Composite 
Inst Quality 
6.10 
(2.37) 
0 10 93 1567 
Real GDP per 
Capita (PPP) 
13297 
(11990) 
399 68290 92 1529 
Trade to GDP 
 
79.92 
(56.23) 
13.75 429.95 92 1538 
Exports to 
GDP 
38.50 
(29.76) 
4.90 229.68 92 1538 
Imports to 
GDP 
41.24 
(27.25) 
6.08 200.27 92 1538 
Population 2.90*10^7 
(4.66*10^7) 
366706 2.98*10^8 92 1545 
Polity2 
 
5.97 
(5.35) 
-9 10 91 1524 
Natural Res 
Rents to GDP 
3.98 
(6.59) 
0 65.02 92 1545 
Average yrs 
of Schooling 
7.61 
(2.86) 
0.28 13.19 86 334 
Manuf Trade 
to GDP 
41.41 
(39.17) 
4.18 299.88 92 1392 
Food Trade 
to GDP 
8.28 
(7.20) 
1.00 60.03 92 1392 
Comm Serv 
Trade to GDP 
0.21 
(0.20) 
0.04 1.71 90 96 
Natural Res 
Trade to GDP 
10.84 
(9.26) 
1.15 88.74 91 1377 
Manuf Exp to 
GDP 
17.38 
(21.29) 
0.01 152.04 92 1401 
Food Exp to 
GDP 
4.72 
(5.67) 
0.04 48.16 92 1401 
Comm Serv 
Exp to GDP 
0.11 
(0.12) 
0.01 1.07 90 96 
Natural Res 
Exp to GDP 
5.57 
(6.91) 
0.03 45.73 91 1386 
Manuf Imp to 
GDP 
24.04 
(18.99) 
2.10 151.73 92 1402 
Food Imp to 
GDP 
3.57 
(2.70) 
0.24 22.84 92 1402 
Comm Serv 
Imp to GDP 
0.10 
(0.09) 
0.02 0.64 90 96 
Natural Res 
Imp to GDP 
5.27 
(4.41) 
0.23 47.69 92 1402 
Note: Standard deviation reported in parentheses 
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Table 3.A3. Descriptive Statistics (Closed Countries) 
 
Variable Mean Minimum Maximum Countries Observations 
Corruption 
 
2.62 
(1.27) 
0 6.17 77 871 
Bureaucratic 
Quality 
1.46 
(1.09) 
0 4 77 871 
Composite 
Inst Quality 
4.07 
(2.10) 
0 10.17 77 871 
Real GDP per 
Capita (PPP) 
4538 
(5662) 
101 34889 70 747 
Trade to GDP 
 
62.05 
(36.95) 
0.31 198.77 73 773 
Exports to 
GDP 
29.68 
(19.90) 
0.18 100.70 73 773 
Imports to 
GDP 
32.37 
(18.63) 
-17.14 98.42 73 773 
Population 7.80 * 10^7 
(2.34*10^8) 
239511 1.30^10^9 77 871 
Polity2 
 
-1.58 
(6.31) 
-9 10 74 817 
Natural Res 
Rents to GDP 
13.88 
(19.76) 
0 218.89 74 785 
Average yrs 
of Schooling 
4.84 
(2.54) 
0.53 11.90 64 170 
Manuf Trade 
to GDP 
24.88 
(20.87) 
4.55 132.01 61 473 
Food Trade 
to GDP 
9.35 
(6.64) 
1.06 37.32 61 473 
Comm Serv 
Trade to GDP 
0.20 
(0.13) 
0.04 0.54 20 20 
Natural Res 
Trade to GDP 
14.27 
(12.11) 
1.26 77.63 58 455 
Manuf Exp to 
GDP 
7.39 
(10.39) 
0.00 60.40 63 495 
Food Exp to 
GDP 
5.57 
(6.06) 
0.01 31.15 63 495 
Comm Serv 
Exp to GDP 
0.08 
(0.08) 
0.01 0.34 20 20 
Natural Res 
Exp to GDP 
9.90 
(12.68) 
0.02 77.55 61 470 
Manuf Imp to 
GDP 
17.30 
(11.87) 
2.24 71.61 63 478 
Food Imp to 
GDP 
3.81 
(2.72) 
0.12 17.63 63 478 
Comm Serv 
Imp to GDP 
0.12 
(0.07) 
0.04 0.26 20 20 
Natural Res 
Imp to GDP 
4.48 
(3.65) 
0.08 23.64 63 478 
Note: Standard deviation reported in parentheses 
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Table 3.A4. Pair-wise Correlation Matrix (Trade) 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1 1.00           
2 0.67 1.00          
3 0.92 0.90 1.00         
4 0.11 0.21 0.17 1.00        
5 0.31 0.42 0.39 0.20 1.00       
6 0.25 0.35 0.32 0.71 0.71 1.00      
7 -0.00 0.08 0.04 0.80 0.10 0.61 1.00     
8 0.19 0.28 0.25 0.85 0.28 0.78 0.80 1.00    
9 -0.06 -0.15 -0.11 0.38 -0.11 0.20 0.37 0.20 1.00   
10 0.25 0.26 0.28 0.65 0.03 0.61 0.32 0.33 0.24 1.00  
11 -0.23 -0.15 -0.21 0.38 -0.06 0.28 0.66 0.14 0.05 0.01 1.00 
Notes: 
1. Corruption 
2. Bureaucratic Quality 
3. Composite Institutional Quality 
4. Trade to GDP 
5. Sachs and Warner Openness Indicator 
6. Liberalized Trade to GDP 
7. Merchandise Trade to GDP 
8. Manufacturing Trade to GDP 
9. Food Trade to GDP 
10. Commercial Services Trade to GDP 
11. Natural Resource Trade to GDP 
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Table 3.A5. Pair-wise Correlation Matrix (Exports) 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1 1.00           
2 0.67 1.00          
3 0.92 0.90 1.00         
4 0.13 0.27 0.21 1.00        
5 0.32 0.42 0.39 0.22 1.00       
6 0.28 0.39 0.36 0.75 0.68 1.00      
7 -0.00 0.09 0.05 0.76 0.08 0.58 1.00     
8 0.24 0.35 0.32 0.73 0.33 0.78 0.67 1.00    
9 -0.01 -0.09 -0.05 0.14 -0.15 0.04 0.14 -0.08 1.00   
10 0.28 0.31 0.32 0.53 0.13 0.58 0.05 0.20 0.10 1.00  
11 -0.22 -0.16 -0.21 0.35 -0.16 0.08 0.64 -0.04 -0.13 -0.20 1.00 
Notes: 
1. Corruption 
2. Bureaucratic Quality 
3. Composite Institutional Quality 
4. Exports to GDP 
5. Sachs and Warner Openness Indicator 
6. Liberalized Exports to GDP 
7. Merchandise Exports to GDP 
8. Manufacturing Exports to GDP 
9. Food Exports to GDP 
10. Commercial Services Exports to GDP 
11. Natural Resource Exports to GDP 
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Table 3.A6. Pair-wise Correlation Matrix (Imports) 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1 1.00           
2 0.67 1.00          
3 0.92 0.90 1.00         
4 0.08 0.14 0.12 1.00        
5 0.32 0.42 0.39 0.17 1.00       
6 0.22 0.31 0.28 0.64 0.73 1.00      
7 -0.00 0.05 0.02 0.84 0.12 0.59 1.00     
8 0.11 0.18 0.16 0.89 0.20 0.73 0.84 1.00    
9 -0.14 -0.19 -0.17 0.63 0.03 0.38 0.62 0.50 1.00   
10 0.18 0.16 0.18 0.70 -0.12 0.53 0.47 0.44 0.35 1.00  
11 -0.09 -0.00 -0.05 0.43 0.16 0.55 0.70 0.25 0.24 0.35 1.00 
Notes: 
1. Corruption 
2. Bureaucratic Quality 
3. Composite Institutional Quality 
4. Imports to GDP 
5. Sachs and Warner Openness Indicator 
6. Liberalized Imports to GDP 
7. Merchandise Imports to GDP 
8. Manufacturing Imports to GDP 
9. Food Imports to GDP 
10. Commercial Services Imports to GDP 
11. Natural Resource Imports to GDP 
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Table 3.A7. Pooled OLS Results for Institutional quality (Equation 3.1) 
 
 Corruption Bureaucratic Quality Composite Inst Quality 
 
Ind Var (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Log(YPC) 0.65*** 
(0.07) 
0.66*** 
(0.07) 
0.54*** 
(0.07) 
0.68*** 
(0.05) 
0.69*** 
(0.05) 
0.62*** 
(0.06) 
1.33*** 
(0.11) 
1.35*** 
(0.11) 
1.16*** 
(0.11) 
Open  0.36** 
(0.15) 
0.12 
(0.22) 
0.07 
(0.24) 
0.34** 
(0.13) 
-0.02 
(0.26) 
0.10 
(0.26) 
0.70*** 
(0.25) 
0.09 
(0.43) 
0.17 
(0.45) 
Trade -0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.01 
(0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.01* 
(0.01) 
-0.00 
(0.01) 
Trade 
*Open 
 0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
 0.01* 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
 0.01* 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
log(pop)   -0.05 
(0.06) 
  0.15*** 
(0.04) 
  0.09 
(0.09) 
Polity2   0.03*** 
(0.01) 
  0.01 
(0.01) 
  0.04** 
(0.02) 
NRRents   -0.01 
(0.01) 
  -0.01 
(0.01) 
  -0.01 
(0.01) 
Obs 2554 2554 2433 2554 2554 2433 2554 2554 2433 
Country    114 114 109 114 114 109 114 114 109 
‘α3 + α4 = 
0’ 
 0.851 0.858  0.443 0.005  0.575 0.073 
T.E incl Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.496 0.498 0.503 0.593 0.600 0.627 0.608 0.613 0.620 
Notes:  A constant is included in all regressions but not reported. Annual 
observations of the dependent variable are used from 1987-2008. The explanatory 
variables are lagged by three years. Robust standard errors clustered by countries 
reported in parenthesis. TE refers to the set of time dummies. The statistic reported 
for ‘α3 + α4 = 0’ is the p-value of the F statistic testing that ‘Trade + (Trade * Open)’ 
equals zero.                                                                                                                        
*Significant at the 10% level                                                                                                              
**Significant at the 5% level                                                                                                                 
***Significant at the 1% level 
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Table 3.A8. Pooled OLS Results for Institutional quality(Equation 3.2) 
 
 Corruption Bureaucratic Quality Composite Inst Quality 
 
Ind Var (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Log(YPC) 0.66*** 
(0.07) 
0.67*** 
(0.07) 
0.55*** 
(0.07) 
0.68*** 
(0.05) 
0.70*** 
(0.05) 
0.61*** 
(0.06) 
1.34*** 
(0.11) 
1.36*** 
(0.11) 
1.16*** 
(0.11) 
Open  0.36** 
(0.15) 
-0.01 
(0.21) 
-0.05 
(0.22) 
0.33** 
(0.13) 
-0.05 
(0.24) 
0.05 
(0.24) 
0.69*** 
(0.25) 
-0.06 
(0.40) 
-0.00 
(0.41) 
Exports -0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.01** 
(0.01) 
-0.01* 
(0.01) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.01* 
(0.01) 
-0.00 
(0.01) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.02** 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
Export 
*Open 
 0.01** 
(0.01) 
0.01* 
(0.01) 
 0.01** 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
 0.02** 
(0.01) 
0.02* 
(0.01) 
Log(pop)   -0.06 
(0.06) 
  0.14*** 
(0.04) 
  0.08 
(0.08) 
Polity2   0.03*** 
(0.01) 
  0.01 
(0.01) 
  0.04** 
(0.02) 
NRRents   -0.00 
(0.01) 
  -0.01 
(0.01) 
  -0.01 
(0.00) 
Obs 2554 2554 2433 2554 2554 2433 2554 2554 2433 
Countries 114 114 109 114 114 109 114 114 109 
‘α3 + α4 = 
0’ 
 0.769 0.985  0.305 0.004  0.431 0.035 
T.E incl Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.496 0.502 0.506 0.593 0.602 0.629 0.608 0.617 0.624 
Notes:  A constant is included in all regressions but not reported. Annual 
observations of the dependent variable are used from 1987-2008. The explanatory 
variables are lagged by three years. Robust standard errors clustered by countries 
reported in parenthesis. TE refers to the set of time dummies. The statistic reported 
for ‘α3 + α4 = 0’ is the p-value of the F statistic testing that ‘Exports + (Export * Open)’ 
equals zero.                                                                                                                                                         
*Significant at the 10% level                                                                                                              
**Significant at the 5% level                                                                                                                 
***Significant at the 1% level 
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Table 3.A9. Pooled OLS Results for Institutional quality (Equation 3.3) 
 
 Corruption Bureaucratic Quality Composite Inst Quality 
 
Ind Var (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Log(YPC) 0.65*** 
(0.07) 
0.65*** 
(0.07) 
0.53*** 
(0.07) 
0.68*** 
(0.05) 
0.69*** 
(0.05) 
0.63*** 
(0.06) 
1.33*** 
(0.11) 
1.33*** 
(0.11) 
1.16*** 
(0.11) 
Open  0.36** 
(0.15) 
0.30 
(0.23) 
0.27 
(0.24) 
0.34** 
(0.13) 
0.07 
(0.26) 
0.18 
(0.25) 
0.70*** 
(0.25) 
0.38 
(0.44) 
0.45 
(0.45) 
Imports -0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.01) 
-0.00 
(0.01) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
0.00 
(0.01) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
0.00 
(0.01) 
Import 
*Open 
 0.00 
(0.01) 
0.00 
(0.01) 
 0.01 
(0.01) 
0.00 
(0.01) 
 0.01 
(0.01) 
0.00 
(0.01) 
Log(pop)   -0.04 
(0.06) 
  0.15*** 
(0.04) 
  0.11 
(0.09) 
Polity2   0.03*** 
(0.01) 
  0.01 
(0.01) 
  0.04** 
(0.02) 
NRRents   -0.01 
(0.01) 
  -0.01 
(0.00) 
  -0.02* 
(0.01) 
Obs 2554 2554 2433 2554 2554 2433 2554 2554 2433 
Countries 114 114 109 114 114 109 114 114 109 
‘α3 + α4 = 
0’ 
 0.999 0.759  0.672 0.005  0.812 0.164 
T.E incl Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.496 0.496 0.501 0.593 0.597 0.625 0.608 0.609 0.618 
Notes:  A constant is included in all regressions but not included. Annual 
observations of the dependent variable are used from 1987-2008. The explanatory 
variables are lagged by three years. Robust standard errors clustered by countries 
reported in parenthesis. TE refers to the set of time dummies. The statistic reported 
for ‘α3 + α4 = 0’ is the p-value of the F statistic testing that ‘Import + (Import * Open)’ 
equals zero.                                                                                                                                                       
*Significant at the 10% level                                                                                                              
**Significant at the 5% level                                                                                                                 
***Significant at the 1% level 
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Table 3.A10. Pooled OLS Results for Composite Institutional Quality  
(Equations 3.4-3.6) 
 
Indep Vars (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Log(YPC) 1.41*** 
(0.12) 
1.43*** 
(0.11) 
1.30*** 
(0.12) 
1.40*** 
(0.11) 
1.42*** 
(0.11) 
1.28*** 
(0.12) 
1.44*** 
(0.12) 
1.44*** 
(0.12) 
1.27*** 
(0.12) 
Open 0.68** 
(0.28) 
0.07 
(0.41) 
0.25 
(0.40) 
0.59** 
(0.28) 
0.32 
(0.35) 
0.36 
(0.35) 
0.72** 
(0.30) 
0.64 
(0.40) 
0.43 
(0.37) 
NatResTrd -0.02* 
(0.01) 
-0.04*** 
(0.02) 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
      
Open * 
NatResTrd 
 0.04*** 
(0.02) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
      
NatResExp    -0.03** 
(0.01) 
-0.04*** 
(0.02) 
-0.00 
(0.02) 
   
Open * 
NatResExp 
    0.03* 
(0.02) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
   
NatResImp       0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.04) 
-0.02 
(0.04) 
Open* 
NatResImp 
       0.02 
(0.04) 
0.038 
(0.04) 
Log(pop)   0.07 
(0.10) 
  0.08 
(0.09) 
  0.08 
(0.10) 
Polity2   0.03* 
(0.02) 
  0.04* 
(0.02) 
  0.04* 
(0.02) 
NRRents   -0.03*** 
(0.01) 
  -0.03*** 
(0.01) 
  -0.03** 
(0.01) 
Obs 2026 2026 1950 2050 2050 1973 2083 2083 2000 
Countries 112 112 107 114 114 109 114 114 109 
‘α3 + α4 = 0’  0.822 0.151  0.526 0.171  0.437 0.319 
T.E included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.621 0.630 0.640 0.623 0.627 0.634 0.617 0.617 0.639 
Notes: Annual observations are used from 1984-2008. Robust standard errors clustered by countries 
reported in parenthesis. The explanatory variables are lagged by three years. TE refers to the 
set of time dummies. The statistic reported for ‘α3 + α4 = 0’ is the p-value of the F statistic testing that 
‘Trade + (Trade * Open) = 0’ in columns (1)-(3), ‘Export + (Export * Open) = 0’ in columns (4)-(6), 
‘Import + (Import * Open)=0’ in columns (7)-(9) respectively.                                                                                                                                                       
*Significant at the 10% level                                                                                                               
**Significant at the 5% level                                                                                                                  
***Significant at the 1% level 
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Chapter 4: Corruption, Public Investment and Growth 
across Autocracies and Democracies 
 
Abstract 
This chapter examines the implications of institutional quality for public investment in 
fixed capital. The previous empirical literature has found mixed evidence regarding the 
contribution of public investment in fixed capital to economic growth. However, this 
literature has overlooked the possibility that institutional determinants potentially 
shape both the amount of public investment as well as its impact on growth. I 
hypothesize that the link between corruption and public investment (pointed out by 
anecdotal evidence and a relatively recent literature), and consequently the growth 
impact of public investment, fundamentally differs across autocratic and democratic 
regimes due to political economy considerations. The chapter presents empirical 
evidence based on a panel data analysis covering 87 countries, which suggests that 
corruption inflates public investment only in autocratic countries. It is also found that 
in autocratic countries public investment adversely affects the growth rate. The results 
point to the role of arbitrary and sub-optimal decision making regarding allocation of 
public funds in autocratic countries. 
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4.1 Introduction 
The role of public investment in promoting economic growth remains a contentious 
issue. Investment in fixed capital by the government mainly consists of developing 
infrastructure and investing in state-owned enterprises. Public investment in 
infrastructure, in principle, helps increase overall investment while also enhancing the 
productivity of the private sector (Barro 1990, Chhiber et al 1992, Glomm and 
Revikumar 1994). Such large-scale infrastructure can often not be built by the private 
sector alone due to a divergence between private and social benefits. On the other 
hand, government spending can also crowd out the private sector by using up scarce 
resources and reducing the availability of credit for private firms. Also, state-owned 
enterprises may complement or compete with private firms, and there is evidence 
that private investment is more productive (Blejer and Khan 1984, Khan and Reinhart 
1989, Chhiber et al 1992, Khan and Kumar 1997). Whether public investment helps or 
hurts economic growth is a question that, therefore, deserves further investigation. 
Other than the economic issue of complementing or crowding out the private 
sector, investment by the public sector in developing countries is especially 
susceptible to corruption and often dictated by political considerations. State-owned 
enterprises are frequently plagued by poor governance and used as a means of 
providing wide-scale employment or supporting selected constituencies by the 
government of the day (Khan and Kumar 1997, Huang and Snell 2003). Even the 
positive impact of public investment in infrastructure on growth is not 
straightforward. A number of studies, motivated by a plethora of anecdotal evidence, 
find that large scale investment in infrastructure is often driven by factors which are 
142 
 
not purely economic (Tanzi and Davoodi 1997, Pritchett 2000, Haque and Kneller 2012 
etc). The proverbial bridges to nowhere and airports in the desert are conceived 
because of the potential for political corruption in large scale construction projects.  
The existing empirical literature that tests for the impact of public investment 
on growth in developing countries provides mixed results (e.g. Aschauer 1989, Khan 
and Reinhart 1989, Barro 1991, Devarajan et al 1996, Khan and Kumar 1997, Devarajan 
et al 2003, Athukorala and Sen 2004, Erden and Holcombe 2005). The mixed evidence 
might simply be due to the varying country and time coverage employed by different 
studies. Or it could be that the quality and quantity of public investment interacts with 
the institutional environment present in a country – a possibility which has been 
relatively overlooked by the previous literature and merits a more detailed 
investigation especially in the context of developing countries. Even those empirical 
studies that postulate a link between corruption and public investment ignore the role 
of the nature of the political regime as an important determinant. Figure 4.1 shows a 
simple bivariate relation between public investment in fixed capital and corruption for 
a group of developing (non-OECD) countries with autocratic political regimes in the 
year 2005. Figure 4.2 presents the same relationship for a group of countries that are 
democratic in the same year.46 The figures suggest that corruption affects public 
investment in very differing manners across autocratic and democratic countries. 
                                                             
46 The year 2005 was chosen because of the availability of data for the maximum number of 
countries. The bivariate relationship shown in the figures remains similar in other years. The 
definitions of the variables and data sources, as well as the classification of countries as 
autocratic and democratic, are described in further detail in Section 4.4 of this chapter. 
 
143 
 
Figure 4.1 ‘Public Investment in Fixed Capital’ against ‘Corruption’, in autocratic                                                                                                                                             
countries in the year 2005. 
 
This chapter empirically examines the role of institutional quality in 
determining firstly the size and secondly the productivity (the impact on growth) of 
fixed capital investment by the public sector in developing (non-OECD) countries, while 
recognizing that the relationship between corruption and public investment might be 
non-linear. Specifically, based on a relatively recent strand of ‘public choice’ literature 
(Mohtadi and Roe 2003, Plumper and Martin 2003, Hausken et al 2004, Deacon 2009), 
it is hypothesized that the link between corruption and public investment, and 
subsequently public investment and growth, is dictated by political economy 
considerations. This hypothesis is incorporated into the modeling strategy through the 
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use of multiplicative interaction variables, as well as estimation of the postulated 
relationship separately for autocratic and democratic countries. Moreover, I use a 
larger sample of countries and a more recent time coverage for the cross-country 
econometric analysis compared to previous investigations. 
Figure 4.2 ‘Public Investment in Fixed Capital’ against ‘Corruption’, in democratic                                                                                                                                            
countries in the year 2005. 
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rather than as a proportion of GDP, as the relevant measure for public investment in 
the model specification. This helps to abstract from the question of whether public 
investment crowds out or complements private investment, which is not the primary 
question here.47  
The analysis draws upon various strands of the related literature which I survey 
in Section 4.2 in order to provide the analytical framework for the empirical analysis. 
Section 4.3 explains the model specification. Section 4.4 describes the variable 
construction and data sources. Section 4.5 discusses the estimation methodology. The 
descriptive statistics are presented in Section 4.6 and the estimation results discussed 
in Section 4.7. I conclude in Section 4.8 with a discussion and the policy implications of 
the study. 
 
4.2 Literature Survey 
4.2.1 Institutional Determinants of Public Investment 
A great deal of anecdotal evidence, as well as earlier works investigating the growth 
impact of public investment hinted that corruption was a factor that inflates and 
misdirects investment by the government (e.g. Krueger and Orsmond 1989). Then in a 
seminal paper, Devarajan et al (1996) demonstrated that the capital component of 
                                                             
47  Using this measure of public investment implies that I do not have to control for 
private investment in the model specification. In other words, I assume full crowding 
out. However, as a robustness check, public investment as a proportion of GDP is also 
used as a measure in the model specification. 
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public expenditure has a negative impact on per-capita growth in a sample of 
developing countries.48 Their finding was in contrast to the conventional wisdom, 
which recommended allocating a higher share of the budget for public investment in 
developing countries. 
Building on this important insight, Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) presented cross-
country evidence that corruption inflates capital expenditure and lowers the quality of 
infrastructure. The authors argued that capital expenditure generates more rent-
seeking opportunities for government officials compared to current expenditure. 
Investment in accumulating new capital or infrastructure involves larger amounts of 
money and more arbitrary decision-making compared to maintenance of existing 
capital and the operating expenses of the government. In fact, in many developing 
countries repair of existing infrastructure is neglected for precisely this reason. Haque 
and Kneller (2012) use a larger sample of countries and longer time coverage to 
simultaneously estimate equations for growth, corruption, and public investment. 
Their findings confirm that in countries with a higher incidence of corruption, the level 
of public investment is higher and its impact on growth is lower. 
A recent strand of the ‘public choice’ literature incorporates political economy 
considerations to explain the link between corruption and public spending (Mohtadi 
and Roe 2003, Plumper and Martin 2003, Hausken et al 2004, Deacon 2009). Public 
spending is in the hands of the executive and the bureaucracy that acts as its agent. 
The control over the allocation of these public funds creates opportunities for rent-
                                                             
48 In contrast, the authors found that current expenditure had a positive impact on 
growth in the same sample of countries. 
147 
 
seeking. The pattern of rent-seeking in turn is a function of the nature of the political 
regime in terms of the power of the executive, and the relation between the executive 
and the bureaucracy.  
There are at least two classes of theoretical models exploring the link between 
corruption in public spending and the nature of the political regime. The first is a 
framework that models the demand for rent-seeking (Mohtadi and Roe 2003). Rent 
seekers outside the government act as monopolistic competitors in order to 
appropriate a portion of funds earmarked for provision of public goods as rents, by 
bribing government functionaries. The mechanism through which the rent seekers are 
able to operate depends on the openness of the political regime.  
In an autocratic regime, the number of rent seekers is restricted to the small 
elite who operate by bribing the executive which tightly controls the bureaucracy. As 
the regime becomes more democratic, the tight control of the executive over the 
bureaucracy weakens, allowing it to independently engage in rent-seeking, in effect 
decentralizing rent-seeking. Also, information about opportunities for rent-seeking 
becomes more readily available as does access to government functionaries. As the 
return to rent-seeking activity becomes higher, the number of rent seekers increases, 
driving up aggregate rents. As the regime evolves and becomes highly democratic, two 
separate mechanisms reduce aggregate rents. First, the rent-seeking becomes more 
and more competitive so that eventually average rents per individual (as well as 
aggregate rents) fall, making the activity less attractive. Also the probability of corrupt 
government officials being caught rises. Thus this model predicts that as an autocratic 
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regime becomes more politically open, corruption in public spending initially increases 
but then eventually falls as democracy matures. 
The second class of theoretical models developed by Plumper and Martin 
(2003), Hausken et al (2004), and Deacon (2009) explain the supply side of rent-
seeking. Both autocratic and democratic government seek to remain in power by 
assuring political support, and rely on public spending for this purpose. However, the 
manner in which public funds are employed as a means towards political survival 
depends on the nature of the political regime. An autocratic regime relies on the 
support of small elite or certain powerful groups. A democratic regime, in contrast, 
needs wider political support. A highly autocratic government can assure the support 
of its small constituency of power by doling out public funds as rents (as long as the 
general individual can be provided a certain minimum level of consumption which 
prevents a revolution). As the regime becomes democratic and political participation 
increases, it becomes increasingly expensive to give direct transfers. As the regime 
eventually transitions towards becoming highly democratic and political participation 
becomes widespread, popular support can only be assured through large scale 
provision of public services.  
The first part of my empirical analysis, which examines the impact of corruption 
on public investment, incorporates the predictions of the two types of models that 
corruption in public spending is a function of a regime’s political openness (authority 
characteristics). These models also suggest that the political economy considerations 
that drive rent-seeking in public funds are different in autocratic regimes compared to 
149 
 
those that are democratic. This insight is incorporated and tested by estimating the 
relationship separately for autocratic and democratic countries.  
The point of departure of my analysis compared to the political economy 
literature discussed above (Mohtadi and Roe 2003, Plumper and Martin 2003, Hausken 
et al 2004, Deacon 2009) is that I focus on public investment in fixed capital, rather 
than public spending more broadly defined. This is because, as already discussed, 
funds allocated for investment or capital expenditure provide the most obvious 
opportunities for rent-seeking. In order to test this proposition, I also examine the 
association of corruption with government consumption expenditure, and compare 
with it with the association of corruption with public investment. 
4.2.2 Growth Impact of Public Investment 
Investment is the key determinant of growth in both neoclassical and endogenous 
models of growth (Solow 1956, Romer 1994). Whereas in the neoclassical framework 
investment contributes to growth simply through physical capital accumulation, in 
various endogenous growth models it also explains improvement in technology 
(Romer 1986 and 1990, Lucas 1988, Barro 1990, Grossman and Helpman 1990, and 
others). The essential difference in the two frameworks relates to the returns to 
capital. In the former the elasticity of output with respect to capital is less than one 
and in the latter it equals one. 
In the neoclassical framework, total investment can simply be disaggregated 
into its private and public components (Khan and Reinhart 1989, Khan and Kumar 
1997). In this context public investment neither competes with nor complements 
private investment and both kinds of capital exhibit diminishing returns. This leads to a 
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steady state growth path and sustained growth is explained by exogenous 
technological change. In contrast, the endogenous growth model developed by Barro 
(1990) incorporates government investment as provision of public services which 
enhance the productivity of private capital. If government spending is set at the 
optimum level, then private capital when combined with public services exhibits 
constant returns and generates sustained growth.  
Therefore in both the theoretical formulations, public investment enters the 
production function. Therefore, regardless of whether the neoclassical or endogenous 
growth frameworks are assumed to be correct, the impact of public investment on 
growth can be analyzed using cross-country growth regressions, which are based on a 
log linearization around the steady state (Mankiw et al 1992, Barro and Sala-i-Martin 
2004). The endogenous growth models merely predict the coefficient of initial income 
per capita to be zero in these regressions, as opposed to the neoclassical framework in 
which it is expected to be negative. 
However, the large number of empirical studies investigating the link between 
public investment and growth using the cross-country growth regression framework 
provide extremely mixed results. Barro (1991) found that government consumption is 
negatively associated with growth in per capita income, while government investment 
does not have any statistical association. Devarajan et al (1996), and Ghosh and 
Gregoriou (2008), find that in developing countries current expenditure is positively 
related to growth while capital expenditure or public investment has a negative effect, 
which goes against conventional policy advice. In contrast, Easterly and Rebelo (1993) 
present cross country evidence that general government investment is robustly and 
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positively related with growth. In particular they demonstrate that public investment 
in transport and communication has an extremely significant impact on growth. Khan 
and Kumar (1997) also find a positive and statistically significant impact of public 
investment on growth, although lower than the impact of private investment, and also 
that it varies across regions and according to the level of development. 
In all the empirical studies mentioned above, no account is taken of the fact 
that the growth impact of public investment potentially depends on institutional 
quality. Rajkumar and Swaroop (2008) show that the effectiveness of public spending 
in health and education depends on the quality of governance. Haque and Kneller 
(2012) let the growth impact of public investment depend on corruption using a 
simultaneous system of equations. However the growth model they specify includes 
public and private investment as a proportion of GDP separately, and therefore total 
investment is ignored, similar to the approach of Khan and Kumar (1997). I am 
interested in investigating the impact of public investment in fixed capital specifically, 
and not public investment as more broadly defined. Therefore total investment needs 
to be included in the empirical model if it is to be based on the theoretical models of 
growth. Then with investment as a proportion of GDP already included in the model, I 
consider public investment as a percentage of total investment in fixed capital (rather 
than as a proportion of GDP) as the relevant proxy for the relative size of public sector 
investment in infrastructure.49 
                                                             
49 However, as a robustness check, I also report results using public investment as a 
proportion of GDP (publicinv2) in line with the previous empirical growth literature. 
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Moreover, corruption is not the only institutional quality variable that 
potentially affects the productivity of public investment. The political economy 
literature discussed in Section 4.2.1 suggests that the ways in which public funds are 
employed, and hence their impact on growth, depends on the nature of the political 
regime. Therefore in the growth regression framework, I consider political openness as 
an additional institutional determinant of the growth impact of public investment.50 
 
4.3 Empirical Model 
4.3.1 Institutional Determinants of Public Investment  
For the first part of the analysis which investigates the institutional determinants of 
public investment in fixed capital, the following equations are estimated: 
publicinvi,t  = α0 + α1 corri,t-3  + α2 log(ypc)i,t-3 + α3 invi,t-3 + α4 indusi,t-3 + α5 urbani,t-3                  
+ α6  openi,t + μi + εi,t                                                                                                                                         (4.1)                                                                                                            
publicinvi,t = α0 + α1 corri,t-3  + α2 poli,t-3 + α3 (corr * pol)i,t-3 + α4 log(ypc)i,t-3 + α5 invi,t-3          
+ α6 indusi,t-3 + α7 urbani,t-3 + α8 openi,t-3 + βt +   μi + εi,t                                 (4.2) 
Where, 
Subscripts i,t : country ‘i’ in year ‘t’. 
                                                             
50 Similar to the first part of the empirical analysis, I also estimate the growth 
equations separately for autocratic and democratic countries, based on the insight that 
the political economy considerations in the use of public funds essentially differ across 
the two kinds of countries.  
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publicinv: Public sector fixed capital formation as a proportion of total fixed capital 
formation. It proxies for the relative size of public investment in infrastructure and 
state owned enterprises.  
corr: Measures the level of corruption. Higher values represent lower corruption 
pol: Measures openness of the political regime. Higher values represent more 
democracy.  
corr * pol: A multiplicative interaction variable which represents the impact of 
corruption on public investment conditional on political openness. 
log(ypc): The logarithm of real per capita GDP in purchasing power parity terms.  
inv: Total investment as a proportion of GDP. 
ind: Value added by the industrial sector as a proportion of GDP. 
urban: The percentage of the population living in urban areas. 
open: Total trade as a proportion of GDP.  
β: A set of dummy variables for each year except for the first to capture time varying 
shocks that are common to all countries. These reflect global trends in the dependent 
variable. 
μ: Country-specific and time-invariant fixed factors. Capture the invariant country 
characteristics correlated with both the dependent variable and the explanatory 
variables. These include geography, historical experience, legal origin, ethno-linguistic 
fragmentation and culture. 
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The right-hand side variables enter the model with a lag because fixed capital 
does not begin forming instantaneously (Deacon 2009).51 The level of corruption is the 
main explanatory variable, and Equation (4.1) estimates its association with public 
investment while ignoring political economy considerations. Equation (4.2) 
incorporates the insight that the association of corruption with public investment 
depends on the openness of the political regime — ‘α1 + α3 pol i,t-3’  in Equation (4.2) is 
the estimated association of corruption with public investment as a function of 
political openness.52 
The other variables (ypc, inv, indus, urban and open) are included in Equations 
(4.1)-(4.2) as control variables because these are possible determinants of public 
sector investment (while also plausibly being correlated with institutional quality). The 
size of the public sector in an economy is influenced by the level of development and 
the overall level of investment, and the extent of industrialization as predicted by the 
widely cited Wagner’s Law (Sturm 2001, Hausken et al 2004). As a country develops 
                                                             
51 I attempt different lag lengths, but increasing it to more than three years does not 
change the results to any significant degree. I use the minimum possible lag length in 
order to maximize the number of observations given the availability of the data over a 
relatively short time span — the time period of the analysis is discussed in Section 4.4.  
52 It has to be recognized that the coefficient α3 can also be interpreted as the impact 
of political openness on public investment conditional on corruption, in contrast to the 
manner stated. This is true for any multiplicative interaction of two variables. 
However, the test for the statistical significance of the coefficients potentially provides 
guidance for interpreting the interaction variable in one way or the other. If for 
example α1 and α3 are separately as well as jointly significant while α2 and α3 are not, I 
consider it supportive of the interpretation I have used. 
155 
 
economically, and it becomes more industrialized, the demand for infrastructure 
(along with other public services) is expected to increase. The degree of urbanization 
can also be viewed in this light, in addition to being a control for population 
dependency (Sturm 2001, Haque and Kneller 2012). Countries that have a greater 
exposure to trade are also expected to possess larger public sectors (Rodrik 1998). At 
the same time all these variables have been shown to be correlated with the quality of 
institutions as well (e.g. Acemoglu et al 2008, Burke and Leigh 2010, Bhattacharya 
2012). Thus these variables need to be controlled for in the model in order to minimize 
potential omitted variable bias. 
The Equations (4.1) and (4.2) are also estimated separately for countries with 
autocratic regimes and democratic regimes, in addition to the entire sample together, 
based on the hypothesis that the political economy considerations which explain the 
relationship between corruption and public investment differ across autocratic and 
democratic countries. The validity of splitting the sample into the two sub-samples can 
be examined by relying on the Chow Test (Chow 1960, Burke 2012). This procedure 
tests whether the improvement in the fit of the estimated equation as a result of 
splitting the sample is statistically significant.    
Finally, In addition to public investment in fixed capital, the Equations (4.1) and 
(4.2) are also estimated with the government consumption expenditure as a 
proportion of GDP (govcons) as an alternate dependent variable. This is done to make 
sure that the estimated coefficients are not capturing the association of the 
explanatory variables with overall government size, rather than public investment 
specifically; this allows testing for the premise that rent-seeking opportunities 
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primarily arise from public funds meant for infrastructure and investment in state 
owned enterprises.  
4.3.2 Growth Impact of Public Investment  
For the second part of the empirical analysis, the following cross-country growth 
equations are estimated: 
gri,t = α0 + α1 log(ypc)i,t-5 + α2 invi,t-5 + α3 popi,t-5  + α4 publicinvi,t-5 + βt + μi + εi,t   (4.3) 
gri,t = α0 + α1 log(ypc)i,t-5 + α2 invi,t-5 + α3 popi,t-5  + α4 openi,t-5 + α5 publicinvi,t-5   + α6 poli,t-5    
+ α7 (publicinvi,t-5*poli,t-5) + βt + μi + εi,t                                     (4.4)     
gri,t = α0 + α1 log(ypc)i,t-5 + α2 invi,t-5 + α3 popi,t-5  + α4 openi,t-5 + α5 publicinvi,t-5   + α6 corri,t-5 
+ α7 (publicinvi,t-5*corr i,t-5) + βt + μi + εi,t                                            (4.5)                                                                                                                                                                                 
where, in addition to the variables included in the previous analysis, 
gr: Five year average of the growth of per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) from 
time t-4 to t.  
pop: Annual population growth.  
publicinv * pol: A multiplicative interaction term to test for the effect of political 
openness on the growth impact of the relative size of public investment in fixed 
capital. 
publicinv * corr: A multiplicative interaction term to test for the effect of corruption on 
the growth impact of the relative size of public investment in fixed capital. 
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The dependent variable is the average growth of real GDP per capita from time 
t-4 to t.53 Annual observations of this variable are used so the dependent variable is a 
forward moving average. Using a five year average counteracts against business cycle 
fluctuations, whereas a moving average substantially increases the number of 
observations in the sample (Devarajan et al 1996).54 However I also re-estimate the 
baseline regression (Equation (4.3)) using observations of the variable occurring every 
five years (i.e. a five yearly panel), which is more standard in the empirical literature, 
and report the results as a robustness check.  
The set of time dummies in the growth equation captures in particular the 
common productivity and technology shocks to all countries. Similarly, the country-
specific effects specifically capture the differences in the initial level of technology or 
efficiency, in addition to the invariant country characteristics mentioned in the context 
of Equations (4.1)-(4.2) (Mankiw et al 1992, Bond et al 2001). 
The explanatory variables enter the model with a five year lag to capture the 
medium term growth impact of these factors — the right-hand side variables can then 
be interpreted as initial values of these factors. The choice of a five year lag length is 
common in the empirical growth literature (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 2004).55 Equation 
(4.3) is the baseline regression estimating the growth impact of publicinv, which is the 
                                                             
53 It is calculated as the compound rate of growth over a five year period, by taking the 
geometric average of the annual rates of growth. 
54 As explained further in Section 4.5, the fixed effects regression technique does not 
estimate the growth equations consistently unless the number of time periods is large. 
55 Using a different length does not substantially change my estimation results. 
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main explanatory variable. The addition of the interaction variables in Equations (4.4) 
and (4.5) tests for the effect of institutional quality (political openness and corruption 
considered in turn) on the growth impact of publicinv. In addition to investment as a 
proportion of total investment in fixed capital (publicinv), I also estimate Equations 
(4.3)-(4.5) with public investment in fixed capital as a proportion of GDP (publicinv2) as 
an alternate explanatory variable. This allows verifying for the growth impact of public 
investment regardless of the way it is measured.  
The variables ‘initial per capita income’ (ypc), ‘annual population growth’ (pop) 
and ‘total investment’ (inv) in Equations (4.3)-(4.5) are standard in growth regressions 
and derived from the neoclassical growth model (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 2004). The 
expected sign of the estimated coefficient of initial per capita income is negative as 
theory predicts the conditional convergence of per capita growth rates once other 
factors are kept constant. The expected sign for the coefficient of inv is positive and 
pop is negative. 
Similar to Equations (4.1) and (4.2), Equations (4.3)-(4.5) are also estimated 
separately for countries with autocratic and democratic regimes, in addition to the 
entire sample together, again based on the premise that political economy 
considerations make the relationship between institutional quality, public investment 
and growth fundamentally different across the two types of countries.56  
                                                             
56 Estimating the equation separately for the two groups is exactly equivalent to 
estimating a single equation, in which a binary variable (that separates the sample into 
two groups) is used to generate separate intercept and slope interaction variables – 
the approach employed in Chapter 3 of this thesis. Unlike in Chapter 3, I find the 
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4.4 Variable Construction and Data Sources 
The dataset used for the first part of the empirical analysis, relating to the 
institutional determinants of public investment, covers a maximum of 87 countries 
over the time period 1988 to 2011. The time coverage is limited by the availability of 
data for corruption, which is only available from 1985 onwards. The second part of the 
empirical analysis, which investigates the growth impact of public investment, covers a 
maximum of 109 countries. The time coverage for estimating Equation (4.5), in which 
corruption is an explanatory variable, is limited to 1990-2011. However, for estimating 
Equations (4.3) and (4.4), which do not include corruption as a variable, the time 
coverage is expanded to the period 1970-2011. For both parts of the empirical 
analysis, the country coverage is dictated by availability of data for public investment. 
The data source for all variables, except for measures of institutional quality 
and the real GDP per capita, is the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI) 
online database. Data provided by WDI is itself based on different underlying sources 
such as IMF’s Government Finance Statistics, United Nation’s World Urbanization 
Prospects and World Population Prospects and World Bank’s National Accounts Data 
and International Comparison Program. 
The measure for the main variable (public investment) is gross fixed capital 
formation by the public sector. WDI provides data for total fixed capital formation in 
                                                             
approach of sample splitting preferable for presentation purposes here, because of the 
larger number of key variables (stemming from theory in the model) – a slope 
interaction variable would need to be generated for each of the variables in order to 
estimate separate coefficients for the two groups.  
160 
 
an economy and that by the private sector, which I use to obtain the variable 
publicinv.57 This includes government construction of infrastructure such as roads, 
railways, land improvements, buildings etc and also plant, equipment and machinery 
purchases by the government.  
The measure for corruption (corr) is from the International Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG) provided by the PRS group. This indicator is constructed on the basis of 
subjective assessment by experts. The data are primarily meant to be a guide for 
foreign investors but have been widely used in the empirical literature as well. The 
indicator is an assessment of not only direct financial corruption encountered by 
businesses in dealing with the government, but also political corruption such as 
“excessive patronage, nepotism, job reservations, favour-for-favours, secret party 
funding, and suspiciously close ties between politics and business” (ICRG 2008, page 
31) . Thus it is a broad measure that represents the type of rent-seeking activities that 
influence public investment as pointed out by the political economy literature. The 
indicator runs on a discrete scale from 0 to 6 with higher values indicating less 
corruption. 
The measure for political openness is an indicator provided by the PolityIV 
project run by Marshall et al (2010). The PolityIV project rates underlying authority 
characteristics of the political regime, namely ‘competiveness and openness of 
executive recruitment, constraints on the executive, and competitiveness or regulation 
of political participation’. The scores assigned for these distinct elements are combined 
                                                             
57 And similarly, also to obtain publicinv2 as the alternate explanatory variable in 
Equations (4.3)-(4.5). 
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to form separate variables to measure both the degree of democracy (democ) and 
autocracy (autoc) of each regime. Both democ and autoc run on an 11 point scale58, 
with higher absolute values representing a greater extent of democracy and autocracy 
respectively. For an empirical analysis these two variables can be added together to 
form a combined variable called Polity2 (pol) that runs from -10 (most autocratic) to 10 
(most democratic). I use this variable to measure the openness of political regimes. For 
the purpose of splitting the sample, I classify countries as democratic if the pol score is 
above 0, and as autocratic otherwise.  
The institutional quality measures are subjective indicators unlike the economic 
variables, as there is no objective way to measure abstract characteristics such as 
corruption and democracy. Despite the possible bias involved in constructing 
subjective indicators, both the data sources have been widely used to carry out 
empirical analysis concerning institutions. Also, the fact that these indicators are 
purchased widely by investors to judge the institutional environment of a country 
shows a revealed preference for this data. 
WDI provides data for annual percentage changes of GDP per capita based on 
constant price local currency units, which I use to obtain the five yearly average rate of 
growth (gr). GDP per capita (ypc) is measured in constant year 2000 US dollars and is in 
purchasing power parity terms.59 The measure for total investment (inv) is gross capital 
formation as a proportion of GDP; it consists of not only outlays on fixed assets in an 
economy but also net changes in inventories. Value added by industry as a proportion 
                                                             
58 Democ varies from 0 to 10 for and autoc runs from 0 to -10. 
59 This data is obtained from Penn World Tables (PWT 7.0) of Heston et al (2011). 
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of GDP (indus) refers to the ISIC divisions 10-45 and incorporates the subgroups 
mining, manufacturing, construction, electricity, water and gas. Total trade (open) is 
the sum of exports and imports of goods and services as a proportion of GDP. Annual 
population growth (pop) is based on mid-year de-facto population — it includes 
immigrants. The alternate dependent variable used in Equations (4.1) and (4.2) is the 
consumption share of government as a proportion of GDP (govcons), which only 
consists of current expenditures by the government and does not include any capital 
formation. 
 
4.5 Estimation Strategy 
For the purpose of estimating Equations (4.1)-(4.5), I employ the fixed effects 
estimation technique, which is widely used in cross-country empirical analysis. The 
reason for the suitability and popularity of the technique for empirical analysis of this 
sort is because it provides consistent estimates for the coefficients even when the 
country-specific and time-invariant factors are correlated with the set of explanatory 
variables. Fixed factors such as geography and historical experience are thought to be 
related with not only economic variables but also institutional quality (Acemoglu et al 
2001, 2005, 2008). In contrast, the random effects estimation technique makes the 
unrealistic assumption that the country-specific fixed factors are not correlated with 
any of the right-hand side variables. I formally test for this assumption using a robust 
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version of the Hausman test.60 As suspected, for each of the equations the test 
strongly rejected the null hypothesis that random effects provide consistent estimates 
of the coefficients. 
While the fixed country-specific factors and the control variables mitigate the 
possible omitted variable bias which leads to inconsistent estimation, there is still a 
concern over the endogeneity bias arising from reverse causality. For example, with 
regard to Equations (4.1)-(4.2), a higher level of public sector investment could lead to 
more opportunities for corruption or influence the authority characteristics of the 
political regime. Or with reference to Equations (4.3)-(4.5) it is quite possible that the 
growth rate of per capita GDP influences the size of public sector investment. Thus, 
although fixed effects estimation allows us to isolate the within-country association 
between the explanatory variables and the dependent variable, it does not establish a 
causal relationship. Ideally, I need instrumental variables that are correlated with the 
right-hand side variables while not affecting public investment through any other 
channel in Equations (4.1) and (4.2) (uncorrelated with the idiosyncratic error term). 
This is especially difficult for institutional quality variables and thus is beyond the 
scope of the current study.61 However, it can be reasonably argued that through the 
use of lagged explanatory variables the possibility of reverse causality is minimized. For 
the lagged explanatory variables to be endogenous, some factor not captured by the 
                                                             
60 Unlike the standard version, the robust version of the test does not assume that the 
random effects estimator is efficient and instead uses cluster (country) robust standard 
errors to calculate the chi-squared test statistic (Cameron and Trivedi 2010). 
61 Exogenous shocks are more likely to be valid instruments for changes in output 
rather than for institutional quality (e.g. Burke 2012). 
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set of control variables or the fixed country effects would have to influence public 
investment three years ahead, while also being correlated with the explanatory 
variables in the initial period. Even though not impossible, it is not immediately 
obvious either. 
For the second part of the empirical analysis pertaining to the examination of 
the growth impact of public investment, there is another source of endogeneity bias. 
The logarithm of initial GDP per capita on the right-hand side of a growth regression is 
equivalent to the lagged dependent variable (Bond et al 2001). It is well known that 
the fixed effects regression technique does not consistently estimate an equation that 
includes the lagged dependent variable as an explanatory variable.62 The size of the 
bias, however, becomes smaller as the number of time periods increases (Nickell 1981, 
Wooldridge 2002). Thus I use observations occurring annually when using fixed effects 
to estimate Equations (4.3) to (4.5) in order to maximize the number of time periods.  
The presence of the lagged dependent variable on the right-hand side of the 
growth regressions allows me to rely on the system generalized method of moments 
(system GMM) estimation technique to further address endogeneity concerns.63 The 
system GMM technique provides consistent estimates even when the explanatory 
variables are endogenous or weakly exogenous (correlated with past error terms only). 
                                                             
62 This is because the lagged dependent variable on the right-hand side is correlated 
with the error term after the equation is demeaned to purge the fixed effects. 
63 The System GMM estimation technique developed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and 
Blundell and Bond (1998), is popularly used in the empirical literature to consistently 
estimate an equation that contains the lagged dependent variable as an explanatory 
variable. 
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When the right-hand side variables enter the econometric specification with a lag as in 
my model, the less restrictive restriction of weak exogeneity allows the explanatory 
variables to be endogenous (correlated with the contemporaneous error term). The 
estimation technique generates a set of internal instruments uncorrelated with the 
error term. This set consists of the appropriate number of lags of the right-hand side 
variables as instruments in the differenced version of the original equation, and the 
first differences (and the appropriate number of lagged first differences) as 
instruments in the original level equation.  
The validity of the instrument set can be tested through a Hansen test of over-
identifying restrictions. Under the null of this test the residuals are un-correlated with 
the set of instruments. Thus if the instrument set is found to be exogenous, we are 
able to establish a causal relationship between the explanatory variables and the 
dependent variable. However the Hansen test is weakened if the set of instruments is 
relatively large compared to the number of observations due to an over-fitting bias 
(Roodman 2009b). For this reason I am only able to estimate Equation (4.3) through 
system GMM; the additional variables in Equations (4.4) and (4.5) cause rapid 
instrument proliferation.  
Lastly, in estimating Equation (4.3) through system GMM, I use observations 
occurring every five years from 1970 to 2010 (i.e. using a five yearly panel), so that the 
number of time periods in the panel is nine. This System GMM technique works best 
for small T (time interval) and large N (countries) samples (Roodman 2009a, Jayasuriya 
and Burke 2013).  
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4.6 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 4.A1 in the appendix of this chapter reports the descriptive statistics 
including the means, standard deviations, maximums, minimums, numbers of 
observations and countries, for all the variables used in the empirical analysis. The 
sample consists of developing (non-OECD) countries at varying stages of development. 
Even with the OECD countries excluded, all the economic variables as well as the 
institutional quality measures show a substantial variation. For example, the real GDP 
per capita in purchasing power parity terms varies from a minimum of 250 US dollars 
to a maximum of 70,000 US dollars. Public investment as a proportion of GDP ranges 
from close to 1 percent up to 43 percent. Public investment as a proportion of total 
investment in fixed capital ranges from 1 to 98 percent. Similarly, the institutional 
quality scores for the countries in the sample vary across the entire range of these 
indicators.  
Tables 4.A2 and 4.A3 present these statistics separately for the sample of 
countries with autocratic and democratic regimes. The main economic variables (real 
GDP per capita, growth, investment, and public investment) display a larger variation 
as indicated by their standard deviation for the sample of autocratic countries. Further 
comparison between the two sets of countries reveals some interesting insights.  
Democratic countries are on average more prosperous during the time period 
of this study — average real GDP per capita is 800 international dollars higher. This is 
despite the fact that OECD countries (which are all democratic) are excluded and the 
maximum real GDP per capita for the democratic countries in the sample is only 
18,000 international dollars compared to a maximum of 70,000 for autocratic 
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countries. Similarly, the mean of annual growth rate for democratic countries is 0.5 
percent higher than autocratic countries.  
However, the mean of total investment as a proportion of GDP is almost the 
same for the two types of countries. In contrast, the level of public investment in 
democratic countries on average is significantly lower than in autocratic countries – as 
a proportion of GDP it is one and a half percentage points lower and as a proportion of 
total investment in fixed capital it is 8 percentage points lower. The share of 
government consumption expenditure as a proportion of GDP on average is also 
slightly lower (less than one percentage point) in democratic countries 
For the other variables as well, democratic countries on average ‘perform 
better’. The mean of the corruption score for democratic countries is 0.2 points or 3.33 
percentage points (=0.2/6 *100) greater.64 The mean of population growth is 0.7 
percent lower, the trade to GDP ratio is 5 percentage points greater and tax collected 
as a proportion of GDP is 2 percentage points higher. The proportion of population 
living in urban areas is on average 6 percentage points higher. Surprisingly the 
industrial share of GDP is on average 2 percentage points lower for democratic 
countries.  
 
                                                             
64 Here and henceforth a percentage point is defined as the change as a proportion of 
its total range of the variable. 
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4.7 Estimations Results 
4.7.1 Institutional Determinants of Public Investment   
The fixed effects regression results for Equations (4.1) and (4.2), pertaining to the 
institutional determinants of public investment in fixed capital (publicinv), are 
presented in Table 4.1. The results are reported for the entire sample (in Columns 1 
and 2), as well as separately for autocratic countries (in Columns 3 and 4) and 
democratic countries (in Columns 5 and 6). The p-value of the Chow test statistic 
indicates the validity of splitting the sample. 
The first regression for each of the estimation samples (Columns 1, 3 and 5) 
corresponds to Equation (4.1), which does not include political openness (pol) as an 
explanatory variable. The main explanatory variable in these columns is corruption 
(corr)65. The next column for each estimation sample (Columns 2, 4 and 6) reports the 
regression results for Equation (4.2), which adds political openness and its interaction 
with corruption ( i.e. corr * pol) into the model. These regressions show the association 
of corruption with publicinv as a function of political openness. Comparing the results 
of the two sets of regressions illustrates the importance of the nature of the political 
regime in determining the impact of corruption on public investment. 
The results for the entire sample (reported in the first two Columns of Table 
4.1) do not demonstrate any relationship of corruption with publicinv at a reasonable 
level of statistical significance — neither as the sole institutional variable (in Equation 
4.1) nor as a function of political openness (in Equation 4.2). These regressions explain 
                                                             
65 As a reminder, higher values of the variable represent lower corruption. 
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less than 10 percent of the within-country variation in publicinv as indicated by the R2 
(within). However, the p-value of the Chow test statistic indicates that a significant 
improvement in fit is achieved by estimating Equations (4.1) and (4.2) separately for 
autocratic and democratic countries, justifying the approach of sample splitting.    
Following the splitting of the sample, interesting results emerge for the group 
of autocratic countries. The regressions in Columns (3) and (4) of the table reveal that 
corruption is positively associated with public investment in the sample of autocratic 
countries, but only when the impact of corruption is considered as a function of 
political openness. Column (3) indicates that corruption has no statistically significant 
relation with publicinv when political openness is not taken into account, similar to the 
results for the entire sample. However once political openness (pol) and its interaction 
with corruption (i.e. pol *corr) are added to the specification (in Column 4 to represent 
Equation 4.2), it is found that corruption explains public investment in fixed capital at 
the one percent level of significance. Both the variables added to the specification in 
Column (4) are jointly significant at the one percent level.  
The estimated coefficient of corruption in Column (4) indicates that an 
improvement of one standard deviation in the corruption score is associated with an 
almost four percentage points lower publicinv.66 To put this into perspective, if 
Pakistan reduced corruption to the level prevalent in India in the year 2008 (i.e. 
improved the corruption score from 2 to 2.5) keeping everything else constant, its 
                                                             
66 This calculation employs the estimated coefficient of corruption in Column (4) and 
the standard deviation of corruption (listed in Table 4.A2) for the autocratic group of 
countries. 
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publicinv is predicted to fall by 2 percentage points.67 Moreover, the coefficient of the 
interaction variable is also significant at the five percent level; it indicates that the 
negative association of a standard deviation improvement in the corruption score on 
publicinv is enhanced by half a percentage point, when the political openness score 
increases by one point (or 5 percentage points). The rationale for interpreting the 
interaction variable as I have done, rather than as the association of political openness 
with public investment (conditional on corruption), is based on the statistical 
significance of the coefficient of political openness – the association of political 
openness with public investment is estimated at a very low level of statistical 
significance. 
For the group of democratic countries, corruption shows no statistically 
significant association with public investment (Columns 5 and 6). Compared to 
autocratic countries, for democratic countries a lesser extent of the within-country 
variation in publicinv is explained by the regressions. Even adding political openness 
and its interaction with corruption makes no noticeable difference to the results. In 
fact, the institutional quality variables are not even jointly significant at a reasonable 
level of statistical significance, indicating that for democratic countries institutional 
quality does not determine public investment.  
 
 
                                                             
67 The actual difference in publicinv between the two countries in 2008 is 1.3 
percentage points. 
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Table 4.1 Fixed Effects Regression Results for Public Investment in fixed capital        
(as  a proportion of total investment in fixed capital) 
 
 Entire Sample Autocratic Countries Democratic Countries 
 
Independent 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Corr -1.334 
(0.936) 
-1.315 
(0.937) 
-0.547 
(1.587) 
-4.184*** 
(1.546) 
-0.414 
(0.958) 
0.316 
(1.077) 
Pol  -0.027 
(0.379) 
 0.632 
(0.562) 
 0.670* 
(0.336) 
Pol * Corr  -0.044 
(0.123) 
 -0.584** 
(0.222) 
 -0.226 
(0.141) 
Log(ypc) 0.854 
(5.595) 
0.546 
(5.678) 
3.824 
(6.394) 
3.380 
(6.762) 
21.901*** 
(6.629) 
21.214*** 
(6.566) 
Inv -0.267** 
(0.132) 
-0.269** 
(0.132) 
0.011 
(0.159) 
0.047 
(0.141) 
-0.475*** 
(0.137) 
-0.499*** 
(0.143) 
Indus 0.442** 
(0.168) 
0.433** 
(0.170) 
0.664*** 
(0.212) 
0.654*** 
(0.198) 
0.250 
(0.304) 
0.254 
(0.289) 
Open 0.047 
(0.052) 
0.050 
(0.053) 
0.025 
(0.103) 
0.018 
(0.096) 
0.038 
(0.058) 
0.029 
(0.058) 
Urban 0.067 
(0.352) 
0.061 
(0.352) 
0.731 
(0.463) 
0.879* 
(0.478) 
0.106 
(0.286) 
0.083 
(0.289) 
Countries 88 88 51 51 72 72 
Observations 1521 1521 592 592 929 929 
Chow Test 0.001 0.001     
‘α1=0,α2=0, 
α3=0’ 
 0.415  0.002  0.264 
‘α1=0,α3=0’  0.321  0.014  0.255 
‘α2=0,α3=0’  0.782  0.002  0.141 
T.E. Included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.640 0.640 0.700 0.712 0.718 0.720 
R2(within) 0.095 0.096 0.173 0.207 0.127 0.133 
R2(between) 0.008 0.027 0.000 0.000 0.083 0.083 
Notes: A constant is included in all regressions but not reported. Annual 
observations of the dependent variable are used from 1988-2011. The explanatory 
variables are lagged by three years. Robust standard errors clustered by countries 
are reported in parentheses. TE refers to the set of time dummies. The statistic 
reported for the Chow Test is the p-value of the F statistic testing the null hypothesis 
that the set of estimated coefficients for the sample of autocratic countries is 
statistically the same as that for the sample of democratic countries. α1 is the 
coefficient of corr, α2 is the coefficient of pol and α3 is the coefficient of corr*pol — 
the statistics reported for the test of joint significance of the coefficients is the p-
value of the F statistic. The R2 refers to the coefficient of determination from 
estimation of the equivalent Least Squares Dummy Variable Model (LSDV).                                                                                                                                                 
*Significant at the 10% level                                                                                                               
**Significant at the 5% level                                                                                                                  
***Significant at the 1% level 
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Table 4.2. Fixed Effects Regression Results for Government Consumption                       
(as  a proportion of GDP) 
 
 Entire Sample Autocratic Countries Democratic Countries 
 
Independent 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Corr 0.425** 
(0.203) 
0.430** 
(0.204) 
0.171 
(0.356) 
0.876* 
(0.481) 
0.702** 
(0.271) 
0.967*** 
(0.336) 
Pol  -0.016 
(0.078) 
 -0.225 
(0.153) 
 0.042 
(0.084) 
Pol * Corr  -0.007 
(0.025) 
 0.117** 
(0.057) 
 -0.058 
(0.038) 
Log(ypc) 1.765* 
(1.080) 
1.678 
(1.101) 
4.248** 
(1.607) 
3.976** 
(1.481) 
1.966 
(1.949) 
1.592 
(1.938) 
Inv 0.027 
(0.028) 
0.027 
(0.028) 
0.139*** 
(0.040) 
0.132*** 
(0.039) 
-0.027 
(0.025) 
-0.029 
(0.026) 
Indus -0.038 
(0.051) 
-0.041 
(0.050) 
-0.017 
(0.056) 
-0.015 
(0.055) 
0.000 
(0.060) 
-0.014 
(0.058) 
Open 0.002 
(0.013) 
0.002 
(0.013) 
-0.064*** 
(0.022) 
-0.062*** 
(0.022) 
0.027** 
(0.012) 
0.027** 
(0.012) 
Urban -0.216** 
(0.102) 
-0.217** 
(0.102) 
-0.416*** 
(0.154) 
-0.441*** 
(0.152) 
-0.035 
(0.086) 
-0.043 
(0.084) 
Countries 88 88 51 51 82 82 
Observations 1517 1517 588 588 929 929 
Chow Test 0.293 0.082     
‘α1=0,α2=0, 
α3=0’ 
 0.143  0.175  0.027 
‘α1=0,α3=0’  0.096  0.113  0.019 
‘α2=0,α3=0’  0.674  0.090  0.089 
T.E. Included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.759 0.760 0.819 0.823 0.798 0.804 
R2(within) 0.105 0.107 0.343 0.355 0.103 0.127 
R2(between) 0.001 0.001 0.068 0.070 0.103 0.114 
Notes: A constant is included in all regressions but not reported. Annual observations of the 
dependent variable are used from 1988-2011. The explanatory variables are lagged by three 
years. Robust standard errors clustered by countries are reported in parentheses. TE refers 
to the set of time dummies. The statistic reported for the Chow Test is the p-value of the F 
statistic testing the null hypothesis that the set of estimated coefficients for the sample of 
autocratic countries is statistically the same as that for the sample of democratic countries. 
α1 is the coefficient of corr, α2 is the coefficient of pol and α3 is the coefficient of corr*pol — 
the statistics reported for the test of joint significance of the coefficients is the p-value of 
the F statistic. The R2 refers to the coefficient of determination from estimation of the 
equivalent Least Squares Dummy Variable Model (LSDV).                                                                                                                                                 
*Significant at the 10% level                                                                                                                            
**Significant at the 5% level                                                                                                                  
***Significant at the 1% level 
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As a side-note, the set of control variables also explain publicinv differently 
across autocratic and democratic countries. For autocratic countries, the only variable 
other than corruption that explains publicinv is the level of industrialization. It is 
positively associated with public investment at a high level of statistical significance 
(one percent level). For democratic countries the only variables to explain public 
investment are GDP per capita (positively associated with publicinv) and the level of 
overall investment as a proportion of GDP (negatively associated with publicinv). 
For the purpose of comparison, I also report (in Table 4.2) the regression 
results for Equations (4.1) and (4.2) with government consumption expenditure as a 
proportion of GDP (govcons) replacing publicinv as the dependent variable.68 This is 
done to check that corruption enhances only public investment in fixed capital, rather 
than the overall size of the government. The results are consistent with this 
hypothesis.  
For the group of autocratic countries, in contrast to publicinv, improved 
corruption scores are positively associated with government consumption 
expenditure, however only when considered as a function of political openness (in 
Column 4). Moreover, the positive association is enhanced, as an autocratic country 
becomes more politically open as indicated by the estimated coefficient of the 
interaction variable (i.e. pol * corr). The relationship between corruption and public 
investment is similar for the group of democratic countries, regardless of whether the 
impact of corruption is considered as a function of political openness or not. In this 
                                                             
68 Note that the sample of countries remains the same in both Table 4.1 and Table 4.2, 
in order to make a valid comparison. 
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case adding political openness and the interaction variable to the specification only 
increases the magnitude and the statistical significance of the positive coefficient for 
corruption slightly.  
With regards to the other variables, for the sample of autocratic countries, now 
four other variables also explain govcons at a high level of statistical significance (one 
percent or five percent). In these countries, GDP per capita and overall investment 
(inv) are positively associated with government consumption. On the other hand the 
proportion of trade to GDP (open) and the level of urbanisation (urban) are negatively 
associated with govcons. For the group of democratic countries, other than corruption, 
the only variable associated with govcons at a reasonable level of significance is open 
(the association is positive). 
Thus the comparison suggests that the determinants of government 
consumption expenditure noticeably differ from the determinants of public 
investment in fixed capital. The extent of within-country variation (as indicated by the 
within R2) in govcons that is explained by the regressions is much higher compared to 
publicinv for the group of autocratic countries. For democratic countries, however, the 
within-country variation in govcons explained by the regressions remains roughly 
similar to the regressions for publicinv.   
4.7.2 Growth Impact of Public Investment 
The regression analysis investigating the growth impact of public investment is 
presented in this sub section. My preferred measure of public investment is publicinv 
(public investment in fixed capital as a proportion of total investment in fixed capital) 
based on the discussion in Sections 4.2 and 4.3. However as a robustness check, the 
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results using publicinv2 (public investment in fixed capital as a proportion of GDP), 
following the previous empirical growth literature, are also reported and discussed 
alongside.  
Table 4.3 reports the fixed effects results for the entire sample with publicinv as 
the explanatory variable.69 The first column in this table corresponds to Equation (4.3), 
which is the baseline specification and does not include the institutional quality 
variables. The second column represents Equation (4.4), in which political openness 
and its interaction with public investment (i.e. pol * publicinv) are added to the 
specification. The third column corresponds to Equation (4.5), in which corruption (and 
its interaction with publicinv) rather than political openness is the institutional quality 
variable added to the baseline specification. The results in the table indicate that 
publicinv is not associated with growth at any reasonable level of statistical significance 
in any of the specifications, neither by itself nor as a function of institutional quality 
variables. However, the p-value of the Chow test statistic shows that a significant 
improvement in fit is achieved by estimating Equations (4.3) and (4.4) separately for 
the sample of autocratic and democratic countries. However, with corruption as the 
institutional quality variable, the Chow Test provides no reason to split the sample.  
 
 
 
                                                             
69 As a reminder, the fixed effects analysis is carried out using annual data, with the 
five year (forward moving) average growth rate of GDP as the dependent variable 
176 
 
Table 4.3. Fixed Effects Regression Results  for Annual Growtht (Entire Sample) 
(using Public Investment as a proportion of Total Investment in Fixed Capital as the 
explanatory variable) 
 
Independent  
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
log(ypc)t-5 -3.493*** 
(0.809) 
-3.451*** 
(0.826) 
-5.718*** 
(0.964) 
invt-5 0.196*** 
(0.303) 
0.197*** 
(0.031) 
0.176*** 
(0.038) 
popt-5 0.015 
(0.141) 
0.040 
(0.130) 
0.012 
(0.217) 
publicinvt-5 -0.012 -0.010 
(0.007) 
-0.001 
(0.016) 
polt-5  -0.024 
(0.045) 
 
(publicinv * pol)t-5  0.000 
(0.001) 
 
cort-5   0.120 
(0.351) 
(publicinv * cor)t-5   -0.001 
(0.007) 
Countries 109 107 88 
Observations 2233 2214 1516 
Chow Test  0.082 0.079 0.293 
‘α4 =0, α5 = 0, α6=0’  0.454 0.966 
‘α 4=0, α6= 0’  0.370 0.955 
‘α5 =0, α6 = 0’  0.868 0.896 
T.E Included Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.631 0.634 0.696 
R2(within) 0.346 0.347 0.501 
R2(between) 0.019 0.018 0.001 
Notes: A constant is included in all regressions but not reported. Annual observations of the 
dependent variable are used from 1970-2011 in Columns (1) and (2), and from 1990-2011 in 
Column (3). The dependent variable is a moving average of the growth rate from year t-4 to 
t. The explanatory variables are lagged by five years. Robust standard errors clustered by 
countries are reported in parentheses. TE refers to the set of time dummies. The statistic 
reported for the Chow Test is the p-value of the F statistic testing the null hypothesis that 
the set of estimated coefficients for the sample of autocratic countries is statistically the 
same as that for the sample of democratic countries. α4 is the coefficient of publicinv, α5 is 
the coefficient of pol in Column (2) and corr in Column (3), and α6 is the coefficient of the 
interaction variable — the statistics reported for the joint significance of coefficients is the 
p-value of the F statistic. The R2 refers to the coefficient of determination from estimation of 
the equivalent Least Squares Dummy Variable Model (LSDV).                                                                                                                                                  
*Significant at the 10% level                                                                                                                          
**Significant at the 5% level                                                                                                                  
***Significant at the 1% level 
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Table 4.4. Fixed Effects Regression Results  for Annual Growtht 
(using Public Investment as a proportion of Total Investment in Fixed Capital as the explanatory 
variable) 
 
  
Autocratic Countries 
 
 
Democratic Countries 
Independent 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
log(ypc)t-5 -2.454** 
(1.223) 
-2.315** 
(1.170) 
-6.419*** 
(0.915) 
-6.500*** 
(0.926) 
invt-5 0.223*** 
(0.038 
0.225*** 
(0.038) 
0.152*** 
(0.048) 
0.149*** 
(0.048) 
popt-5 0.034 
(0.149) 
0.067 
(0.131) 
-0.052 
(0.239) 
-0.009 
(0.233) 
Publicinvt-5 -0.037*** 
(0.011) 
-0.019* 
(0.010) 
-0.003 
(0.012) 
0.001 
(0.013) 
polt-5  -0.122 
(0.082) 
 0.052 
(0.062) 
(publicinv 2* 
pol)t-5 
 0.003* 
(0.002) 
 -0.001 
(0.001) 
Countries 75 75 81 79 
Observations 1033 1031 1200 1183 
‘α4 =0, α5 = 0, 
α6=0’ 
 0.007  0.709 
‘α 4=0, α6= 0’  0.002  0.553 
‘α5 =0, α6 = 0’  0.149  0.530 
T.E Included Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.689 0.696 0.697 0.697 
R2(within) 0.374 0.382 0.466 0.468 
R2(between) 0.212 0.222 0.048 0.048 
Notes: A constant is included in all regressions but not reported. Annual observations of the 
dependent variable are used from 1970-2011 in columns (1) and (2), and from 1990-2011 in 
column (3). The dependent variable is a moving average of the growth rate from year t-4 to t. 
The explanatory variables are lagged by three years. Robust standard errors clustered by 
countries are reported in parentheses. TE refers to the set of time dummies. α4 is the 
coefficient of publicinv, α5 is the coefficient of pol , and α6 is the coefficient of the interaction 
variable — the statistics reported for the joint significance of the coefficients is the p-value of 
the F statistic. The R2 refers to the coefficient of determination from estimation of the 
equivalent Least Squares Dummy Variable Model (LSDV).                                                                                                                                                 
*Significant at the 10% level                                                                                                                            
**Significant at the 5% level                                                                                                                  
***Significant at the 1% level 
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Therefore, Table 4.4 then reports the regression results for Equations (4.3) and 
(4.4), separately for the sample of autocratic countries (in Columns 1 and 2 
respectively) and for the democratic countries (in Columns 3 and 4 respectively). 
Publicinv is negatively associated with annual growth only for the sample of autocratic 
countries at a reasonable level of significance. Comparing across Columns (1) and (3) 
(i.e. in the baseline regressions), the estimated coefficients for publicinv for the sample 
of autocratic and democratic countries do no overlap within one standard error band; 
therefore the association of publicinv with growth is statistically different across the 
groups at the ten percent level of significance. Column (1) indicates that an increase of 
1 percentage point in publicinv is associated with a reduction of 0.04 percent in 
average growth. 
Once political openness and its interaction with publicinv ( i.e. publicinv * pol) is 
added to the baseline specification, it is again found that public investment only 
impacts growth in autocratic countries, although the negative association is mitigated 
as the level of political openness increases (as indicated by the coefficient of the 
interaction variable).70 The coefficient of the interaction variable indicates that as the 
score for political openness increases by 1 point (or 5 percentage points), the 
estimated negative growth impact of publicinv is reduced by almost 15 percent.71 For 
the sample of democratic countries there is no evidence of such a relationship.  
                                                             
70 Support for interpreting the coefficient of the interaction variable in the manner that 
I have done is provided by the statistical significance of the coefficients.  
71 This calculation is based on the estimated coefficients of publicinv and publicinv * 
pol in Column (2).  
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These growth regressions also demonstrate another interesting contrast 
between the two groups of countries. The coefficient of initial GDP per capita is 
estimated with a high degree of statistical precision (it is significant at the one percent 
level) and has a negative sign, in line with the neoclassical theories of growth, for both 
groups of countries. However, the magnitude of the coefficient is significantly higher 
for democratic countries72, suggesting that there is greater conditional convergence 
amongst this group. The coefficient for investment is also estimated at a high level of 
significance for both groups, however it does not statistically differ across the two 
groups at the ten percent level. 
When publicinv2 (public investment in fixed capital as a proportion of GDP) is 
used as the measure of public investment, the regression results remain qualitatively 
the same, and in fact become slightly stronger in terms of statistical precision: 
compare Table 4.A4 with Table 4.3, and Table 4.A6 with Table 4.4. Columns (1) and (2) 
of Table 4.A4 indicate that publicinv2 is negatively associated with growth even for the 
entire sample.73 An increase of 1 percentage point in publicinv2 is associated with a 
reduction of slightly less than 0.1 percent in the average rate of growth. A similar result 
is not portrayed in Column (3), most likely because the time coverage of the 
regressions that include corr is relatively curtailed. The p-value of the Chow test 
statistic supports estimating Equations (4.3) and (4.4) separately for the sample of 
autocratic and democratic countries. Table 4.A5 reports the results after the sample 
                                                             
72 The coefficients do not overlap within one standard error band. 
73 Recall that publicinv was not found to be negatively associated with growth in Table 
4.3 
180 
 
splitting. In line with the results in Table 4.4, public investment is adversely associated 
with growth only in autocratic countries at a high level of statistical significance (five 
percent level). Also similar to previously, an increase in political openness mitigates the 
negative impact. However, now there is a strong evidence of convergence only 
amongst democratic countries, and not amongst autocratic countries.74 
Finally I report the system GMM results for the regression of Equation (4.3) 
using a five yearly panel (observations occurring every five years rather than 
annually).75 The estimated coefficient of public investment now represents the strict 
causal impact of public investment on growth. Table 4.5 reports the results for the 
entire sample (in Column 1), as well as the sample of autocratic countries (Column 2) 
and democratic countries (Column 3), with publicinv as the measure of public 
investment. Table 4.A6 instead reports the regression results using publicinv2 as the 
measure of public investment. The diagnostics indicate that the equation has been 
adequately estimated. The p-value of the Hansen test for over-identifying restrictions 
shows that we cannot reject the null hypothesis pertaining to the validity of the 
instrument set at the ten percent level of significance. Also, the estimation does not 
likely suffer from an over-fitting bias (caused by over-instrumentation) as the p-value 
associated with the test statistic is not unrealistically high (Roodman 2009b). The p-
value of the AR(2) test indicates that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no second 
                                                             
74 In fact the estimated coefficients of initial GDP per capita across the two set of 
countries do not overlap within two standard error bands. 
75 As discussed in Section 4.5, I do not estimate Equations (4.4) and (4.5) using this 
technique because of the instrument proliferation and weak diagnostics that result 
from the additional variables in the specification. 
181 
 
order serial correlation, which is a necessary assumption for consistent estimation 
using system GMM.  
 
Table 4.5. System GMM Results for Growtht 
(using Public Investment as a proportion of Total Investment in Fixed Capital as the 
explanatory variable) 
 
 
 Entire                    
Sample 
Autocratic 
Countries 
Democratic 
Countries 
 
Independent  
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
log(ypc)t-5 -1.088*** 
(0.427) 
-1.330** 
(0.531) 
-0.223 
(0.438) 
invt-5 0.206*** 
(0.054) 
0.239*** 
(0.062) 
0.205*** 
(0.061) 
popt-5 -1.772*** 
(0.338) 
-1.152*** 
(0.293) 
-1.017*** 
(0.319) 
publicinvt-5 -0.031** 
(0.015) 
-0.048*** 
(0.017) 
0.004 
(0.029) 
Countries 109 63 79 
Observations 464 204 260 
Chow Test  0.000   
T.E Included Yes Yes Yes 
Instruments 77 75 72 
Hansen J Test p-
value 
0.293 0.715 0.632 
AR(2) Test p-value 0.696 0.299 0.320 
Wald chi-sq 
statistic 
91.34 81.17 171.71 
Wald chi-sq p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Notes: A constant is included in all regressions but not reported. Observations of the 
dependent variable at five year intervals are used from 1970-2010, thus the number 
of time periods in the panel is equal to nine. The dependent variable is the average 
of growth rate from t-4 to t. All explanatory variables are treated as endogenous and 
instrumented by 1 lag. Windmeijer-Corrected robust standard errors from the two-
step GMM estimation are shown in parenthesis. Orthogonal forward deviations are 
used to purge fixed effects. TE refers to the set of time dummies. The statistic 
reported for the Chow Test is the p-value of the F statistic testing the null hypothesis 
that the set of estimated coefficients for the sample of autocratic countries is 
statistically the same as that of the sample of democratic countries.  
*Significant at the 10% level                                                                                                                            
**Significant at the 5% level                                                                                                                  
***Significant at the 1% level 
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The results presented in Table 4.5 are consistent with the fixed effects 
regressions results. The estimated impact of publicinv on growth is negative for the 
entire sample at a high level of statistical significance (one percent level). However the 
p-value of the Chow test indicates that a significant improvement in fit is achieved 
through sample splitting. Once the sample is split, it is found that publicinv has a 
negative impact on growth at a level of reasonable statistical significance only for the 
sample of autocratic countries.76 In autocratic countries, an increase in publicinv by 
one percentage point reduces the average rate of growth by almost 0.05 percent. 
Similarly when publicinv2 is used as the measure of public investment as reported in 
Table 4.A6, the Chow test again supports estimating the equation separately for the 
two sets of countries, and the results show that public investment impacts growth 
negatively only in autocratic countries.77 Column (2) of the table indicates that an 
increase of one percentage point in publicinv2 curtails average growth by 0.3 percent. 
In contrast to the fixed effects regression results reported previously, the 
estimated coefficients of initial GDP per capita in both the tables (Table 4.5 and Table 
4.A6) suggest that convergence occurs in autocratic countries rather than the 
democraticgroup of countries 78 — the system GMM regression technique is 
preferable to fixed effects on the grounds discussed in Section 4.5. These results also 
                                                             
76 The estimated coefficients of publicinv across the two samples do not overlap within 
one standard error band. 
77 Moreover, now the estimated coefficients of publicinv2 across the two samples do 
not overlap within two standard error bands i.e. we can reject the null that the 
coefficients are equal to each other at the five percent level of significance. 
78 The coefficients do not overlap within one standard error band. 
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provide evidence that the population growth rate adversely affects growth in both 
samples of countries, and the magnitude of the impact is similar.79 The fixed effects 
regression results only estimate the association of investment (and not population 
growth) with growth of GDP per capita with precision.  
 
4.8 Conclusion 
This chapter is an empirical investigation into the implications of institutional quality 
for both the relative size as well as the growth impact of public investment in fixed 
capital in developing countries. The chapter examines the proposition that corruption 
influences public sector investment, for which there already exists anecdotal and 
empirical evidence. The innovation of the empirical analysis is that it incorporates 
political economy considerations based on theoretical works from a ‘public choice’ 
literature (Mohtadi and Roe 2003, Plumper and Martin 2003, Hausken et al 2004, 
Deacon 2009). Based on these works it is hypothesized that the impact of corruption 
on the relative size of public investment depends on the openness of the political 
regime. Furthermore, the relationship between corruption and public investment, and 
subsequently the growth impact of public investment, is fundamentally different 
across autocratic and democratic regimes.  
 The empirical analysis, which is based on a panel dataset of developing 
countries, yields some interesting results. The first main finding is that a lowering of 
corruption is associated with a reduction in public investment only in autocratic 
                                                             
79 The coefficients overlap within one standard error band.  
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countries. Moreover, corruption affects public investment within autocratic countries 
only when it is considered as a function of political openness. The evidence does not 
suggest any link between corruption and public investment in democratic countries. 
The results are not driven by the overall size of the public sector, but pertain 
specifically to investment in fixed capital. With government consumption expenditure 
as the dependent variable, there is no evidence of such relationships. This supports the 
proposition that it is public funds meant for infrastructure development and state 
owned enterprises which are most vulnerable to rent-seeking activities, rather than 
the operating and maintenance expenditure of a government. 
 The second main finding, which is consistent with the first set of results, is that 
the relative size of public investment in fixed capital is negatively associated with the 
growth of GDP per capita only in autocratic countries. Moreover, within autocratic 
countries the negative impact of public investment on growth is mitigated by 
increasing political openness. The evidence presented has important implications. The 
results suggest that in autocratic countries, enlarging the share of public sector 
investment in fixed capital is not good for growth prospects. The lack of political 
openness leads to corruption and rent-seeking in public spending, and hence sub-
optimal public investment. The findings should not be interpreted to mean that 
corruption does not exist in democratic countries, but only that rent seeking does not 
affect the size and productivity of public investment. This is consistent with the 
theoretical models of public choice which predict that democratic regimes are only 
able to secure popular support and ensure political survival through provision of public 
185 
 
goods, and not direct transfers (Plumper and Martin 2003, Hausken et al 2004 and 
Deacon (2009). 
  While this chapter focused specifically on public investment, the study is a 
subset of a vast empirical literature on the growth impact of overall public spending 
and also its composition,80 the growth impact of institutions,81  and finally also the 
institutional determinants of patterns of public spending82. Further empirical research 
could perhaps investigate the role of political economy considerations in directing 
public investment at a more disaggregated level of classification (by functionality). Are 
certain types of public investment more susceptible to corruption and political 
considerations? The data required for such an analysis was not available for this study, 
but nevertheless it is a potentially fruitful future endeavor. In particular, it would be 
worthwhile identifying a better measure than public sector gross fixed capital 
formation to proxy for investment in physical infrastructure in a large enough cross-
section of countries. 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
80 For example, Krueger and Orsmond (1990), Barro ( 1989, 1991), Hansson and 
Henrekson (1994), 
81 For example, Mauro (1995), Barro (1996), Acemoglu et al (2001), Rodrik et al (2004) 
82 For example, Mauro (1998), Gupta et al (2001), Mulligan et al (2004) 
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Appendix 4 
 
Table 4.A1. Descriptive Statistics (Entire Sample) 
 
 
Variable 
 
Mean Minimum Maximum Countries Observations 
 
Growth 
(Annual) 
1.88 
(6.06) 
-47.29 65.69 113 2626 
Publicinv 35.59 
(19.32 
0.84 98.59 113 2637 
Publicinv2 7.19 
(4.66) 
0.10 42.98 113 2637 
Govcons 14.78 
(6.50) 
2.05 69.54 112 2618 
Corr 2.53 
(0.96) 
0 6 89 1677 
Pol 0.43 
(6.69) 
-10 10 113 2637 
Ypc 3867 
(4854) 
180 65879 111 2618 
Inv 22.25 
(8.98) 
1.76 91.59 113 2635 
Pop 2.04 
(1.36) 
-7.53 14.78 113 2637 
Ind 29.69 
(12.68) 
4.22 95.70 113 2462 
Open 72.55 
(39.06) 
6.09 280.36 113 2633 
Urban 41.44 
(19.76) 
3.11 93.03 112 2635 
 
Note: Standard Deviations are reported in parentheses.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
187 
 
Table 4.A2. Descriptive Statistics (Autocratic Countries) 
 
 
Variable Mean Minimum Maximum Countries Observations 
 
Growth 
(Annual) 
1.60 
(7.10) 
-47.29 65.69 83 1329 
Publicinv 39.54 
(20.90) 
0.84 98.59 83 1337 
Publicinv2 8.02 
(5.47) 
0.10 42.98 83 1337 
Govcons 15.15 
(6.92) 
2.05 69.54 82 1323 
Corr 2.39 
(0.99) 
0 4 56 716 
Pol -5.67 
(2.71) 
-10 0 83 1337 
Ypc 3478 
(5913) 
180 65879 82 1326 
Inv 22.23 
(10.21) 
1.76 91.59 83 1335 
Pop 2.41 
(1.42) 
-7.53 14.78 83 1337 
Ind 30.77 
(15.00) 
4.25 95.70 79 1251 
Open 69.54 
(37.85) 
6.09 275.23 83 1337 
Urban 38.15 
(18.86) 
3.11 93.03 83 1337 
 
Note: Standard Deviations are reported in parentheses.  
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4.A3.Descriptive Statistics (Democratic Countries) 
 
 
Variable Mean Minimum Maximum Countries Observations 
 
Growth 
(Annual) 
2.17 
(4.75) 
-33.75 21.76 84 1297 
Publicinv 31.53 
(16.60) 
3.53 96.19 84 1300 
Publicinv2 6.34 
(3.45) 
0.70 23.22 84 1300 
Govcons 14.39 
(6.03) 
3.46 54.52 84 1295 
Corr 2.62 
(0.92) 
0 6 67 961 
Pol 6.71 
(2.33) 
0 10 84 1300 
Ypc 4266 
(3400) 
182 19908 83 1292 
Inv 22.28 
(7.52) 
2.17 76.70 84 1300 
Pop 1.66 
(1.17) 
-2.85 5.08 84 1300 
Ind 28.63 
(9.82) 
4.22 65.53 83 1211 
Open 75.65 
(40.04) 
7.53 280.36 84 1296 
Urban 44.82 
(20.11) 
8.53 92.75 83 1298 
 
Note: Standard Deviations are reported in parentheses.  
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Table 4.A4. Fixed Effects Regression Results  for Annual Growtht (Entire Sample) 
(using Public Investment as a proportion of GDP as the explanatory variable) 
 
 
Independent 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
log(ypc)t-5 -3.450*** 
(0.873) 
-3.249*** 
(0.890) 
-6.033*** 
(1.098) 
invt-5 0.213*** 
(0.033) 
0.211*** 
(0.033) 
0.191*** 
(0.043) 
popt-5 0.033 
(0.134) 
0.056 
(0.125) 
0.067 
(0.242) 
Publicinv2t-5 -0.082* 
(0.044) 
-0.071* 
(0.041) 
-0.037 
(0.067) 
polt-5  -0.016 
(0.042) 
 
(publicinv2 * pol)t-5  0.000 
(0.001) 
 
corrt-5   0.090 
(0.305) 
(publicinv2 * cor)t-5   -0.000 
(0.005) 
Countries 109 107 85 
Observations 2233 2214 1323 
Chow Test  0.055 0.094 0.143 
‘α4 =0, α5 = 0, α6=0’  0.247 0.909 
‘α 4=0, α6= 0’  0.218 0.765 
‘α5 =0, α6 = 0’  0.932 0.942 
T.E Included Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.634 0.636 0.697 
R2(within) 0.350 0.350 0.403 
R2(between) 0.029 0.025 0.008 
Notes: A constant is included in all regressions but not reported. Annual observations of the 
dependent variable are used from 1970-2011 in Columns (1) and (2), and from 1990-2011 in 
Column (3). The dependent variable is a moving average of the growth rate from year t-4 to 
t. The explanatory variables are lagged by five years. Robust standard errors clustered by 
countries are reported in parentheses. TE refers to the set of time dummies. The statistic 
reported for the Chow Test is the p-value of the F statistic testing the null hypothesis that 
the set of estimated coefficients for the sample of autocratic countries is statistically the 
same as that for the sample of democratic countries. α4 is the coefficient of publicinv, α5 is 
the coefficient of pol in Column (2) and corr in Column (3), and α6 is the coefficient of the 
interaction variable — the statistics reported for the joint significance of coefficients is the 
p-value of the F statistic. The R2 refers to the coefficient of determination from estimation of 
the equivalent Least Squares Dummy Variable Model (LSDV).                                                                                                                                                  
*Significant at the 10% level                                                                                                                           
**Significant at the 5% level                                                                                                                  
***Significant at the 1% level 
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Table 4.A5. Fixed Effects Regression Results  for Annual Growtht 
(using Public Investment as a proportion of GDP as the explanatory variable) 
 
 
 Autocratic Countries 
 
Democratic Countries 
Independent 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
log(ypc)t-5 -1.847 
(1.316) 
-1.902 
(1.267) 
-6.372*** 
(0.943) 
-6.479*** 
(0.971) 
invt-5 0.264*** 
(0.042) 
0.252*** 
(0.043) 
0.155*** 
(0.045) 
0.150*** 
(0.046) 
popt-5 0.068 
(0.131) 
0.088 
(0.123) 
-0.048 
(0.237) 
-0.011 
(0.227) 
publicinv2t-5 -0.189*** 
(0.059) 
-0.136** 
(0.063) 
-0.018 
(0.057) 
-0.006 
(0.060) 
polt-5  -0.102 
(0.063) 
 0.049 
(0.062) 
(publicinv2 * 
pol)t-5 
 0.003** 
(0.001) 
 -0.001 
(0.001) 
Countries 75 75 81 79 
Observations 1033 1031 1200 1183 
‘α4 =0, α5 = 0, 
α6=0’ 
 0.008  0.639 
‘α 4=0, α6= 0’  0.003  0.484 
‘α5 =0, α6 = 0’  0.132  0.591 
T.E Included Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.695 0.701 0.697 0.697 
R2(within) 0.387 0.392 0.466 0.468 
R2(between) 0.325 0.295 0.047 0.047 
Notes: A constant is included in all regressions but not reported. Annual observations of the 
dependent variable are used from 1970-2011 in Columns (1) and (2), and from 1990-2011 in 
Column (3). The dependent variable is a moving average of the growth rate from year t-4 to 
t. The explanatory variables are lagged by three years. Robust standard errors clustered by 
countries are reported in parentheses. TE refers to the set of time dummies. α4 is the 
coefficient of publicinv, α5 is the coefficient of pol , and α6 is the coefficient of the interaction 
variable — the statistics reported for the test of joint significance of coefficients is the p-
value of the F statistic. The R2 refers to the coefficient of determination from estimation of 
the equivalent Least Squares Dummy Variable Model (LSDV).                                                                                                                                                 
*Significant at the 10% level                                                                                                                            
**Significant at the 5% level                                                                                                                  
***Significant at the 1% level 
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Table 4.A6. System GMM Results for Growtht                                                                                             
(using Public Investment as a proportion of GDP as the explanatory variable) 
 
 
 Entire                     
Sample 
Autocratic 
Countries 
Democratic 
Countries 
 
Independent 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
log(ypc)t-5 -0.929** 
(0.438) 
-1.262*** 
(0.438) 
-0.440 
(0.334) 
invt-5 0.233*** 
(0.061) 
0.317*** 
(0.071) 
0.202*** 
(0.049) 
popt-5 -1.734*** 
(0.345) 
-1.084*** 
(0.294) 
-1.178*** 
(0.291) 
Publicinv2t-5 -0.160*** 
(0.061) 
-0.266*** 
(0.072) 
-0.044 
(0.085) 
Countries 109 63 79 
Observations 464 204 260 
Chow Test  0.003   
T.E Included Yes Yes Yes 
Instruments 77 75 72 
Hansen J Test p-
value 
0.351 0.167 0.423 
AR(2) Test p-value 0.799 0.754 0.841 
Wald chi-sq statistic 80.09 111.61 145.30 
Wald chi-sq p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Notes: A constant is included in all regressions but not reported. Observations of the 
dependent variable at five year intervals are used from 1970-2010, thus the number 
of time periods in the panel is equal to nine. The dependent variable is the average 
of growth rate from t-4 to t. All explanatory variables are treated as endogenous and 
instrumented by 1 lag. Windmeijer-Corrected Robust standard errors from the two-
step GMM estimation are shown in parenthesis. Orthogonal forward deviations are 
used to purge fixed effects. TE refers to the set of time dummies. The statistic 
reported for the Chow Test is the p-value of the F statistic testing the null hypothesis 
that the set of estimated coefficients for the sample of autocratic countries is 
statistically the same as that for the sample of democratic countries.  
*Significant at the 10% level                                                                                                                          
**Significant at the 5% level                                                                                                                  
***Significant at the 1% level 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
 
This thesis contributes to the literature on institutions and economic performance. 
Following a stage-setting introductory chapter, which places the thesis within the 
context of the related literature, Chapters 2 and 3 explored the endogeneity of 
institutional quality to economic policy variables. Chapter 4 then examined the 
implications of institutional quality for public investment in fixed capital, which is an 
important tool of public policy.  
The importance of institutional quality for economic growth is now well 
established. However, a large part of the literature attributes the development of 
political and economic institutions to long-run factors such as historical experience, 
geography, culture and so on. In fact the central thesis of one of the most talked about 
books to emerge from the development literature in recent times, Why Nations Fail 
(Acemoglu et al 2012), is that institutions are a product of the long run historical 
experience of societies. At certain ‘critical junctures’ the development of institutions 
diverged across nations, as a result of unique circumstances. The Western world and 
its offshoots were fortunate enough to develop inclusive institutions which facilitated 
extensive investment and entrepreneurship resulting in prosperity. The rest of the 
world was unable to develop in the same way because it was held back by extractive 
institutions, which concentrated power in the hands of narrow groups and discouraged 
widespread participation in economic activity. Once a certain path of institutional 
development was set in motion, societies embarked on very different paths of 
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development because of institutional persistence. This view predicts a bleak picture for 
the prospects of poor countries to develop, and suggests that institutions are destiny. 
Even though long run historical experience may be extremely significant, this 
thesis took the view that institutional quality can improve through policy action even 
over relatively shorter periods of time. It agrees with the insight that institutions 
cannot simply be transplanted into the developing world, and institutional change has 
to come from within countries (e.g. Lin 2009, Leftwich and Sen 2011). North (1990) 
describes institutional change as incremental, and a consequence of the maximizing 
activity of various players in society. If government policy can shift the distribution of 
resources in such a way as to strengthen the constituency for reform, and those with 
an interest in wealth creation, sustainable institutional improvement may be possible 
in the poor countries of the world. 
The empirical evidence presented in Chapters 2 and 3 is consistent with the 
optimistic view. The long run historical experience that led to the development of 
inclusive political and economic institutions in the Western world could be replicated 
in the contemporary world if the appropriate policy action is taken. A contemporary 
rather than historical focus is achieved in this thesis through the use of recent and 
relatively short time coverage for the empirical analysis, and through the consideration 
of explanatory variables that are immediately in the hands of political makers. 
The empirical investigation carried out in Chapter 2 suggests that if a 
government relies on taxation in order to fulfill its fiscal needs, then democratization 
may be possible. This link is more pronounced for poorer countries. On the other hand, 
revenue from natural resources is harmful for political openness. This finding has an 
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important policy implication for the new African resource producers such as Ghana, 
Kenya, Mozambique and Tanzania. These countries have well-developed systems for 
tax collection, but now have a choice of fulfilling their fiscal needs through natural 
resource rents. The findings of this chapter suggest that these countries could hamper 
the progress of their nascent democracies by replacing taxation with natural resource 
rents as the main source of revenue. The findings also have policy implications for 
international lenders and donor agencies, and the richer countries of the world. These 
actors should incorporate an encouragement of domestic taxation into their agendas 
for assistance of developing countries. These actors might also have an influence over 
the international markets for natural resources, and should press poorer countries, 
especially the new resource producers, to rely less on natural resource rents to directly 
fulfill their fiscal needs. They should advocate creative proposals such as those that 
suggest redistribution of resource rents to citizens, and then subsequent taxation of 
the citizens by the government (Devarajan et al 2010).   
The findings from Chapter 3 suggest that increased trade intensity (i.e. trade to 
GDP ratio) following the liberalization of trade policy regime is beneficial for economic 
institutions; it leads to a decrease in corruption and an improvement in the quality of 
the bureaucracy. Un-liberalized trade on the other hand is detrimental for institutional 
quality. This link is stronger for exports compared to imports. For exporters of natural 
resources in particular, the evidence suggests that a liberalization of trade policy is 
critical. In the presence of an interventionist trade regime, exporting natural resources 
has an extremely harmful impact on institutional quality; this negative impact, 
however, is mitigated by liberalization. The investigation was premised on an essential 
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insight of the ‘rent-seeking’ literature which points out that any government-imposed 
restriction on economic activity has adverse consequences for institutional quality. 
The findings of Chapter 3 present important policy recommendations as well. It 
has already been recognized by the mainstream trade and development literature that 
import substitution policies are counterproductive (Krueger 1980, 1990a, 1997 and 
various other studies). However, even for countries that aim to follow an export 
promoting development strategy it is important that government-imposed distortions 
be removed. While export growth is inherently considered ‘better’ than import growth 
due to balance of payment and employment generation considerations, the evidence 
in Chapter 3 suggests that rent-seeking activities which negatively impact institutional 
quality operate much more vigorously on the export side.  
  Chapter 4 investigated the reverse question, the impact of political openness 
and corruption (a symptom of poor economic institutions) on the size and productivity 
of public investment in fixed capital, which proxies for infrastructure. Thus, whereas 
the first two core chapters explored the effect of economic policy variables on 
institutional quality, the final core chapter examined how the interaction of political 
and economic institutions influences an important tool of economic policy. The 
evidence from this chapter suggests that the political economy considerations that 
drive public investment operate differently across autocratic and democratic regimes. 
It is found that public investment in fixed capital is positively associated with 
corruption, only in countries with autocratic regimes. Furthermore, results also 
indicate that the growth impact of public investment in fixed capital is negative in 
autocratic countries; the negative impact, however, is mitigated by increased political 
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openness. The findings point to the relevance of sub-optimal decision making in 
autocratic countries.  
The empirical strategy in all the papers involved addressing establishing a 
causal relationship between the explanatory and the dependent variables by 
addressing endogeneity issues, through estimation by the system Generalized Method 
of Moments technique (SGMM). This technique is an important convenience as it 
generates a set of internal instruments consisting of the appropriate number of lagged 
level and first differences of the explanatory variables. However, SGMM technique is 
often criticized for its sensitivity to the choice of lags (e.g. Acemoglu et al 2013). But 
the empirical analysis of the thesis does not solely rely on the SGMM estimator; it is 
used to supplement the fixed effects regression technique. In all three core chapters 
the SGMM results are broadly similar to the fixed effects results, indicating that the 
estimated relationships are not driven by the choice of a particular estimation 
technique. 
 The alternative strategy of identifying an exogenous external instrument is 
very difficult in practice, even harder is to argue convincingly for its validity. However, 
a convincing external instrument potentially provides a greater insight into the 
mechanism at work. It helps develop the broad contours of a theory. For example the 
theory of institutional change proposed by Acemoglu et al (2005d, 2012) is based on 
the instrument for institutional quality they identified in an earlier paper (2001). They 
argued that the mortality rate of colonial European settlers is highly correlated with 
the quality of current institutions, but do not affect contemporary economic 
performance through any other channel. This provided an explanation for the origins 
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and development of institutions based on historical experience. For example with 
reference to Chapter 2 in this thesis, if an external instrument can be identified and 
this variable is more easily influenced than the fiscal policy of countries, this could help 
develop a more practical theory of how to promote democracy. The lack of any 
external identification strategy is perhaps a shortcoming of the empirical approach 
employed in this thesis, but does suggest directions for future research. 
Another potential limitation of the thesis is the sole reliance on cross-national 
investigations. Such studies provide evidence for the average statistical relationship 
between variables of interest across and within countries. However, it is a worthwhile 
as a future research agenda to carry out more nuanced comparative studies of 
countries following the direction suggested by the cross-national evidence. This could 
help identify with more clarity and in more detail the mechanisms at work. 
Finally, there is room for improvement relating to the measures of institutional 
quality used. This thesis has made a broad distinction between political and economic 
institutions. However, there are possibly even more nuanced classifications of 
institutions. For instance, this thesis did not consider the role of informal institutions, 
which are based on cultural norms and traditions and are distinct from formal 
institutions (North 1990, Roland 2004). Informal institutions likely play a critical role in 
early stages of development, and specifically in enabling initial growth accelerations 
(Sen 2013). Moreover, even the measures for the quality of formal political and 
economic institutions considered in this thesis are highly aggregate. Some previous 
studies have attempted to ‘unbundle’ institutional quality through classifications based 
on functionality (Rodrik 2005, Acemoglu et al 2005c, Sen 2013). Given the focus of this 
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thesis, it was not necessary to distinguish further between different facets of 
institutional quality. However, as a future direction of research it could perhaps be 
useful, in terms of understanding the link between economic policy and institutional 
quality, to take a more nuanced view of institutions. Since this is initially difficult in the 
context of cross-national investigations, there is a need for detailed comparative 
country studies.  
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